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n It is the Hermit Crab, I remember from a book, that 
as it grows migrates from one empty shell to 
another ... Whose shell I presently skulk in does not 
matter, it is the shell of a dead creature. What 
matters is that my anxious softbodied self should have 
a refuge from the predators of the deep." (In The Heart 
of the Country, by J .H. Coetzee) 
.. 
• . .. all creation is really a re-creation of a once 
loved and once whole, but now lost and ruined object, a 
ruined internal world and self. It is when the world 
within us is destroyed, when it is dead and loveless, 
when our loved ones are in fragments, and we ourselves 
in helpless despair - it is then that we must re-create 
our world anew, reassemble the pieces, infuse life into 
dead fragments, re-create life." (Hanna Segal) 
ABSTRACT 
The case-study method of psychological research was applied to 
the brief psychodynamic therapy of a narcissistically disordered 
female patient. The aim of this research was to explore, clarify 
and explain certain diagnostic and psychodynamic anomalies to 
emerge in the course of treatment, using a conceptual framework 
derived from select psychoanalytic object relations theorists in 
the area of narcissistic pathology. The author, discovering that 
there was no diagnostic or explanatory object relations model 
adequate to the therapeutic data, formulated his own diagnostic 
category narcissistic neurosis and an eclectic object 
relations model in order to explain the anomolous research 
findings. Narcissistic neurosis was defined as a form of 
psychopatholgy in which a primarily neurotic character structure 
presents with a distinctly narcissistic profile . The narcissistic 
false self structure serves the functional purpose of protecting 
the psyche from a repressed negative self-representation derived 
from a destructive bipolar self-object introject. The primary 
etiological factor to emerge was that of a narcissistic mother 
conditional affection and selfobject 
target child necessitated adaptive 
whose insensitivity, 
relationship with the 
premature self -sufficiency and the defensive emergence of a 
narcissistic surface self-representation . It was proposed that 
narcissistic neurosi s and narcissistic personality disorder are 
two discrete forms of pathology differing in terms of severity, 
psychodynamics, defensive structure, mode of object relating, 
therapeutic accessibility and prognosis. Assessment criteria were 
proposed in order to differentiate the two areas of narcissistic 
pathology and assess suitability for psychotherapeutic treatment. 
Positive treatment results in this case-study suggest that 
narcissistic neuroses may receive long-term benefit from short-
term psychodynamic therapy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Pathological narcissism is not a new concept. The term itself 
derives from our Wes t ern mythological heritage, in Ovid's famous 
tale of the beautiful Greek youth who spurns the love of others 
only to languish and die beside a pool (see appendix one), 
besotted with his own reflected image. The popularity of this 
myth and its various reworkings over the centuries testifies to 
its archetypal significance and insight into the human condition . 
The Narcissus myth thus refers to a transhistorical and universal 
aspect of human experience . However, we are faced with the 
curious anomaly that narcissism as a clinical entity has only 
relatively recently emerged as the controversial focus of the 
international psychological community . It is common knowledge 
that pathological narcissism, previously considered s omething of 
a clinical rarity, is being diagnosed and treated with increasing 
frequency by clinicians today. Carrilio, quoted in Russell (1985) 
,. 
notes that: 
" ... mental health professionals have been increasingly 
confronted with individuals who do not fit into 
traditional categories. They manifest a range of 
impulsive behaviour, feelings of emptiness, iso lation, 
alienation and rootlessness, which may be seen as 
manifestations of narcissism." 
One way of accounting for this is simply to attribute this 
increasing diagnostic incidence to more refined and sophisticated 
assessment procedures and psychodynamic formulations. It could 
thus be argued that the only reason we see more narcissists today 
is because, thanks to the current popularity of the concept in 
books and journals, we are more attuned to its manifestations 
than were previous generations of clinicians. 
However, a more popular but diametrically opposed perspective 
2 
contends that our recently acquired knowledge of narcissism is a 
direct consequence of its increasing prevalence. We diagnose more 
narcissism today, not because we are thus conceptually 
predisposed, but rather because it is assuming the proportions of 
a cultural epidemic. More specifically, narcissism is a 
historically specific pathological expression of a unique 
configuration of sociological forces operant at this historical 
I juncture in late capitalist society. The most articulate 
spokesperson for this sociological approach is the celebrated 
historian Christopher Lasch who, in his bestselling book The 
Culture of Narcissism, argues 
" New social forms require new forms of personality , 
new modes of socialization, new ways of organizing 
experience. The concept of narcissism provides 
us ... with a way of understanding the psychological 
impact of recent social changes .. . Narcissism appears 
realistically to represent the 
best way of coping with the tensions and anxieties of modern 
life, and the prevailing social conditions therefore tend to 
bring out narcissistic traits that are present, in varying 
degrees, in everyone." (Lasch 1979 pg 50) , 
Lasch vigorously argues that cultural narcissism is the modern 
day product of late capitalism's erosion of family authority, 
commodification of need and bureaucratization of increasingly 
large areas of human life. This is not the place to examine 
Lasch's argument. However, it is interesting to note the 
conceptual blend of neo-marxist critical social theory and 
Klein/Kernberg object relations theory that he employs in his 
analysis, an approach further developed by Richards (1984). Nor 
is the cultural epidemiological approach to narcissism the sole 
preserve of neo-marxists. Existentialists (Muller, 1987; 
Levin,1987) and even the occasional Jungian (Satinover,1987) are 
following Lasch e t al to argue that narcissism is a modern 
cultural artifact. 
I 
I 
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While I would endorse Lasch's claim that "every age develops its 
own peculiar forms of pathology, which express in exaggerated 
form its underlying character structure" (1979 pg 41), I will not 
pursue this point any further. 
attempt to- illustrate the 
psychodynamics of narcissistic 
This case study, rather, is an 
phenomenology, structure and 
pathology as evidenced in the 
process of short-term therapy with a remarkable young woman. It 
is intended as a modest contribution to the existing clinical 
material on the subject. 
Whether or not we embrace the epidemiological argument, the fact 
remains that fewer and fewer patients are presenting with a 
clear-cut neurotic profile. More typical is a mixed picture in 
which personality disorder traits are present, even in the 
absence of the unambiguous symptomatology necessary to satisfy 
the stringent DSM-3 criteria for specific personality disorder 
diagnoses. In fact, those of us who work within a broadly depth 
psychology framework tend to rely increasingly on the quality of 
, 
contact with our patients and our countertransference feelings as 
more useful diagnostic indicators than the traditional 
psychia tric symptom check list. And interes tingly , it is 
borderline and narcissistic rather than other personality 
disorder 
to both 
traits that appear to be more 
of these pathologies is an 
prevalent. What is common 
identity disturbance or 
disorder of selfhood in which the person's self-experience is 
commonly described by words such as empty, hollow, superficial, 
fraudulent, inauthentic, lifeless, unreal, alienated and 
disembodied. What specifically identifies narcissistic character 
pathology is a rigid surface shell of self-reliance, confidence, 
self-preoccupation and interpersonal shallowness/aloofness which 
hides a deficient sense of selfhood manifest as vulnerability, 
hollowness, inadequacy, envy and an ambivalent need for and fear 
of intimate relatedness with others. In spite of this well-
documented profile diagnostic and therapeutic dilemmas abound. 
In spite of the many articles on narcissism flooding the journals 
I 
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it remains a poorly understood and relatively uncharted 
territory. It has replaced its cousin, the borderline 
personality, as the most controversial and hotly debated area in 
contemporary psychoanalytic thought. Pulver, quoted in Fine 
(1986) says: 
" In the voluminous literature on narcissism, there are 
probably only two facts on which everyone agrees, first 
that the concept of narcissism is one of the most 
important contributions of psychoanalysis, second that 
it is one of the most confusing" (pg 53) 
The two theoretical giants in the field of narcissistic 
pathology, Kernberg and Kohut, although both psychoanalysts, have 
argued from largely incommensurate metapsychological paradigms 
that echo a much earlier conceptual schism between their 
respective forebears, Klein and Fairbairn. The result has been a 
lot of heat and dust but little prospect of a completely unified 
theory of narcissism. This case study will avoid the finer points 
of the metapsychological controversies, except i,nsofar as they 
have an immediate bearing on my work with this patient. However, 
my theoretical perspective is largely informed by the object 
relations tradition in psychoanalysis, particularly the work of 
Mahler, 
adopted 
Kernberg, Balint, Winnicott, Guntrip and Kohut. I have 
this perspective primarily because for over four decades 
it has contributed more than any other conceptual approach to the 
systematic understanding and treatment of character pathology in 
general and narcissistic pathology in particular. Although I will 
present a more detailed discussion of object relations theory in 
chapter two I propose the following working definition of this 
approach: " A psychoanalytic developmental account of how primary 
interpersonal relationships in the infant's external world become 
internalized, represented and metabolized at the level of 
phantasy into a nuclear core of personal identity which, whether 
heal thy or def icient, determines subsequent personality 
development and deformation. 
I 
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Although psychoanalysts have led the field in this regard a 
significant number of Jungians and post-Jungians are writing 
about narcissism . (Schwart z-Saland 1982) The size and scope of 
this case study, however, precludes any discussion of the 
specific contribution of analytical psychology to the work on 
narcissism. I will confine my literature review to a limited 
cadre of psychoanalytic authors who illuminate facets of 
narcissistic pathology particularly well. 
The outline of this case study is as follows: Chapter two is a 
brief methodological section on the specific use of the case 
study method in this thesis . Chapter three includes a brief 
history of the concept of narcissism in the psychoanalytic 
literature and presents three diagnostic systems currently in 
use. Chapter four is a select literature review of influential 
psychoanalytic authors who have contributed to the field. Chapter 
five contains the case study proper and details the process of 
therapy by briefly examining the highlights of each session and 
the author's interpretation of the emerging material. Chapter six 
is devoted to a discussion of the psychotherapy material and the 
formulation of an explanatory model adequate to the therapy data . 
Chapter seven is the conclusion. 
I , 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CASE-STUDY METHOD 
The case-study method of psychotherapy research is over a century 
old and is historically best exemplified in the work of Freud : .. 
Depth psychology owes its existence to this research method, 
which has undergone little significant change since its 
inception. This chapter thus begins with the assumption that the 
case-study method is a valid and valuable research strategy and 
is not concerned with justifying the latter's existence against 
the methodological critiques of empirical psychology . (This is 
adequately dealt with in the methodological literature e .g. 
Bromley (1986), Bellack and Hersen (1984), Kvale (1986) ). This 
chapter, rather, is simply devoted to a brief description of the 
case-study method and the details of its application in this 
particular case. 
The individual case-study method in psychotherapy research may be 
broadly defined as the ideographic description and interpretation 
of the psychological meaning-events that occur in the 
interpersonal context of a professional relationship devoted to 
the task of helping the patient understand, alleviate or cope 
more adaptively with some form of emotional distress. Although 
ideographic in nature, the research findings may be inductively 
extrapolated and productively applied to the universe of similar 
cases. Each case-study thus functions as a heuristic device, 
generating explanatory hypotheses and research questions 
concerning certain psychological phenomena and so adding 
incrementally to our understanding of those phenomena. 
Kvale (1986) lists the central characteristics of the 
(psychoanalytic) research method as follows: 
1. The focus is on the individual case study. As a consequence 
the therapist "obtains a unique and penetrating knowledge of the 
7.-
relation of the patient's behaviour to his present life situation 
and to his past history, which may again provide a basis for 
understanding the more general conditions of human behaviour". 
(1986 pg 157) 
2. The mode of observation is ideally open i.e. not directed by-
preconceived theories or expectations. The attitude of the 
therapist is ideally that of "a presupposition less listener, the 
therapist should listen with an evenly-hovering attention, 
listening to what comes without engaging in selective hypothesis 
testing". (ibid pg 158) 
3. The focus is on the interpretation of meaning. Any phenomenon 
is open to multiple meanings or levels of meaning. Uncertainty 
and ambiguity are thus intrinsic to meanings and their 
interpretation. The question of the validation of any particular 
interpretation is thus a thorny issue although a number of 
commonly accepted clinical criteria are acknowledged e.g 
deepening of rapport, emotional insight, biographical 
associations, symptom relief etc. 
4. There is emphasis on the historical dimension of the patient's 
experience. As historical beings the meaning of our present 
experience is inextricably related to our biographical past. The 
therapist is thus concerned with understanding present symptoms 
in the context of historically formative past relationships in 
order to help the patient relive pertinent earlier relational 
conflicts and integrate these adaptively into his/her present 
conscious life. 
5. Knowledge emerges in the context of an intimate relationship 
and is thus not neutral or objective. Not only is the patient's 
exper ience of the therapist refracted through the transference 
but the therapist's understanding of the patient is likewise 
filtered through countertransference feelings and fantasies. 
8.-
6. Knowledge is obtained not for its own sake but in order to 
positively influence the life of the patient. 
The above points provide a good description of this type of 
research. More technical rules, procedures and research criteria 
are outlined by Bromley (1986) and included in a seperatc· 
appendix (appendix two) at the end of the case study. The 
methodological procedure I employed was as follows: 
The (neces sarily selective) data was obtained from therapy notes 
written up immediately after each session. (There was no audio 
recording of sessions). These written entries comprised: (a) the 
patient's verbatim and paraphrased communications concerning 
associations, memories, feelings, fantasies, dreams etc., (b) the 
therapist's verbal and unarticulated interpretatio ns and 
emotional responses to the patient's communications, (c) analysis 
of the changing quality of the therapeutic relationship in terms 
of the technical categories of transference and 
' . 
countertransference, (d) theoretically informed speculation on 
the etiological, ge netic and psychodyna mic significance of the 
patient's experience and behaviour, and (e) supervisors' comments 
during supervision sessions. (Owing to the limited number of 
supervision sessions during the course of the therapy this vital 
component of the therapeutic process is not developed as a 
sustained theme in this case-study . Instead, it is simply 
mentioned periodically in very specific contexts) . 
No case study written as an academic exercise can possibly do 
full justice to the experience of the participants in a 
therapeutic relationship. In the actual case-study write-up only 
highlights of each of the twenty sessions were presented. This 
raises the met h odological question of the deliberate (or 
unconscious ) selective presentation of only those data congenia 1 
to the author's argument and conceptual bias. Although largely 
informed by the hermeneutics of object relations theory the 
author has attempted to employ the phenomenological tenet of 
• 
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remaining faithful to the patient's experience rather than to a 
metatheoretical position. The primary question guiding this case-
study is the extent to which object relations theory is adequate 
to the patient's experience, rather than whether the latter can 
be truncated or distorted to fit this theoretical perspective. It 
will be argued, however, that in the context of this particula~ 
case-study the object relations approach offers a rich and 
penetrating, albeit limited, insight into the patient's 
psychological life. The truth uncovered in psychotherapy is 
narrative truth. Narrative truth is not concerned with the 
correspondence between theory and objective fact but rather with 
the extent to which a certain hermeneutic language allows a 
personally meaningful biographical story or healing narrative to 
unfold. Object relations theory, I hope to demonstrate later, 
accesses a rich world of narrative possibility. 
The author makes no apologies for not pursuing alternative 
hermeneutic approaches to the data. The limited scope of this 
project makes such an undertaking impossible. 
A seperate discussion chapter is devoted to a detailed 
interpretation of selected aspects of the therapy data. Even 
though the psychotherapy was short-term not all of the data 
presented in the case study chapter could be discussed in detail. 
The focus naturally falls on those sustained themes and incidents 
which are most alive and have the greatest emotional gravity for 
patient and therapist. This means, however, that the selective 
focus on certain data automatically consigns other material to 
background status. For example, I was struck by the weal th and 
complexity of my patient's dream material, much of which would 
profitably lend itself to extensive archetypal interpretation. My 
focus, however, necessarily precludes this, with the unfortunate 
result that, although I have reported all of her dreams, my 
(partial) interpretation of the latter does not do justice to the 
multiple horizons of meaning contained therein . : 
The authors therapy notes provided the raw material for this case 
I 
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study, which was chosen on the basis of the particular research 
question it invited concerning narcissistic pathology. The 
patient was not informed at the time that she was the focus of 
special interest and my decision to ask her permission to use and 
publish the therapeutic data was made only once the therapy was 
complete. She readily consented to this request. 
L 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF NARCISSISM AND CURRENT 
DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS 
This chapter will briefly survey the origin and development of 
narcissism as a theme in the clinical literature and discuss the 
various diagnostic frameworks that have evolved as a consequence. 
Although narcissistic pathology has been recognized and treated 
by psychoanalysts for over half a century it was only given 
formal recognition by the American psychia tr ic As socia tion in 
1980 when narcissistic personality disorder was introduced as a 
category in its diagnostic manual (DSM-3). 
3.1 Freud's contribution to the theory of narcissism 
The term narcissism was coined in 1898 by the sexologist Havelock 
Ellis who used it to refer to auto-eroticism, a sexual perversion 
in which a person takes his/her own body rather than the body of 
another as a love object. It was in this context that Freud 
introduced the term to psychoanalysis in 1910. However, it was 
Freud's colleague Karl Abraham who had, in 1908,. first commented 
on the narcissistic behaviour of schizophrenics. Abraham 
described the main characteristic of schizophrE?nia as being a 
lack of libidinal obj ect cathexis i. e. the autistic withdrawal 
from external object relations. The libido, theorised Abraham, 
was turned back reflexively on the ego, thus giving rise to the 
familiar autism and megalomania. Thus, although Freud's most 
important contribution on narcissism was written in 1914, the 
concept had already been broached by him with reference to three 
, 
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different phenomena: Firstly, it designated 
when 
a period in infantile 
the undifferentiated development prior to object relating 
psychic apparatus supposedly had no relationship with the 
external -world. Secondly, the term referred to a form of 
"perversion" in which self-stimulation of one's own body replaced 
stimulation by another as the primary sexual aim. Homosexuality 
was also considered a form of narcissism because the homosexual 
object choice was believed to unconsciously mirror the person's 
own body and so love of oneself in the person of the other. 
Thirdly, narcissism referred to the schizophrenic's supposed : I 
withdrawal of libido from external objects and its investment in 
the subject's own ego, resulting in delusions of grandeur. 
In the famous 1914 paper Freud distinguished ego-libido from 
object-libido and stated that "The more of the one is employed, 
the more the other becomes depleted." (pg 76) He also states that 
some narcissistic investment of the ego is essential for 
maintaining self-regard. Implicit here is a fourth meaning of 
narcissism: the healthy libidinal cathexis of the ego resulting 
in high self-esteem and confidence. But when ego-libido occurs at 
the expense of object-libido, pathology results: 
"A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, 
but in the last resort we must begin to love in order 
not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in 
consequence of frustration, we are unable to love." 
(Freud 1914 pg 85) 
Freud never systematically developed the concept of secondary 
narcissism. He did, however, distinguish what he called the 
narcissistic neuroses from the transference neuroses and argued 
that the former patients, because they supposedly withdrew all 
libido cathexes from their objects and transferred this to their 
own egos, could not form transference relationships and hence 
could not be helped by psychoanalysis. 
By noting that " ... the self-regard has a very intimate connection 
, 
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with the narcissistic libido" (1914 pg 98), Freud was hinting at 
a point that others would later develop to become the crux of 
all subsequent psychoanalytic work that defined narcissism as a 
pathological lack of self-esteem defended against by compensatory 
grandiosity. 
I, 
In this same paper he proposes that " ... the aim and the I 
satisfaction in a narcissistic object-choice is to be loved" (pg 
98), thus presaging another important insight from contemporary 
research. 
These insights notwithstanding, Freud's 1914 seminal contribution 
was wedded firmly to his energic metapsychology, a doctrinal 
heritage that hampered rather than facilitated subsequent 
psychoanalytic theory. This position may be summed up in a few 
points: 
1. Firstly, what makes object relationships possible is the 
subject's investment (cathexis) of a quantity of energy (libido) 
in the object. ' I 
2. There is a fixed amount of libido and therefore, in terms of 
the laws of energic economy, the more libido invested in the ego 
the less is available for object cathexis. Narcissists, 
therefore, are incapable of forming relationships with others 
because all of their libido is bound up in ego-cathexis. 
Narcissism and object relations are thus mutually exclusive. 
3. Thirdly, in narcissism, not only is libido unavailable for 
external object relations but it is even withdrawn at the level 
of phantasy: " ... the libido that is liberated by frustration does 
not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but withdraws onto 
the ego." (1914 pg 86) 
4. Because transference is a precondition for analytic cure 
narcisSists, because their libido is inwardly directed, cannot 
I 
I 
I 
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form a workable transference relationship and hence do not 
respond favourably to psychotherapy. 
Today everyone of the above postulates has been largely 
invalidated by contemporary psychoanalytic theorists . 
Firstly, the notion that object relations are initiated in order 
to satisfy instinctual needs for libidinal release has been 
superseded by object relations theory which has, f or the most 
part, rejected the metapsychological primacy of libido theory. 
Object relations are considered to be a motivational end in 
themselves, thus obviating the conceptual need for the 
anachronistic economic premise. 
Secondly, pathological narcissism and object relations are 
certainly not mutually exclusive. Many narcissists, in spite of 
their aloofness and self-sufficiency, often engage in very 
intense interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, even when close 
relationships with other people are absent, narcissists show an 
intense emotional involvement with internal objects. This finding 
does away with FLeud's third postulate that narcissists are 
uninvolved with objects even at the level of phantasy. 
Lastly, extensive 
they are in fact 
relationships and 
psychotherapy. 
therapeutic work with narcissists show that 
capable of extremely powerful transference 
can be helped considerably by long-term 
3.2 Post-Freudian psychoanalytic contributions to the definition 
of narcissistic pathol ogy 
One of the most interesting and important post-Freudian 
conceptual developments in psychoanalysis is the concept of the 
self. While the self was, right from the start, a cardinal 
concept in Jungian thought, it has received remarkably little 
attention from psychoanalysts who, when they mentioned it at all, 
considered ita subsidiary function or aspect of the ego 
'" , 
apparatus. Today, however, it is starting to get the attention it J 
deserves even though the concept has not yet been systematically 
1 5 • 
dealt with at a metapsychological level in psychoanalytic 
theory. - I In terms of narcissistic disorders it becomes 
imperative to address the issue of self for the following reason: 
Narcissistic character pathology is not a thought disorder. In 
other words, even though the narcissist ' s object relations and 
defenses are often extremely primitive, reality testing and other 
ego functions remain intact. Narcissism, therefore, cannot be 
adequately accounted for by reference to distortions in ego 
functioning unless the term ego is stretched elastically to cover 
the totality of human experience , at which point it becomes so 
encompassing and removed from its original usage that it proves 
theoretically useless. However, although narcissism cannot be 
explained in terms of deficient ego functioning it is an identity 
disorder or self-pathology 2 It was thus historically inevitable 
that the concept self should be smuggled into psychoanalysis by 
the ego psychologist Hartmann in 1950. Hartmann distinguished 
between ego (the system of mental functions), self (the 
psychosomatic totality of the person, including all body parts 
and psychic sub-systems) and self-representation unconscious, 
preconscious and conscious representations of the somatic knd 
psychic self-aspects.) Another ego psychologist, Edith Jacobson, 
referred to narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the self-
representation rather than the ego. Although still obviously 
committed to the economic model the shift in focus was important 
and heralded a growing interest in the relationship between ego 
1 This can be seen even in Winnicott ' s work where he 
stubbornly persists in using the term ego, even though he 
uses it to refer to a psychosomatic composite sense of 
identity or self, a radically different meaning from that 
assigned to the concept ego in the topographic model. 
2 I use the term identity disorder interchangeably with the 
term self-pathology, to refer to a spectrum of character 
pathology in which the person's self-experience of being 
psychosomatically cohesive, complex and continuous over time 
is chronically deficient, resulting in the characteristic 
symptoms of depersonalization, hollowness, numbness, 
emotional instability and impoverished object relations. 
I 
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and self. 
Stolorow (1980) credits Annie Reich (1953, 1960) with being the 
first to clearly argue that the aim of narcissistic behaviour is 
to maintain the self-representation: 
"Reich suggested that ... narcissistic patterns ( e.g. 
grandiose self-inflation, preoccupation with the body 
and its appearance, and ceaseless cravings for admiring 
attention) may represent attempts to repair damage done 
to the self-representation by early traumatic 
experiences. Reich clearly interpreted clinically 
observed narcissistic disturbances as abortive attempts 
to restore and stabilize self-esteem." (Stolorow 1980 
pg 12) 
Many authors followed Reich in contending that the omnipotence 
and grandiosity of the narcissist are regressive attempts to 
repair and protect a fragile and tenuous sense of self against 
the anxiety of depletion or disintegration. This approach is most 
systematically and lucidly argued by Kohut (1971, 1977) who 
claims that the narcissist's defective self-cohesion and 
deficient self-esteem is buttressed by archaic "selfobject" 
relations in which the object is related to as the narcissist's 
missing self function, required to either mirror the narcissist's 
grandiosity or allow his/her fantasized merger with the 
omnipotently perceived and idealized object. 
3.3 Stolorow's functi onal reformulation of the concept narcissism 
Stolorow (1980) argues that in spite of significant theoretical 
progress in the psychoanalytic understanding of narcissism, most 
definitions still embrace an energic metapsychology by defining 
narcissism as libidinal self-investment. The problem with this is 
that it says nothing about the meaning o f narcissism and Yo'hat 
defensive purpose it serves in the psychic organization. He 
proposes a functional definition according to which behaviour, 
fantasies and object relations are termed narcissistic when their 
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function is to preserve the structural cohesion, temporal 
stability and positive emotional valence of the self-
representation. Noting the narcissistic tendency to withdraw from 
close relationships Stolorow says: 
"Withdrawal behaviour is narcissistic depending on its 
function, or the function of the accompanying 
fantasies. If the withdrawal behaviour and/or fantasies 
buttress the cohesion, stability and affective coloring 
of a threatened self representation, then the 
withdrawal may be called narcissistic. This may be 
contrasted with a defensive withdrawal which wards off 
conflicts evoked by sexual or aggressive wishes toward 
objects." (pg 17) 
Stolorow uses this definition to clarify and integrate the 
various confusing uses of the concept: 
1. Narcissism as a sexual perversion 
A number of sexual perversions function as sexualized ,attempts to 
counteract feelings of self-depletion and self-fragmentation, to 
revive a shaky sense of self and restore self-esteem. When 
directed toward this end perversions are narcissistic in 
function. 
2. Narcissism as a mode of object relating 
Noting that the seeming isolation of the narcissist 
wealth of internal object relations Stolorow rejects the 
antithesis between narcissism and object relating. 
hides a 
supposed 
Object 
relations are considered narcissistic to the extent that their 
primary aim is to bolster a deficient self-system and lack of 
se lf-esteem. 
3. Narcissism as a developmental stage 
There has been much debate over whether or not there is a I 
I 
.1 • 
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narcissistic stage of development i.e., whether at any point the 
normal infant does not relate at all to external objects . Balint, 
for example, 
from birth. 
reaction to 
argues that primary object relatedness is present 
Narcissism, if it occurs at all, is a secondary 
environmental frustration . Stolorow undercuts this 
deba te by pointing out that because the neonate cannot 
discriminate between self and object it is meaningless to think 
of this undifferentiated state in terms of either self- or 
object-love. Once an embryonic self-representation does emerge it 
is very rudimentary, tenuous and lacks cohesiveness. Primitive 
object relations thus serve a narcissistic developmental function 
by helping to strengthen the infant's fragile self-
representation: 
"In other words , the earliest manifestations of the 
narcissistic function occur in relation to primary 
selfobjects, and the earliest object relationships 
serve a basic narcissistic function .... Within the 
framework of a functional definit ion, narcissism as a 
developmental line pertains to stages in the growth of 
psychological structure that maintains the cohesion, 
stability and positive affective coloring of the self 
representation. Growth proceeds from primitive 
prestructural narcissistic object relationships towards 
higher forms of narcissism by way of a gradual 
accretion of psychic structure which takes on the 
function of maintaining the self representation." (pg 
19 ) 
4 . Narcissism as self-esteem 
Rather than equating narcissism with self-esteem Stolorow defines 
narcissistic activities as those whose function is to protect and 
restore self-esteem when the latter is threatened by internal or 
external factors. Self-esteem is compcred metaphorically to a 
room's temperature, and narcissistic activity/fantasy to the 
thermostat that regulates the temperature, becoming mobilized 
when the temperature (self-es teem ) falls beyond a certain point. 
, I
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5. Narcissism as a diagnostic category 
While Stolorow does acknowledge specifically narcissistic 
disorders his functional concept of narcissism does not refer to 
a diagnostic category but rather to a dimension of 
psychopathology that may be present across a wide range of 
nosological categories: 
"Thus, one would speak of the degree of narcissistic 
disorder, referring to the degree of structural 
impairment and vulnerability of the self 
representation, the acuteness of the threat of 
narcissistic decompensation, and the motivational 
priority or urgency of the narcissistic function in a 
variety of pathological states . The degree of severity 
of narcissistic disturbance may be evaluated with 
reference to the three properties of the self 
representation included in the functional definition of 
narcissism - that is, its structural cohesion, temporal 
stability, and affective coloration." (pg 23) 
<. 
Stolorow then outlines three levels of narcissistic disturbance 
based on the severity of the threat to the integrity of the 
person's self-representation: 
1. Mild narc i s sistic di sturbance 
The self-representatio n is frequently or predominantly negative 
(low self-e steem) but is mostly stable over time and structurally 
cohesive . 
2. Moderately severe narcissistic disturbance 
Here the self-representation is frequently/predominantly negative 
and, in addition, its organization is not stable over time 
(experiences o f identity confusion/diffusion) . However, in spite 
of temporary, reversible decompensation it largely retains its 
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structural cohesion. 
3. Severe narcissistic disturbance 
The self-representation is frequently/predominantly negative and, 
in addition, is lacking in cohesion and subject to "irreversible 
structural fragmentation and disintegration." (Stolorow pg 24) 
Seen from Stolorow's functional perspective a schizophrenic with 
grandiose delusions and a neurotic woman who is promiscuous in 
order to reassure herself that she is attractive a.ce both 
exhibiting narcissistic disturbances, albeit on very different 
levels of self-stability, 
Stolorow, I believe, has made a valuable contribution to our 
understanding of narcissism by defining it according to its 
structural function of preserving the integrity and stability of 
the self-representation accross a range of seemingly dissimilar 
nosological categories. Narcissism, moreover, need not 
necessarily refer to a characterological structure, it also 
presumably applies, in the above model, to transient or episodic 
modes of defensive organization. A predominantly non-narcissistic 
neurotic, for example, might employ narcissistic defenses at a 
stage when his/her egoic self-understanding is called seriously 
into question. However, while Stolorow's clarification of 
narcissistic dynamics is useful, it complicates the already 
difficuil t task of diagnosing narcissistic character pathology, 
If, in functional terms, most psychopathology is partly 
narcissistic in function, how can we usefully talk about 
narcissism as a seperate diagnostic category? The problem of 
diagnosis is the subject of the remainder of this chapter. 
3.4 Diagnostic systems and criteria for narcissistic character 
Pathology 
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Ronningstam (1988) states that, in spite of the recent (1980) 
inclusion of Narcissistic Personality Disorder (hereafter 
referred to as NPD) in the DSM-3: 
" ... the question of whether NPD comprises a common, 
distinct and coherent cluster of diagnostic features 
that are distinguishable from features in other 
personality disorders remains controversial." (pg 300) 
In her article Ronningstam sets out to compare the criteria for 
NPD in three different diagnostic systems, that of DSM-3, the 
psychoanalytic system of Otto Kernberg, and Ackhtar and Thomson's 
(1982) system derived from their review o f existing literature. 
The aim of this study was to empirically ascertain the degree of 
concordance between the criteria used by the respective 
diagnostic sysytems. 
Table 1 
DSM·l!! CRITERIA FOR NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER 
Charo.cteris tics 
A. Grandiose sense of self·importance or uniqueness. e.g .. exaggeration of achievemen ts and 
talents. focus on the special nature of one's problems. 
B. Preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power. bri ll iance. beauty or ideal love. 
C. Exhibitionism: the person requires constant attention and admiration. 
D. Cool indifference or marked feelings of rage. inferiority. shame. humiliation. or emptiness in 
response to criticism. indifference of others. or defeat. 
E. At least two of the following characteristics of disturbances in interpersonal relationships: 
1. Entitlement: expectation of special favors without assuming reciprocal responsibilities. 
e.g .. surprise and anger that people will not do what is wanted. 
2. Interpersonal exploitiveness: taking advantage of others to indulge own desires or for self· 
aggrandizement: disregard for the personal integrity and rights of others. 
3. Relationships that characteristically alternate between the extremes of overideaIization 
and devaluation. I 
4. Lack of empathy: inability to recognize how others feel. e.g., unable to appreciate the 
distress of someone who is seriously ill. 
Table one outlines the diagnostic criteria for NPD in the DSM-3. 
In this system, for any personality disorder diagnosis the 
symptom profile must firstly be long-standing, secondly, it must 
not be limited to discrete and transient episodes, and thirdly, 
it must cause significant impairment to occupational/social 
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functioning or otherwise result in some 
distress. One problem with the DSM-3 system 
recognize the multifaceted complexity 
form of subjective 
is that it does not 
and subtlety of 
narcissistic pathology. For example, many narcissists who seek 
therapeutic help do not display any of the exhibitionism and 
grandiosity considered to be the hallmark of this disorder. In 
fact they often present as depressed, self-critical individuals 
who feel inferior to others and lack self-esteem in many areas of 
their lives. The grandiosity may be covert, subtle and manifest, 
for example, as rigid and 
political/religious ideals. 
remarkably 
The DSM-3 
high ethical standards or 
criteria do not penetrate 
beneath the surface or overt features of the symptom profile to 
look for the equally important latent or "soft" diagnostic 
indicators. Ackhtar and Thomson recognize this and so divide 
their diagnostic criteria into overt and covert features. 
Table 2 
, 
AKHTAR A:-.iD THO~ISO:-.i: CLI:-.iICAL FEATURES OF NPD 
Areas 
Self-concept 
Interpersonal 
Relations 
Social Adaptation 
Elhics. Standards 
and Ideals 
Love and 
Sexuality 
Cognitive Style 
Ot/ert Features (OU) 
Inflated self-regard 
Haughty grandiosity 
Fantasies of wealth, power. beauty. 
brilliance 
Sense of entitlement 
IUusory invulnerability 
Lack of depth 
Contempt of other people 
Devaluation of other people 
Occasional withdrawal into splendid 
isolation 
Social success 
Sublimation in the sen'ice of 
exhibitionism Ipseudosublima-
tion) 
Intense ambition 
Apparent zeal and enthusiasm 
about moral, sociopolitical and 
aesthetic matters 
Seductiveness 
Promiscuity 
Lack of sexual inhibitions 
Frequent infatuations 
Egocentric perception of reality 
Articulate and rhetorical 
Circumstantial and occasionally 
vague. as if talking to sel r 
Evasive but logically consistent in 
arguments 
Easily becomes devil's advocate 
CO L'ert Features feu) 
Inordinate hypersensitivity 
Feelings of inferiority. worthless, 
ness. fragility 
Continuous search for strength and 
glory 
Chronic idealization of others 
Intense envy of olhers 
Enormous hunger for acclaim 
Chronic boredom 
Uncertainty 
Dissatisfaction with professional 
and social identity 
Lack of any genuine commitment 
Corruptible conscience 
Inabillty to remain in love 
Treating the love-object as exten-
sion of the self rather than as a 
separate and unique individual 
Perverse fantasies 
Occasionally. sexual deviation 
Inattention toward objective 
aspects of events 
Subtle gaps in memory at times 
-Sofl-Iearning difficullies 
Autacentric use of language 
Fluctuations between being 
overabstract and overconcret.e 
Tendency to change meaning of 
realit.y when self-esteem is 
lhreatened 
I 
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From this. perspective contradictory features can exist 
concurrently as manifest and latent (unconscious) aspects of the 
same pathology. 
coexist with 
For example, manifest symptoms ' 
covert (split-off) feelings 
of grandiosity 
of smallness, 
inferiority, worthlessness etc. This diagnostic system is, I 
believe, far more valuable than the DSM-3 system because firstly, 
it recognizes the bipolar structure and dynamics of narcissistic 
pathology and secondly, it throws a larger dragnet over a range 
of symptomatic indicators that the DSM-3 might miss. 
The third diagnostic system is that of Otto Kernb~rg, one of the 
leading authorities on narcissistic disorders. His criteria are 
more comprehensive than those of the other systems and emerge 
from decades of therapeutic experience with narcissistic 
patients. (See table 3) 
After comparing the 
concludes that only 6 
three 
% of 
diagnostic systems Ronningstam 
the criteria are common to all 
systems, although the concordance among broad conceptual themes 
in all systems is somewhat higher at 40 %. This rather low 
concordance level is perhaps attributable to fundamental 
conceptual differences intrinsic to the respective 
approaches. 
However, Ronningstam notes that the above fact is partly 
attributable to the same clinical phenomena in each system being 
described using different descriptive criteria. She thus 
concludes tha t " . clinical consensus exists among the three 
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Table 3 
KER:-;BERC"S DIAC:-;OSTIC SYSTDI FOR NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY 
Aspects 
Pathological 
Self-love 
Pathological 
Object-love 
Superego 
Pathology 
!\oHJder forms d 
Severer forrnsd 
Special Charac-
teristics (for all 
patients with 
narcissistic 
disturbances) 
·Key symptoms. 
Symptoms 
Excessive self-reference and self-centeredness 
G randiosityJ - exhi bitionism 
- superiority 
- recklessness 
-discrepancies between capabiUty and ambitions (grandiose 
aspects of ambitions) 
- grandiose fantasies of superiorityb 
Overdependency on admiration 
Emotional shallown ess 
Bulk of insecurity rall or nothing" view) and feelings of severe inferiority 
Envy~ - conscious and unconscious 
Devaluation of others· - deprecia tion of othersb 
-contempt of othersb 
- tendency to spoil what they receive 
Exploitiveness - greedy attitude 
- sense of entitlement 
- tendencies to steal ideas and thingsb 
Incapacity to depend on others 
Lack of empathy· Ilack of capacity of deep understanding of what happens 
in other people, lack of capacity to feel what other 
people reeli 
Lack of commitment 
Incapacity to experience depression (enraged helplessness and hopelessness 
instead of sadness and guilt) 
Se .... ere mood swings 
Shame-regulated behavior toward othersb 
Lack of integrated sense of valuesb 
Antisocial features 
Ego-syntonic aggression and ego·syntonic sadism 
Generalized paranoid orientationb 
Chronic experience of emptiness 
Incapacity to learn 
A sense of aloneness (no longing for others) 
- a sense of -being boomed" and alone in the worldc 
- a chronic hunger for somethingC 
- a sense of meaningJessnessc 
bAdditional criteria included 1985. 
("Ego sLates. 
dDivision of superego pathology made 1985. 
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systems about many core features of NPD." (pg 308) These include 
the following: 
1. Grandiose - self-experience/fantasies: the belief that one is 
(or the desire to be) remarkably special, talented, attractive 
or in any way superior to most people. This might be manifest as 
a fear of being ordinary. The latent underside of this 
grandiosity is the experience of chronic inferiority, self-
doubt, badness, weakness, worthlessness etc. (Narcissistic people 
usually only come voluntarily to therapy when their defences have 
been ruptured and the underlying negative self-representations 
leave them feeling uncharacteristically helpless and vulnerable.) 
It has been my (limited) experience that in these periods of 
deflation narcissistic patients often describe themeselves 
metaphorically as being cripples, mutants and half-humans. This 
also means that narcissists often experience intense e nvy towards 
those who have qualities missing in themselves . 
. -
2. Exhibitionism: this is manifest as behaviour directed toward 
obtaining constant praise/recognition from others. This is often 
evident in conversation , which the narcissist greedily uses as a 
chance to speak about his/her own experience without sincerely 
listening to or inviting any contribution from the "audience". 
3. Devaluation: Narcissists tend to be highly critical and 
disparaging towards others. This is usually expressed as verbal 
hostility 
generally 
or contempt for specific people or, 
cynical and condescending attitude. 
otherwise, as a 
Devaluation often 
coexists or oscillates with the opposite tendency to idealize or 
uncritically worship certain people/ideas/ideologies etc. 
4. Exploitativeness: Narcissists tend to be 
opportunistic, insensitive and manipulative 
relationships, using and exploiting these without 
concern for the other's welfare. However, I have also 
selfish, 
in their 
genuine 
noticed a 
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coexisting tendency towards the experience of severe guilt and 
self-remorse in some narcissistic patients who experience 
themselves as evil and destructive, contaminating those who 
attempt to get: close to them. One patient of mine experienced 
himself as being poisonous to others and said "Everything I 
touch turns to shit!" 
5 . Pseudo-self-sufficiency: One of the most striking narcissistic 
characteristics is an apparent self-reliance and autonomy. Many 
narcissists are loners and appear not to need other people except 
at a rather superficial level. However, this extreme surface 
independence masks a deeper neediness and hunger for intimate 
relatedness that is very threatening for the narcissist to admit 
to. This defensive self-sufficiency is manifest in therapy (at 
least in the early stages) as a somewhat aloof and detached 
attitude in which the narcissist attempts to do self-therapy 
rather than become dependent on his/her therapist. (It is this 
that some therapist's 
transference feelings). 
mistakenly identify as the absence of 
In my own work with narcissists this 
usually manifests 
spectator to the 
as a countertransference feeli ng of being a 
narcissist's attempts at self-healing. 3 The 
aloofness and independence, when not egosyntonic, is experienced 
negatively as an aching loneliness, isolation and alienation from 
human contact. (Images of watching the wor ld from behind a thick 
3 The narcissist's excessive (pseudo-)independence 
contrasts s trongly with the borderline 's extreme dependency. 
Countertransference feelings, I find, are often a very 
useful differential diagnostic indicator in this regard. 
Often, in the initial session, I feel very close to and warm 
toward borderline people because of their symbiotic need 
for closeness , intimacy and fusion with a benevolent 
nur t urant figure. With most narcissists , however, I 
initially feel distant, removed and emotionally detached as 
they corrununicate the unspoken message "I don't want to get 
close to you, so keep your distance while I try to sort this 
out on my own." Some borderlines, however , may present using 
narcissistic defences against their extreme dependency needs 
because the prospect of fusion with the therapist threatens to 
obliterate their tenuous sense of self. 
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wall of glass or ice are common.) The narcissist's fear of 
dependence and intimacy is expressed in his/her sexual 
relationships as a lack of committment and an inability to remain 
in love once the initial excitement of the relationship has worn 
off and the reality of the other's limitations can no longer 
support the narcissist's perfectionist fantasies. 
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6. Constricted affect: A common indicator of narcissistic L 
pathology is a largely constricted emotional range and depth. A 
common symptomatic complaint in this regard is a cold aloofness 
or inability to feel strong emotion, show affection etc. This 
certainly does not mean that emotion is absent: many narcissists 
experience periods of passionate inspiration, sexual arousal, 
anger , hatred etc. However, these tend to be reactive pockets or 
islands of emotion separated by barren tracts of neurasthenic 
emptiness, phlegmatism and lack of spontaneous aliveness. Unlike 
borderlines who experience intense, unpredictable mood swings the 
narcissist's moods are more stable, less volatile and extreme. 
They are, however, inordinately sensitive to criticism, rejection 
or indifference and often respond to this with feelings of 
hostility, humiliation, inferiority or emptiness. 
Most of the above theme s are common to all, or at least two out 
of three, of the diagnostic systems in Ronningstam's study. While 
they are not exhaustive they do indicate some of the core, 
commonly accepted features of narcissistic pathology. The author 
would like to add another two more diagnostic features because 
they have been so conspicuous in narcissistic people he has 
assessed: 
7. Intellectualization: Many narcissists tend to be excessively 
cerebral people who use their often highly developed intellectual 
powers to analyze, dissect and speculate about their own (and 
,i 
I 
"'I I! :1. J 
l 
, , , , 
, 
others' ) 
clear in 
experience. 4 
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The dynamics of this are particularly 
present later. 
8. Disturbed se~ality: Although most psychopathology results in 
disturbed sexual relations my experience is that narcissists are 
particularly prone to certain sexual problems/trends. One of 
these appears to be an inclination towards homosexuality or 
bisexuality. (If I am correct this would support Freud's early 
thesis about the relationship between narcissism and homosexual 
object choice.) A second feature appears to be the compulsive 
genitalization of erotic relationships. Narcissists tend to see 
sexual organs and orifices rather than sexual partners. (This 
makes psychodynamic sense once we realize that narcissists relate 
to people as part- rather than whole objects. Although they are 
often promiscuous this is not necessarily so . An interesting 
phenomenon the author has noticed is that some narcissists avoid 
sexual relationships because they have impossibly high ideals 
about the perfect partner/relationship. Rather than settle for 
anything less than perfection they refuse to compromise and so 
opt for celibacy instead. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter began by tracing the origin of the concept 
narcissism in the work of Freud. We saw that he used the concept 
to refer to a number of phenomena, including a posited 
4 Most of the narcissists I have dealt with have been 
university students who are not statistically representative (in 
terms of intelligence and education) of the general population. 
Perhaps less educated narcissists are not as prone to 
intellect ualization as the skewed sample I am familiar with. 
However, as I will argue later, the narcissistic child's 
premature maturity would naturally incline him/her towards 
intellectual precocity . This would support my hypothesis that 
narcissists are more intellectually inclined than other 
diagnostic categories. 
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developmental stage prior to object relating, homosexual object 
choice and "autoerotic" phenomena, the healthy libidinal cathexis 
of the ego i.e. self-esteem, and the pathological withdrawal of 
libido from external objects e . g., schizophrenia. According to 
Freud all these diverse phenomena were characterized, according 
to his energic metapsychology, by ego-libido rather than object-
libido i.e., the ego's libidinal cathexis of itself rather than 
external objects. We then briefly reviewed selective post-
freudian contributions to the definition of pathological 
narcissism, culminating in the functional conception of Stolorow, 
according to which narcissism is defined by the defensive 
function it serves in protecting the stability, cohesion and 
emotional flavouring of the self-representation. 
Thirdly, three diagnostic sytems of narcissistic pathology were 
prese nted and briefly discussed. Lastly, a number of common 
diagnostic criteria for narcissis tic personality disorder were 
outlined . 
I 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A SELECTIVE LITERATURE REVIEW OF SEMINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
THEORY OF NARCISSISTIC PATHOLOGY 
This theoretical chapter presents the contributions of important 
ob j ect relations theorists to our understanding of the 
psychodynamics and etiology of narcissistic pathology. To 
comprehensively review every important contribution to this field 
is beyond the scope of this case study . I will focus selectively 
on a small number of psychoanalytic theorists who have each made 
important conceptual advances in this area. This review, " , 
moreover, is expositary rather than critical. The metatheoretical 
minutae and nuances of perspective that distinguish the various 
contributions will be largely ignored. Because of the theoretical 
orientation of this case study, however, it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the concept of internal object relations before 
considering the individual theorists. 
4.1 The concept of internal object relations 
"Of every individual who has reached the state of being 
a unit with a limiting membrane and an outside and an 
inside, it can be said that there is an inner reality 
to that individual, an inner world that can be rich or 
poor and can be at peace or in a state of war." 
(Winnicott 1958) 
Earlier on I defined object relations theory as a psychoanalytic 
developmental account of how primary in~erpersonal relationships 
in the infant's external world become internalized, represented 
and metabolized through the medium of phantasy into a nuclear 
core of personal identity which, whether healthy or deficient, 
determines subsequent personality development and deformation. In 
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other words, primary formative infant-parent interactions, both 
positive and negative, are introjected as affectively charged 
self-other images into the plastic psychic world of the infant. 
These provide the developmental nuclei for subsequent personality 
growth. These . primordial self-other relational introjects are 
gradually transformed or " metabolized ~ and in this way evolve 
into enduring intrapsychic structures that provide the foundation 
for a stable sense of individual identity. (l) In the same way 
that normal good introjects (self-other interactions experienced 
as gratifying) become the catalytic nuclei for psychic 
structuralization (the differentiation and maturation of self-
components/functions), abnormally bad introjects (self-other 
interactions experienced as destructive, painful or otherwise 
negative) retard or distort psychic structuralization and thus 
impede healthy identity formation. Object relations theory is not 
only interested in psychic ontogenesis (the normal process of 
psychological maturation), but is also particularly concerned 
with the developmental deficits or distortions that negatively 
influence normal personality growth and result in adult 
psychopathology. 
Because object relations theory is concerned with the healthy and 
pathogenic internalization of interpersonal relations, the use of 
the term object relations rather than interpersonal relations 
requires justification. Psychoanalysis began with Freud's 
realization that the people who his patients spoke about did not 
correspond in a one-to- one fashion with the "real" people in the 
patient's externa l world. Freud saw that actual persons are 
transformed or refracted through fantasy and expressed as 
psychologically meaningful figures or characters in our 
1 This process is metaphorically analogous to the process 
of digestion whereby an external source o f nourishment is 
internalized and transformed by digestive enzymes into nutritive 
compounds that are then absorbed to become part of our body 
tissue. 
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individual developmental histories. We all interact not only with 
actual external others but also with internal others i.e., 
psychic representations of other peoplE. which are no less real 
and which greatly influence our experience and behaviour. These 
internal representations are phantasy-filtered residues of actual 
interpersonal relations with significant others. The term object 
relations is thus meaningful for the following reasons: 
1) It describes both external real people and the affectively 
charged internal psychic representations (object-images) of them 
while accepting the phenomenological (although not necessarily 
physical) reality of the latter for the person concerned. 
2) Many patients do not relate psychological l y to whole 
individuals but only to certain functions or parts of people 
(part-objects). The other person, for example, may be experienced 
as a part-object in the following way: as an intrusive penis, a 
hollow breast, a devouring mouth etc. The terms object and part-
object are descriptively suited to these modes of relatedness. 
3) Internal objects, unlike actual people, are manipulated and 
modified, introjected and projected, killed and resurrected by 
phantasy-determined intrapsychic processes which have enormous 
consequences for the person's psychological world. The term 
object thus establishes the experiential primacy of phantasy over 
literal reality while in no way minimizing the impact of external 
reality on our internal object world. 
A final general point to be made about internal object relations 
is that they are not simply memories, feelings or free-floating 
fantasies but rather structures - relatively stable, enduring and 
semi-autonomous psychic configurations comprising self- and 
object- representations linked by an emot.ional charge. 
Classical psychoanalytic theory did not have a clear concept of 
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internal objects. Freud, however, toward the erid of his life, 
presaged later theoretical advances by introducing the mechanism 
of identification, whereby one not only remembers a lost one but 
unconsciously models an aspect of oneself after the person: 
"A portion of the external world has, at least 
partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead, 
by identification, been taken into the ego and thus 
become an integral part of the internal world. This new 
psychical agency continues to carryon the functions 
which have hitherto been performed by people (the 
abandoned objects) in the external world." (Freud 
quoted in Ogden 1983 pg 228) 
As Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) note, there have been two major 
psychoanalytic conceptual approaches developed in order to deal 
with the increasing emphasis on object relations in clinical 
psychoanalysis: 
The first is the classical attempt to preserve Freud's original 
instinctual or drive/structure model and simply extend it to 
accomodate the contemporary emphasis on object relations. From 
<. 
this perspective all facets of personality and psychopathology 
are understood to be derivatives of drives and their 
transformations. Object relations are thus understood to derive 
from the need for instinctual release and energic homeostasis. 
Object relations are primarily a means to this end. 
A second model has emerged which is not committed to preserving 
and extending the edifice of Freudian metapsychology. Instead, it 
attempts to supplant the latter by a radical alternative 
conceptual formulation of psychological life in which 
interpersonal relations replace instinctual release as the 
primary motivational force. To paraphrase Fairbairn, the pioneer 
of the most purified variety of object relations theory, we 
essentially seek persons not pleasures. In other words, intimate 
relatedness with others is a primary motivational end in itself 
rather than being merely a vechile or a means to the end of 
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libidinal discharge. Psychopathology, then, does not spring from 
conflicts over instinctual impulses but rather expresses the 
pathogenic disturbance of our quest for object relatedness. Where 
sex and/or aggression appear to be the chief determinants of 
psychic li·fe this indicates a secondary pathological truncation 
of a more primordial need for emotionally gratifying human 
contact . Psychopathology indicates the maladaptive and frustrated 
attempt to protectively deal with bad internalized interpersonal 
experiences by using defenses that invariably deplete and 
impoverish the person's internal world. Greenberg and Mitchell 
call this the relational/structure model, in contrast to the 
classical drive/structure model. Structure in both cases refers 
to enduring, characteristic psychological functions that typify 
the personality, organize experience and change only slowly (if 
at all) over time. 
Because these two psychoanalytic models begin from fundamentally 
different metatheoretical postulates they constitute mutually 
opposed rather than complementary perspectives: 
"The dIive model and the relational model are complete 
and comprehensive accounts of human experience. 
premises upon which they rest constitute 
incompatible visions of life, of the basic nature 
human experience. " (Greenberg and Mithchell pg 406) 
The 
two 
of 
Some theorists refuse to cornrnitt themselves to either model and 
instead try to combine what they see as useful in both 
perspectives. Kernberg, as we shall see later, chooses this mixed 
model strategy (arguably a theoretically ungainly hybrid) by 
superimposing object relations theory onto the classical 
drive/structure model. 
A fourth strategy, 
to differentiate 
which I propose to call the split-level model 
it from the mixed model mentioned above, 
preserves intact both classical and object relations theory by 
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delimiting the range of application of the respective models to 
specific levels of psychopathology. Stolorow and Lachman (1980) 
thus seperate psychopathology into two subtypes by arguing that: 
" ... it is necessary to distinguish between 
psychopathology that is the product of intrapsychic 
conflicts and psychopathology that is the remnant of 
developmental voids, deficits and arrests." (pg 171) 
Most narcissistic pathology falls into the latter category 
although, as this case study will demonstrate, the absolutist 
split-level conception o f psychopathology cannot account for the 
mixed picture evidenced by certain clinical phenomena. However, 
according to this mode l, which clearly echos Melanie Klein's 
distinction between paranoid-schizoid and depressive position 
pathology, oedipal and pre-oedipal disorders are fundamentally 
distinct in terms of symptomatology, etiology and psychodynamics. 
They thus require different hermeneutic models and treatment 
strategies . Heinz Kohut (to be discussed later) exemplifies the 
split-level approach . 
< 
For the purposes of this case study it is not necessary to review 
the history of object relations thought or to trace its genealogy 
from the work of Klein and Fairbairn. These two theorists, 
however, are relevant to the topic of narcissism insofar as both 
made seminal contributions to our understanding of schizoid 
dynamics and psychopathology i. e. the process of pathological 
splitting and primitive projection of bad internal objects 
resulting in a weakened ego and an experience of inner emptiness. 
Fairbairn and his follower Guntrip are the two British object 
relations theorists who focused their work on the dynamics and 
treatment of schizoid pathology, which Guntrip (1961) describes 
as follows: 
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"The tragic dilemma of the schizoid person is that his 
specially intense need of a good love-object is matched 
by an equally great fear of object-relationship, so 
that his love-hunger is hidden from the outer world 
beneath his mask of detachment, aloofness and emotional 
apathy." (pg 282) 
The above description, as we will see, is a central dynamic of 
the narcissist. In fact, in a later work Guntrip (1980) describes 
the following diagnostic criteria for schizoid pathology: 
Introversion, withdrawness, narcissism, self-sufficiency, a sense 
of compensatory superiority, loss of affect, loneliness and 
depersonalization. It could thus be argued that even though DSM-3 
lists them as distinct diagnostic categories, narcissism and 
schizoid pathology are symptomatically and dynamically similar if 
not identical. However, I will not pursue this point or discuss 
the Fairbairn/Guntrip contribution to our understanding of 
narcissism. I will focus, rather, on the work of Michael Balint, 
Donald Winnicott, Heinz Kohut and Otto Kernberg. 
4.2 Michael Balint's concept of the basic fault 
One of the richest metaphors describing narcissistic injury arose 
from the work of Hungarian psychoanalyst, Michael Balint. After 
emigrating to Britain he became one of the leading theorists in 
the British independent tradition. His innovative contribution to 
object relations psychoanalysis culminated in 1968 with the 
publication of his seminal work The Basic Fault. The basic fault 
is a metaphor describing a 
functioning that indicates 
developmental arrest that 
profoundly regressed level or area of 
a pre-oedipal narcissistic injury or 
needs to be accessed in order for 
psychotherapeutic healing to occur. Balint's work is an important 
contribution to conceptualizing and managing regression to and 
through this level of pathology. 
Balint belongs to what I would call the ' environmentalist 
! I 
; I 
j • . ! 
i i ' 
37. 
tradition of object relations theory. He believes that serious 
pathology is primarily the ontogenic consequence of real deficits 
in maternal provision rather than the product of endogenous or 
constitutional factors. 2 According to Balint infancy begins 
not with a stage of primary narcissism but with a mode of 
primitive object relatedness called "primary love". This is 
defined by the following: 
"a) there is complete harmony between individual and 
environment; b) the individual does not care and is not 
in a position to say where he ceases and the external 
world begins; and c) neither can an external observer 
define exact boundaries. At this stage of development 
there are as yet no objects, although there is already 
an individual, who is surrounded, almost floats, in 
substances without exact boundaries; the substances and 
the individual mutually penetrate each other ... they 
live in a harmonious mix-up . " (Balint quoted in Kahn 
1969 pg 241) 
This symbiotic union with the mother ends with the infant's 
gradual awareness of separateness and the resulting anxiety over 
his/her vulnerability and absolute de~endence on maternal care. 
If this care is deficient at this vital stage then a basic fault 
arises as a consequence. This fault finds expression in one of 
two pathological modes of object relating which Balint calls 
ocnophilic and philobatic respectively: 
Ocnophilia refers to a mode of relating characterized by clinging 
behaviour, excessive dependence on others, severe seperation 
anxiety, overvaluation of the object and inhibition of moves to 
2 The environmetal emphasis is particularly evident in the 
work of Winni cot t, Fairba irn, Gun tr ip and Kohut, all who 
emphasized the pathogenic role played by chronically deficient 
parenting in the etiology of self-pathology. I would contrast 
this position with the classical and Kleinian emphasis on 
instinctual/constitutional givens e.g. excessive constitutional 
aggression, as the primary determinants of severe pathology. 
These respective emphases are merely trends rather than 
absolutes. 
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independence and relative self-reliance. Although Balint does use 
the term we recognize in this description the typical 
characteristics of borderline pathology. Normal ocnophilic 
behaviour 
elicited 
is 
by 
a natural 
self-object 
response to the 
differentiation. 
aggravated by deficient 
seperation anxiety 
However, when this 
maternal care 3 normal anxiety is 
excessive ocnophilia becomes a defensive strategy against severe 
anxieties concerning abandonment, starvation, annihilation etc. 
Philobatic object relating is the opposite of this. Other people 
are perceived as dangerous, unreliable etc and the infant, rather 
than clinging, adopts the compensatory fantasy of self-
sufficiency in order to sever the dangerous dependence on a world 
of untrustworthy objects. Once again, although Balint doesn't 
pOint this out, philobatism is the hallmark of the narcissistic 
character who withdraws from all close relationships into a world 
of self-sufficient isolation defended by a grandiose facade. 
Balint does not explain why some people resort to ocnophilia 
rather than philobatism and he does not deliniate mature symptom 
profiles specific to these two pathological modalities. 
strength lies more in describing the phenomenology of the 
fault and how it is to be managed psychotherapeutically. 
4 His 
basic 
The basic f ault metaphor derives from geology where it is used to 
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describe a structural flaw in the rock strata which, although not :1 
visible at the surface, is susceptible to stress fractures, 
collapses etc, thus disrupting the overall rock formation. When 
applied to the "'strata"' of psychic life this metaphor is 
3 A catch-all term that embraces every serious disruption 
of normal mothering, from actual seperation to emotional absence, 
maternal depression, anxiety, clinging, overidentification, 
unconscious resentment etc. 
4 I will later show, drawing on the work of MargClret 
Mahler, how and why these two relational modalities predispose 
the child to either narcissistic or borderline self-pathology. 
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particularly apt. Balint outlines his reasons for selecting this 
term: 
"First, because ... the patient says he feels that there 
is a fault within him, a fault that must be put right. 
And it is felt to be a fault, not a complex, not a 
conflict, "not a situation. Second, there is a feeling 
that the cause of the fault is that someone has either 
failed the patient or defaulted on him; and third, a 
great anxiety invariably surrounds this area, usually 
expressed as a desperate demand that this time the 
analyst should not in fact must not fail him." 
(Balint 1968 pg 21) 
Unlike neurotic disorders which are characterized by conflict 
over impulses or feelings the dynamics of the basic fault are 
completely different. It is experienced as a deficit, a psychic 
lesion, an internal flaw or absence rather than an anxiety over 
repressed egodystonic material: 
"Al though highly dynamic, the force arising from the 
basic fault has the form neither of an instinct nor of 
a conflict . .. It is not something dammed up for which a 
better outlet may be found, but something missing 
ei ther now, or perhaps for almost the whole of the 
patient's life." (1968 pg 21) 
Therapeutic work in the area of the basic fault differs radically 
from work with neurotic pathology in the following ways: 
Firstly, therapy with neurotics takes place by means of 
conventional adult language with its taken-for-granted 
Interpretation is thus the therapist's primary 
intervention. In the area of the basic fault, however, 
meanings. 
form of 
language 
breaks down, meanings are not shared and words often cannot grasp 
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the patient's experience. 5 Moreover, interpretations are often 
experienced as attacks, failures in empathy, intrusions, 
criticisms etc. 
Secondly, neurotic pathology usually involves ambivalent triadic 
the oedipal stage of development. relationships arising 
Basic fault pathology, 
from 
on the other hand, is primarily dyadic, 
located in the pathogenic mother-infant relationship (hence the 
concept of pre-oedipal pathology). 
Thirdly, the structure of neurosis concerns psychic conflict over 
ambivalent feelings toward parental objects. But in the area of 
the basic fault the issue is not one of conflicting feelings but 
rather an internal deficiency, a feeling of something vital 
missing within. 
In order to heal this fault the patient needs to relinquish 
his/her defensive coping strategies and regress to the level of 
the fault. Balint identifies two forms of regression: regression 
for gratification and regression for recognition. The first form 
is a "malignant" regression characterized by the greedy craving 
for immediate instinctual gratification from the therapist, 
impulsive destructive acting out and the constant threat of an 
unending spiral of vociferous untherapeutic demands. The patient 
is not looking for insight or understanding but rather the 
immediate relief of intolerable needs and feeling states. (I have 
5 I have noticed, with both narcissistic and borderline 
patients, that they frequently feel misunderstood by me even 
though I feel empathically attuned to their experience i.e. that 
I do in fact understand. My attempts to language their 
unlanguaged feelings are often unsuccessful because, Balint would 
say, we are talking about regressive preverbal experience, a 
world before words that is not accessible to adult language. I 
have found that therapy at this level means acknowledging that 
there aren't at present words to grasp the feelings and that our 
time together is largely about discovering or creating a shared 
language that will in time allow the patient to understand and 
feel understood. 
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seen this particularly strongly in borderlines and eating 
disorders. ) 
The second form, regression for recognition, Balint describes as 
"benign", in contrast to the malignant regression mentioned 
above: 
"In one form the regression is aimed at gratification 
of instinctual cravings; what the patient seeks is an 
external event, an action by his object . In the other 
form what the patient expects is not so much a 
gratification by an external action, but a tacit 
consent to use the external world in a way that would 
allow him to get on with his internal problems-
described by my patient as "being able to reach 
himself". Al though the participation of , the external 
world, of the object, is essential, the participation 
is entirely different in nature; apart from not 
interfering with, not causing unnecessary disturbance 
in, the patient's internal life ... the chief form of 
this expected participation is the recognition of the 
patient's internal life and of the patient's unique 
individuality." (1968 pg 144) 
Balint says that regression for rec ognition implies the patient's 
search for "a new beginning", an object relationship in which the 
pliable, indestuctible and unintrusive therapist can be 
internalized to ameliorate the destructive effects of the basic 
fault. Since the basic fault determines the nature of all the 
person's object relations it is only by regressing to the 
atavistic relationship that 
can begin . This occurs when 
enough to surrender to the 
caused the deficiency that healing 
the patient trusts the therapist 
archaic love a nd hate that s/he 
protected others and herself from b efore . 
Balint offers a number of import ant techinical recc ommendations 
which need not b e discussed here. Wha t is important though, is 
his recognition o f the t herapeuti c limi tations of working with 
basic fault pathology . If the ther apist can meet the regressive 
need for r ecogni t i o n a degree o f heali n g i s possible: 
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" ... a new relationship may develop which will enable 
the patient to experience a kind of regret or mourning 
about the original defect and loss which led to the 
establishment of the fault or scar in his mental 
structure. This mourning differs fundamentally from 
that caused by the loss in reality of a beloved person 
or that caused by damage to, or destruction of, an 
in ter'nal 'ob ject, characteristic of melancholia. The 
regret or mourning I have in mind is about the 
unalterable fact of a defect or scar in ones'elf which, 
in fact, has cast its shadow over one's whole life, and 
the unfortunate effects of which can never fully be 
made good." (1968 pg 183). 
The fault may heal off but the psychic scars remain, an 
everpresent reminder and influence on the person's internal and 
external object worlds. Balint is a frustrating author. He paints 
the basic baul t in broad brush strokes, with little care for 
detail. There is a lack of specificity concerning the 
symptomatology, 
pathology. We 
etiology 
are told 
and 
only 
psychodynamics 
that the fault 
of basic fault 
arises from a 
"mismatch" between mother and inf ant that disrupts the "primary 
love" relationship mentioned earlier, The outcome is one of ~wo 
pathological modes of object relating: ocnophilia or philobatism. 
Balint is more concerned with the philobatic and it is clear that 
this describes an essentially narcissistic way of object 
relating. The basic fault is hidden behind a "shell" or facade 
which, Balint hints, derives from the internalization of a 
parental figure whose own pathology demands self-reliance and a 
relinquishing of inte r nal needs on the part of the child. The 
external shell learns certain social skills that enable the 
person to cope with the world, but only at the expense of 
impoverished object relati ons and inability to feel intensely, 
spontaneously alive. Balint notes that the philobat often 
searches for intense experience to penetrate the anaesthetic 
shell and momentarily contact the vitality buried deeply within. 
Despite the frustrating lack of detail in Balint's account, his 
metaphor of the basic fault o ff ers an intuitively perceptive and 
prognostically hopeful understanding of narcissistic injury. In 
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the following section I hope to show that Winnicott addresses 
precisely the same issues as Balint, using a similar metaphor and 
a more comprehensive theoretical structure. 
4 . 3 Winnicott's conception of the false self organization 
Winnicott is commonly acknowledged as the most influential 
contributor to psychoanalytic theory and practice since Melanie 
Klein. His most valuable theoretical contributions have 
undoubtedly been the concept of transitional space and its 
phenomena and, secondly, his distinction between the true and 
false self evident in pre-oedipal pathology. Both of these 
closely related concepts are essential to understanding the 
various manifestations of self-pathology. There are a number of 
remarkable parallels between Winnicott and Balint and I will 
illustrate these during the chapter. 
The entirety of Winnicott's work deals basically with one single 
problematic: the embryonic ego's developmental struggle to attain 
a secure sense of selfhood in the face of interpersonal 
impediments and their internal representation. Greenberg and 
Mitchell express this point slightly differently: 
"Almost all his contributions center around what he 
depicts as the continually hazardous struggle of the 
self for an individuated existence which at the same 
time allows for intimate contact with others .... The 
processes leading to the development or inhibition of 
the self are depicted and understood solely in the 
context of the interaction between the child and the 
environmental provisions supplied by significant 
others. (1983 pg 190) 
Winnicott starts from the assumption that selfhood is not a given 
but a developmental task. This task is made possible (and often 
impossible) by the quality of maternal care provided in the first 
critical months of infancy prior to the consolodation of clearly 
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deliniated boundaries between infants and their objects . It is 
this process of psychogenesis and its truncation that provides 
the focus for Winnicott's work. 
A problem with classical psychoanalysis is its taken-for-granted 
assumption that all psychoanalytic patients are persons (selves) 
who symptomatically express aspects of a repressed inner impulse 
world because these impulses are not congenial to their conscious 
self-definition. Winnicott, however, argues that there is a 
spectrum of non-psychotic people who are not yet persons i. e. 
autonomous individuals with an integrated sense of identity, a 
substantive internal world and a capacity to relate to others as 
independent people. For the latter category of people the typical 
anxiety does not concern the issue of integrating egodystonic 
impulses into their self-definition, but rather the partial or 
total lack of self-definition altogether . The neurotic's anxiety 
concerns the fear of owning alien aspects of being, but the 
anxiety of self-pathology is the very real question and threat of 
non-being, either in the form of temporary ego 
dissolution or a denuded inner world. 6 These 
boundary 
people go 
through the motions of everyday interaction with others, seeming 
to adapt relatively well to social tasks and responsibilities. 
However, they are never fully engaged with life, they cannot 
establish mutually fulfilling intimate relations with others, 
they lack depth and density, often feeling empty, disconnected or 
disembodied. Al though l-linnicott never uses a clear-cut 
differential diagnostic taxonomy it is clear that he is referring 
to narcissistic, schizoid and borderline pathology.) 
The question that arises is: if these people have no substantive 
sense of self then how can they adapt to normal vocational and 
social demands? l-linnicott's answer is that the person's rela tions 
6 The former is the typical borderline anxiety while the 
latter is more characteristic of the narcissist. Both, however , 
indicate the lack of an integrated and substantive sense of self . 
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with the external world are regulated by a psychic subsytem that 
emerges in infancy as an adaptive response to external (maternal 
and social) demands. Winnicott calls this subsytem the false self 
because it is not the spontaneous product and expression of the 
infant's instinctual being but rather a compliant conformity to 
the needs of the other. To the extent that it expresses a 
compromise between the demands of our instinctual life and the 
demands of society, the false self is a normal and necessary 
development without which socialization would not be possible. In 
addi tion to social adaptation the false self performs . a second 
vi tal function: protecting the vulnerable hidden inner core of 
identity from contact with the external world. This inner core 
Winnicott calls the true self, the matrix and locus of authentic 
selfhood: 
"I suggest that this core never communicates with the 
world of perceived objects, and that the individual 
person knows that it must never be communicated with or 
be influenced by external reality .. . Although healthy 
persons communicate and enjoy communicating, the other 
fact is equally true, that each individual is an 
isolate, permanently non-communicating, permanently 
unknown, in fact unfound ... and this is sacred and most 
worthy of preservation." (Winnicott 1965 pg 187) 
Winnicott, always unsystematic and cryptic, is never more so than 
when he obliquely discusses the true self. One gets the feeling 
that Winnicott resists a comprehensive theoretical formulation of 
the true self deliberately in order to protect it from conceptual 
probings that would impinge on its secrecy and thus violate it. 
At one point he says that there is no point in formulating an 
accurate idea of the true self "because it does no more than 
collect together the details of the experience of aliveness ." 
(1965 pg 148) He also contradicts himself, at one point equating 
the true self with the Freudian id and at another describing it 
as the ego capacity to make an id impulse a personal experience. 
Winnicott's use of the word ego is ambiguous and different from 
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its meaning in classical psychoanalysis. He uses the words self 
and ego interchangeably to refer to the organizational center 
whereby the infant acquires a personal psychosomatic reality. 
However, the following pOints can be made about the true self: 
1. It is experienced immediately as bodily aliveness and as the 
center of "I-ness" i.e, the locus of individual identity. It is 
the source of "the spontaneous gesture and the personal idea." 
(1965 pg 148) 
2. It is a pre-objectal structure - it is not the product of the 
internal world and in fact preceeds the formation of internal 
objects: 
" .. the concept of an individual inner reality of 
objects applies to a stage later than does ... the True 
Self. The True Self appears as soon as there is any 
mental organization at all, and it means little more 
than a summation of sensori-motor aliveness." (1965 pg 
149) 
3. It emerges in response to a good-enough maternal environment 
in which the mother intuitively and lovingly recognizes and meets 
her infant's hallucinatory omnipotence (which results from the 
primary narcissistic lack of differentiation between self and 
other) rather than destroying the infant's grandiose illusions by 
imposing her own needs on the infant. The earliest impingement on 
the true self occurs when the mother does not meet and mirror the 
infant's spontaneous gesture but instead substitutes a gesture of 
her own, unconsciously demanding a compliant response from the 
infant in order to satisfy her own needs rather than the 
infant's. Under optimal conditions the normal infantile 
omnipotence, if invited and mirrored by mother, is gradually 
relinquished and becomes the source of creative play, symbol 
formation and spiritual / religious experience. 
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4. The true self is protected from impingement by ' the external 
world by the "caretaker" false self which adapts compliantly to 
external demands while preserving the pristine integrity of the 
hidden and incomunicado true self. 
Normal true self/false self development presupposes a 
and "holding" maternal environment. Where this is 
containing 
absent or 
deficient, however, the normal split between true and false self 
becomes a schism. The true self is not nourished and enriched 
because the mother's impingement or lack of intuitive 
responsiveness to the infant's needs threatens and violates the 
embryonic core of sel fhood. The anxiety as socia ted with either 
non-recognotion or exploitation (impingement) of the true self is 
intense, a real fear of psychic annihilation. The true self, 
atrophied and threatened retreats behind the shield of the false 
self facade, which becomes prematurely compliant and attuned to 
the demands of others: 
" ... the infant gets seduced into a compliance, and a 
compliant False Self reacts to environmental demands 
and the infant seems to accept them. Through this False 
Self the infant builds up a false set of relationships, 
and by means of introjections even attains a show of 
being reaL .. " (Winnicott 1965 pg 146). 
In this case the the child identifies with the false self and 
loses touch with his/her spontaneous needs and gestures . Having 
sacrificed his/her own needs the child adaptively becomes the 
parental image of him/her: 
" ... in the extreme of such a case the word being has no 
relevance. In order to be and so have the feeling that one 
is, one must have a predominance of impulse-doing over 
reactive doing." (Winnicott quoted in Davis and Wallbridge 
1981 pg 114) 
The resultant character structure becomes phenomenologically 
evident in some or other disorder of selfhood where the person 
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feels unreal, insubstantial, disembodied, two~dimensional, 
lacking vitality and an internal sense of self-worth. Laing 
(1982) explains this as follows: 
"If the individual delegates all transactions between 
himself and the other to a sytem within his being which 
is not him (the personal), then the world is 
experienced as unreal, and all that belongs to this 
system is felt to be false, futile and meaningless." 
The caretaker false self often adapts so successfully to social 
demands that even psychotherapists 
attunement to the therapist's 
progress. However, what happens is 
may mistake its compliance and 
expectations as therapeutic 
that therapy proceeds at the 
surface level with the false self's associations, anxieties and 
defenses, leaving the true self untouched and unrecognized: 
"It is as if in looking at narcissistic illness the 
clinician is liable to be caught up with the absorbed, 
or in terna 1 i zed, environment, and to mistake this 
(unless well prepared) for the real individual, who in 
fact is hidden and is secretly loved and cared for by 
the self within the self. It is the true individual 
that is hidden ." (Winnicott 1965 pg 127) 
Many therapies with self-pathology disorders fail because the 
therapists treat these patients as neurotics. True therapy can 
only begin once the therapist recognizes and acknowledges not the 
patient's existence , but rather his/her non-existence i.e. 
impoverished sense of 
that very often the 
self and interiority. Only by understanding 
totali ty of the personality is a defense 
against a primitive anxiety can therapeutic interaction with the 
true self begin. This already difficuilt process is exacerbated 
by highly intelligent patients 
patients do) psychotherapy as 
towards self-insight: 
who see (as many narcissistic 
an intellectual task directed 
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"When a False Sel f becomes organized in an individual 
who has a high intellectual potential there is a very 
strong tendency for the mind to become the location of 
the False Self, and in this case there develops a 
dissociation between intellectual activity and' 
psychosomatic existence," (Winnicott 1965 pg 144) 
Winnicott's seminal contribution to our understanding of the 
genesis and truncation of selfhood is his concept of transitional 
space and its related phenomena. Transitional space designates an 
intermediate area of experience between the infantile pre-object 
state characterized by a lack of self-other differentiation, and 
that of Object-permanence, where the boundaries between self and 
other are clearly demarcated. Prior to this stage, which 
Winnicott locates at about six months of age, the infant has not 
yet been born psychologically i.e, is not yet a seperate person 
wi th an awareness of inside and outside, " Personalization", as 
Winnicott refers to this process, is a developmental 
accomplishment which is not guaranteed, but rather contingent on 
the quality of the infant's experience in the intermediate area 
of illusion . Winnicott uses the word illusion to capture the 
nature of the contact between the infant's hallucinatory 
omnipotence 
my fantasy 
"The world is an extension of me and will do what 
commands" and the world of external reality which 
gradually makes the infant's omnipotence increasingly untenable. 
For a while the infant needs the illusion of his/her omnipotent 
creation of the external world. This illusion is held and 
sustained by a mother who intuitively understands and respects 
the infant's grandiosity. Premature rupture of this illusion 
fractures the infant's nascent self and eventuates in self-
pathology. There is a paradox here that needs to be sustained and 
not challenged if the infant's omnipotence is to crystallize into 
a core of personal identity. The paradox is this: the area of 
illusion is also the area of the infant's first not-me i.e , 
object experience. The infant thus both creates the object 
through hallucinatory omnipotence and discovers it, in which case 
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slhe could not have created it. Between the narcissistic phantasy 
of seamless union with the world and the reality perception of 
seperation from the world lies the area of transitional space 
which Winnicott also called potential space. He uses this term 
because in reality there is not yet literal space i.e. 
differentiation between self and object . On the other hand! there 
is no longer complete fusion and identification with the object. 
Certain physical objects or sounds stand for i.e. represent! the 
maternal object in her absence . This is the famous transitional 
object which both is (in phantasy) and yet is not mother. This 
potential space is the matrix of symbolism! play! creativity and 
spiri tuali ty, ,,,here the metaphorical triumphs over the literal. 
It culminates, optimally, in a situation where self and object 
are mediated by a third entity, the symbol. However, where the 
development of transitional space is disrupted or prevented by 
the absence of good-enough-mothering, the attainment of object 
constancy i .e . clear differentiation between self and object, is 
simply not possible. If, owing to maternal privation this occurs 
at the beginning of infancy then not even partial differentiation 
, 
is possible. The result is psychosis, with its characteristic 
absence of ego boundaries expressed as hallucinations and 
delusions. If, however, the infant does receive adequate 
mothering prior to but not during the transitional stage, then 
partial self-object differentiation ensues, sufficient to prevent 
psychotic fusion of self and object but not sufficient to attain 
complete object constancy and a consolidated ego. The latter 
si tuation is typical of borderline pathology where a degree of 
self-other differentiation has occurred but yet the person, 
lacking a substantive sense of self only feels real when in the 
presence of others by adopting their moods and personalities. The 
Ii teral absence of others is experienced as psychic death, not 
only because of a fragmented internal world populated by 
abandoning archaic part-objects, but also because the borderline 
lacks the capacity for symbolization. Because self and object are 
not mediated by symbols people disappear when they are not 
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literally present, hurtful words are experienced as physical 
attacks, and the therapist, rather than resembling parental 
objects (as in neurosis), literally becomes them in the 
borderline's eyes . Borderline pathology is very clearly a 
disturbance of transitional space, but what about narcissistic 
disorders? I would argue that narcissistic character pathology 
too is a transitional space disorder. This is not as evident in 
the narcissistic personality as it is in the borderline because 
the narcissist clearly has a cohesive and relatively stable self-
representation. However, the composition of the self-
representation it reveals a fusion of self and idealized object 
representations, rather than differentiation of the latter. (This 
will become clear in the section on Kernberg later in this 
chapter.) This accounts for the primitive defenses that the 
narcissist employs e.g. projective identification, denial, 
idealization etc. Sohn (1984) quotes Rosenfield (1964): 
"In narcissistic object relations defences against any 
recogni tion of seperateness between self and object play a 
prominant part." (pg 202) Sohn, developing Rosenfield's argument, 
contends that narcissism involves the intrOjection of an 
idealized object and then identification with that object: 
"When 'the object is omnipotently incorporated the self becomes so 
identified with the incorporated object, that all seperate 
identi ty, or any boundary, between self and object is denied ." 
(1985 pg 202) I cite the above authors in support of my argument. 
Although they do not employ Winnicott's concepts it is clear that 
the narcissist's tendency to see other people as extensions of 
his/her self reflects the disruption of transitiona l space. 
Whereas this disruption functions in the borderline to avoid 
independence, in the narcissist the self-other identification 
functions to avoid dependence on the object. (This point wi ll be 
taken up later.) The narcissist's grandiose false self thus 
serves the dual purpose of protecting the true self and avoiding 
dependency relations with external objects. 
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Winnicott delineates four categories of false self organization 
according to the severity of the split between true and false 
self and the extent to which the false self becomes identified as 
the totality of the person: 
1. The first organization is that of healthy normality in which 
the false self is represented by social etiquette and conformity 
to rules and norms of conduct. The person has relinquished 
childhood omnipotence and primary process functioning in order to 
fit into society. 
2. The second organization, still closer to health than serious 
pathology, occurs when the false self comprises actual 
identifications of significant others, thereby incorporating 
their ideals, attitudes etc. Presumably this is where neurosis 
begins as a tension or contradiction between internalized 
parental values and attitudes on the one hand, and spontaneous 
impulse life deriving from the true self influence on the other. 
<. 
3. At the third level of organization significantly more severe 
pathology is evident. The false self is concerned with searching 
for conditions in which the true self can emerge or, failing 
that, reorganizing a new defense against exploitation of the true 
self. Sometimes, says Winnicott, suicide becomes the last 
defense: "Suicide in this context is the destruction of the total 
self in avoidance of annihilation of the True Self." (1965 pg 
143) 
4. At the fourth level the true self "is acknowledged as a 
potential and is allowed a secret life.: (1965 pg 143) This 
secret life is expressed indirectly through symptomatology which, 
ironically, serves the positive function of letting the person 
know that s/he does in fact have an inner life even though s/he 
might feel dessicated or dead inside. 
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5. At all of the above levels of organization the true self does 
find some or other expression in the person's life. But at this 
extreme "The false self sets up as real and it is this that 
observers tend to think is the real person." (Winnicott 1965 pg 
143) Even though at this level there is no tension between 
between true and ' false self functioning, in close relationships 
the false self begins to fail because it becomes evident that 
something essential is missing from the personality. Even at this 
extreme, however, Winnicott sees the potential for access to the 
true self. 
Although Winnicott does not provide diagnostic or rigorous 
clinical descriptions of the forms of pathology expressed by 
various levels of false self organization It may be argued that 
both narcissistic and borderline disorders fall largely into the 
last category. To this end the concepts of egosyntonicity and 
dystonicity may prove useful as criteria for evaluating the 
severity of the schism between true and false self. Where 
personality symptomatology is integrated, with little conflict or 
anxiety, into the overall character structure (egosyntonicity), 
then any residual true self functioning becomes eroded and 
totally entombed behind a wal l of impregnable false self 
defenses. This situation would justify a sixth category of false 
self organization, in addition to Winnicott's original five. Into 
this category the author would place antisocial personalities as 
well as severely 
personalities. These 
because they cannot 
schizoid, paranoid and narcissistic 
people are therapeutically inaccessible 
acknowledge or even feel true self 
possibilities behind the false self character armour . However, 
even a slight tension (egodystonicity) between symptoms and 
character structure speaks of a residual true self life and a 
potentially hopeful therapeutic prognosis. 
At this point the similarities between Balint's and Winnicott' s 
formulations are evident: 
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1. Both theorists propose that 
an external 
there 
shell 
is a split 
(Balint) or 
within the 
false self personality between 
(Winnicott), and a 
from contact with 
vulnerable inner core of selfhood sheltered 
the external world. This split becomes the 
primary dynamic 'focus in self-pathology. 
2. For both theorists these equivalent defensive structures serve 
an identical function: to protect the real or true self from 
damaging contact with the world while adapting compliantly to 
external demands. For both theorists the symptomatic result is 
the same: not feeling real or substantial, alive, spontaneous or 
in intimate contact with either oneself or others. 
3. Both theorists locate the cause of this schism in the maternal 
lack of empathic adaptation to the infant's ego needs. This 
engenders a surface compliance with 
a deeper level, a fundamental 
maternal expectations and, at 
mistrust in the nurturant 
,capacities of the external world. This mistrust is evidenced by 
the subme rgence of the real self behind the false self facade. 
4. Both argue that effective therapy cannot begin until the 
patient feels safe enough to shed the false self carapace and 
regress to the level of the developmental lesion and the 
traumatic primary object relationship. Only the symbolic re-
experi ence of adequate maternal provision in therapy can palliate 
the destructive impact o f that first relationship and modify the 
damaged self- and object-representations . 
5. At the level of technique both Balint and Winnicott emphasize 
non-inte rpretative interventions, the therapist's contribution to 
making a safe r e gressive space. The therapist needs to survive 
both the patient's loving and ha ting, the destructive fantasies 
and transference attacks. Both believe that benign regression, if 
managed correctly, c an result in a new experience of aliveness, 
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individuality and qualitatively improved object relations. 
As is the case with Balint there are serious conceptual flaws, 
ommissions and inconsistencies in Winnicott' s account of false 
self pathology . . This is 
partly to the 
partly due to Winnicott' s 
fact that he was exploring 
unsystematic 
new areas of approach, 
pathology without a pre-existing theoretical map of pre-oedipal 
psychic territory, and partly because, for political reasons, he 
was trying to maintain a sense of continuity with and loyalty to 
the work of Freud and Klein. The above notwithstanding, the 
author believes that Winnicott's concepts of the false self and 
transitional space are valuable theoretical tools for 
understanding narcissistic dysfunction. 
4.4 Heinz Kohut's model of narcissistic pathology 
Balint and Winnicott , though pioneering theorists in their own 
right, did not deal comprehensively with the specific dynamics of 
narcissistic character pathology. They were more generally 
concerned with mapping out the broad domain of pre-oedipal 
pathology and devising general theoretical constructs to describe 
what they saw. The basic fault and false self are thus non-
specif ic constructs encompassing a wide range of self-
pathologies. The next generation of psychoanalytic theorists had 
the task of making finer diagnostic and conceptual 
discriminations in order to explain the particular dynamics of 
narcissistic pathology. Two pre-eminent figures stand out in this 
regard. Perhaps the most celebrated and controversial of these 
was Heinz Kohut, a Viennese neurologist who emmigrated to America 
after the war to train as an orthodox analyst. (He was even 
elected as president of the American Psychoanalytic Association.) 
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The remainder of his professional career, however, .was concerned 
with transcending classical psychoanalytic theory by outlining a 
new theoretical model adequate to the task of understanding 
narcissistic disorders. In his 1971 publication The Analysis of 
the Self, Kohut admits to having "presented my findings 
concerning the psychology of the self mainly in the language of 
classical drive theory . " (1977 pg 13) But in his second book The 
Restoration of the Self (1977) He clearly distances himself from 
classical theory with the central point of departure being the 
clinical and conceptual status of the self. He says there are two 
psychoanalytic approaches or positions in this regard: 
"A psychology in which the self 
of the psychological universe, 
which the self is seen as a 
apparatus . " (1977 pg 15) 
is seen as the center 
and a psychology in 
content of a mental 
While not discrediting the latter Kohut firmly identifies himself 
with the former . It would be more accurate to say that Kohut does 
not so much transcend classical drive theory as he does restrict 
its application to specifically neurotic disorders. At the level 
of oedipal pathology classical theory, wi th its focus on drives 
and defenses against these, is conceptually adequate. But at the 
pre-oedipal level of self-pathology a new explanatory system is 
necessary to account for the dynamics and etiology of the 
deficient self-structure that Kohut posits as the central feature 
in narcissistic disorders: 
"In view of the fact that it is a weakened or defective 
self that lies in the cen ter of th e disorder, 
explanations that focused on c o nflicts concerning 
ei ther the libidinal or aggressive impulses of these 
patients could illuminate neither psychopathology nor 
treatment process." (Kohut and Wolf 1978 pg 414) 
It is for this reason that I call his a split-level 
psychoanalytic model. By arguing that classical psychoanalysis 
and his "psychology of the self" are c omplementary and applicable 
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to different levels of pathology he is attempting to preserve 
rather than supplant the drive/structure model. But Kohut 
allocates developmental primacy to the growth of a cohesive self 
which is a precondition for the later oedipal issues documented 
by the classical theory . Oedipal pathology, moreover, is becoming 
historically eclipsed by narcissistic disorder as the malaise of 
our t ime. In his words "Tragic man", the individual preoccupied 
wi th a depleted sense of self, today largely replaces "Guilty 
man", the individual preoccupied with avoiding oedipal guilt, as 
the focal psychological problem . 
Kohut does acknowledge that periods of self-doubt and loss of 
self-esteem are aspects of both normal and neurotic functioning. 
However, he labels these as secondary self disturbances: 
"The experiential and behavioural manifestations of the 
secondary disturbances of the self are the reactions of 
a structurally undamaged self to the vicissitudes of 
life." (Kohut and Wolf 1978 pg 414) 
His specific interest lies in the primary disturbances of the 
self, a category he divides into the following subgroups 
according to the descending level of severity of the self-
disturbance: (1) the psychoses, (2) the borderline states, (3) 
the schizoid and paranoid personalities, and (4) the narcissistic 
behaviour and personality disorders . 
Only the latter category, 
therapeutic prognosis because 
says Kohut, have a 
only these disorders: 
favourab l e 
"are capable of tolerating the frustrations of the 
r eacti vated narcissistic needs of their vulnerable self 
to which the working-through process in analysis 
exposes them without a protracted fragmentation or 
depletio n of the self," (1978 pg 416) 
The self in narcissistic character pathology, though vulnerable 
and often fragile, is more cohesive and less prone to regressive 
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fragmentation than in the other self-pathologies. It is this that 
makes the narcissist amenable to therapeutic intervention. 
Kohut is strongly opposed to the psychiatric emphasis on seeing 
disorders as disease entities defined by specific symptomatic 
criteria. For thi~ reason he does not systematically outline a 
symptom profile indicative of NPD . 1 His primary criterion is 
not based on presenting symptomatology or life history, but 
rather on the specific quality of the emerging transference. 
Kohut noticed the following typical transference phenomena 
emerging in his analysis of narcissistic patients: 
Firstly, narci ssists tend not to relate empathically to their 
therapists (and other people generally) as seperate, autonomous 
individuals with unique needs, perceptions, feelings etc. Rather, 
they tend to relate to them as parts or extensions of themselves. 
This, argues Kohut, is because, owing to a structural lesion or 
deficit in the narcissist's self-system, the external object is 
required to execute vi tal psychological functions that the 
narcissist's own weakened self is incapable of. Next to 
maintaining a sense of cohesion and continuity the most important 
function performed by the self is that of self-esteem regulation 
i. e. preserving a positively flavoured self-representation and 
sense of self-worth 2 It is the developmental arrest of this 
second function that leads to narcissistic character pathology. 
Kohut noted that beneath the narcissist's grandiose facade was a 
1 Hence his exclusion from the diajnostic systems presented 
in the first chapter. However, the behavioural descriptions that 
emerge in his clinical vignettes tally well with the symptom 
criteria of both Kernberg and Akhtar and Thomson. 
2 Where the developmental dysfunction involves a deficit in 
the primary ontogenetic task of gaining self-cohesion after an 
initial unintegrated state, the resultant pathology is not 
narcissistic but borderline. Narcissistic dysfunction is thus a 
higher level pathology that involves damage to self-worth rather 
than self-integration. 
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chronic sense of inferiority and lack of self-esteem . Lacking 
this internalized self-function the narcissist depends on others 
to provide constant supplies of attention, praise, affirmation 
etc. Because the object is called upon to perform a function that 
in normal circumstances is performed by the self Kohut calls the 
narcissist's external objects selfobjects. This explains why the 
narcissist's relationships are so shallow. The other person is 
not seen as a seperate individual with whom to relate, but simply 
as an impersonal source of positive a.ffirmation necessary to 
buttress the narcissist's precarious self-esteem. 
The second important transference phenomenon that Kohut noted is 
that narcissists not only relate to their therapists as 
selfobjects, but also that these selfobject transferences 
typically fall into two specific modes of object relating. The 
first he calls the mirror transference and the second the 
idealizing transference. 
The mirror transference expresses the narcissist's attempts to 
experience a substantive self and feeling of positive self-regard 
by having the selfobject reflect (mirror) and hence affirm 
his/her compensatory grandiosity and exhibitionism. The 
unconscious logic of this is as follows: "I feel very small, 
inferior and insubstantial. In order to avoid the anxiety of this 
realization I need to deceive myself by pretending to be bigger, 
stronger and more self-confident than I in fact feel. But I can't 
do this alone, I need other people to see my act, to praise me 
and respect me so that by basking in their admiration I can 
confirm and identify with this protect:'ve facade. I need other 
people to admire me and to thus embody my own missing self-
esteem." The problem, however, is that people often experience 
this behaviour as shall ow , egotistical and exasperatingly 
insensitive. When they fail to mirror his/her defensive 
grandiosity and instead become critical or indifferent, the 
narcissist feels hurt, insecure and angry. This is expressed as 
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overt rage, disparagement or cold hostility directed toward the 
offending object; or alternatively, as self-related feelings of 
emptiness, invisibility, ugliness, alienation, inferiority etc. 
The idealizing transference also concerns inflated perceptions of 
grandiosity, power, success etc; but instead of self-perceptions, 
as in the mirror transference, the idealization involves object 
perceptions. Kohut defines this transference as the "therapeutic 
activation of the omnipotent object (the idealized parent 
imago . . . " (1971 pg 37). One of the ironies of this pathology is 
that the hypercritical, cynical and contemptuous narcissist often 
becomes infatuated with certain people, seeing them as being 
unambiguously good, strong, wise , exciting etc. This manifests in 
the transference as unrealistic perceptions of the therapist as 
omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly wise, understanding and caring. 
Whereas the mirror transference functions directly to preserve 
the narcissist's grandiose self-representation the idealizing 
transference performs the same function indirectly through 
vicarious identification with the idealized selfobject. The 
unconscious logic of this'is as follows: "I feel small, inferior 
and unlovable. If I can identify or merge with certain other 
people who I see as powerfu l, knowledgeable, attractive etc then 
I can vicarious ly share those qualities and 
negative self-representations from both others 
so conceal my 
and myself." A 
narcissistic patient of mine would watch a lot of movies and find 
himself identifying completely with certain heroic chara~ters in 
these films and actually living out these movie personae in his 
everyday life. He would also adopt the characteristic mannerisms, 
speech patterns and gestures of acquaintances he admired, thus 
iII ustra ting the s truct ure and function of the ideali zing 
t ransference. (This attempt to vicariously participate in the 
qualities of the idealized other in order to rais e self-esteem 
should not be confused with the borderline tendency to fuse with 
the other in order to prevent fragmentation and annihilation. 
Thus, although the borderline and the narcissist may both show 
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the same symptomatology i.e. object devaluation and idealization, 
the functional purpose of this is different in the respective 
pathologies.) 
Kohut refers to the "mirror-hungry" and "ideal-hungry" modes of 
object relating as representing distinct personality styles. 
However, narcissistic people may exhibit both modes of relating 
toward the same selfobject at different times: 
"Swings from the therapeutic activation of 
idealized parent imago (idealizing transference) 
transient hypercathexis of the grandiose 
are ... common occurrences in the analysis 
narcissistic personalities." (Kohut 1971 pg 67) 
the 
to a 
self 
of 
The function of these two different modalities is the same - to 
create and protect, by means of selfobjects, a precarious sense 
of self-worth that cannot be maintained by resilient internal 
self-struct=es. 
These two selfobject transference modalities indicate, says 
Kohut, developmental 
the internalization 
arrest of normal self-development prior to 
and transformation of archaic selfobjects 
into internal self-structures . 
Although Kohut calls his work "self psychology" and defines 
narcissism as a developmental self-deficiency he never defines 
the term self exactly. Nor is he apologetic for not doing so: 
"My investigation contains hundreds of pages dealing 
with t he psycho logy of the self - yet it never explains 
how the essence of the self should be defined. The 
self .. . as the center of the the individual's 
psychological universe, is . . . not knowable in its 
essence ... (Kohut 1977 pg 310) 
He does, however, describe the nuclear self in the following 
terms: 
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"This structure is the basis for our sense of being an 
independent center of initiative and perception, 
integrated with our most central ambitions and ideals 
and with our experience that our body and mind form a 
unit in space and a continuum in time." (1977 pg 177) 
This nuclear self, which begins to emerge in infancy, has a 
bipolar structure comprising two distinct but intimately related 
components. The first of these derives from the infant's natural 
grandiosity and exhibitionism . Kohut, like Winnicott, attributes 
great developmental importance to the infantile omnipotence that 
emerges as a consequence of the interaction between the infant's 
lack of differentiation between self and maternal object (hence 
the term selfobject) on the one hand, and rapidly developing 
motor skills on the other. The child takes exhibitionistic 
delight in showing off its burgeoning developmental skills to an 
admiring selfobject (First mother and later father and other 
people.) If the primary selfobject spontaneously delights in the 
child's grandiose gestures and expresses unambiguous admiration 
and encourag~~ent then the child experiences him/herself as "the 
gleam in the mother's eye." The 
child's grandiosity and so makes 
and loveable. What then happens 
admiring selfobject mirrors the 
him/ her feel special, competent 
is that, through a process of 
gradual disillusionment resulting from the realistic limits of 
maternal devotion, the admiring selfobject is internalized and 
transformed into a nuclear self-structure. 3 This structure 
comprises both feelings of self-esteem and competence and 
realistic ambitions of success and mastery. Kohut calls this 
process transmuting internalization because the role previously 
performed by a selfobject is now performed by an internal self-
structure which provides internal resources of self-esteem and 
3 Kohut's understanding of this process is almost identical 
to that of Winnicott who understands ego differentiation and 
growth as resulting from the benign failure (optimal frustration) 
of the good enough mother to perfectly meet every infantile need. 
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hence positive self-representations. When this self-structure is 
consolidated and stable the person's oDgoing self-esteem is not 
dependent on a constant supply of external praise and admiration 
and s /he does not need to behave in a grandiose or 
exhibi tionistic way . This is not to say that the heal thy adult 
does not need recognition and respect. We do need periodic 
affirmation from others, particularly when feeling uncertain or 
despondent about ourselves. However, our self-representations 
remain largely positive in flavour and fairly resilient to life's 
vicissitudes. But if for some reason the selfobject fails to 
admire or mirror the child's grandiosity then transmuting 
internalization cannot occur and the appropriate self-structure 
fails to develop. The child becomes fixated at this developmental 
juncture and remains chronically dependent on constant external 
supplies of admiration in order to feel appreciated, loveable and 
worthwhile. The self-representation becomes predominantly 
negative and the child uses the defense of splitting to 
externalize i.e. project this "bad" self-image and compensate for 
his / her consequent hollow psychic interior by grandiose fantasies 
, 
of power, we alth, knowledge etc. Life revolves around a c onstant 
greedy search for selfobjects to bolster one ' s chronic self-
deficiency against the omnipresent threat of split-off negative 
self-pe rceptions. The latter are pro jected onto others, resulting 
in the narcissist ' s perception of others as being weak, inferior, 
stupid, boring etc . 
The second component of this nuclear bipolar structure derives 
from the infantile need to not only be admired by a mirroring 
selfobject, but also to idealize and identify with a selfobject 
perceived as omnipotent, good, perfectly nurturant etc. This 
idealized parental imago is experienced as gratifying, soothing 
and containing. The idealized imago is gradually modified through 
experience o f parental limi tations and becomes internalized as 
the nucleus of an embryonic superego . This in turn matures into a 
system o f moral ideals, values and a sense of conscience. If, 
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however, infantile object-idealization becomes traumatically 
deflated then the idealized parental imago cannot be 
internalized. Consequently a mature superego structure cannot 
evolve. This results in the narcissist's exploi tativeness and 
conspicuous absence of moral values and conscience. It also 
accounts for the phenomenon whereby some narcissists experience 
accute guilt and shame. This occurs because the punitive archaic 
superego precursors have not been tempered and modified by an 
idealized parental imago and real experiences with affectionate 
selfobjects: 
"Unconsciously fixated on an idealized self-object for 
which they continue to yearn, and deprived of a 
sufficiently idealized superego, such persons are 
forever searching for external omnipotent powers from 
whose support and approval they attempt to derive 
strength." (Kohut 1971 pg 84) 
The selfobject mirroring pole 
constitute the two nuclear 
and the idealized selfobject pole 
self-structures around which the 
embryonic persona Ii ty consolidates. Kohut posits that a "tension 
arc" exists between the nuclei of ambitions (derivative 
of '-early 
directs the 
of early 
object 
child's 
grandiosity) and 
idealization). This 
emerging skills and 
ideals 
tension 
talents, 
(derivative 
mobilizes and 
performing a catalytic and guiding 
function. Healthy adults are thus driven by their ambitions and 
led by their ideals. Kohut further contends that if one of these 
two self-constituents is retarded by a deficient selfobject the 
resulting effect can be compensated for by the other constituent: I 
" ... if the exhibitionistic component of the nuclear I 
self (the child's self-esteem insofar as it is related 
to his ambitions) cannot become consolidated, then its 
voyeuristic component (the child's self-esteem insofar I 
as it is related to the child's ideals) may yet give it 
enduring form and structure." (Kohut 1977 pg 187) 
In other words a child whose mother failed his/her need for 
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mirroring is not automatically destined for narcissistic 
pathology according to Kohut. The damage may be ameliorated by an 
empathic and caring father who is 
idealized parental imago. When 
adequately internalized as an 
narcissistic pathology does 
result, whichever self-constituent is deficient will determine 
the specific nature of the narcissistic phenomenology i.e. 
whether the deficit is expressed as a predominantly mirror-hungry 
or ideal-hungry personality style. 
Whatever the specific developmental failure, Kohut clearly 
locates narcissistic etiology in deficient parental provision: 
"Similarly to Winnicott, disorders of the self in 
general are understood as environmental deficiency 
diseases; the caretakers have failed to allow the child 
to establish and slowly dissolve the requisite 
selfobject configurations which, through transmuting 
internalization, generate healthy structures within the 
self." (Greenberg and Mitchell pg 356) 
The healthy bipolar self maintains its cohesiveness in two ways: 
firstly, from support derived from internalized selfobjects which 
provide ambitions, assertiveness and internal reserves of self-
esteem (having been loved by external others one is now loved by 
internal objects); and secondly, from affirmative people who 
revive infantile memory traces of mirroring, soothing or guiding 
archaic selfobjects. 
Kohut's model is one of the most detailed , comprehensive and 
influential object relations accounts of narcissistic pathology. 
His contribution, moreover, has not just been theoretical. He 
provides clinical accounts of his own therapeutic approach and 
reccommends, as does Winnicott, technical modification of the 
traditional interpretative technique. Because narcissistic 
pathology involves developmental arrest of the nuclear bipolar 
self psychotherapy is directed towards restoring the growth of 
the retarded self-structures. This is not effected primarily 
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through cognitive interpretation but rather by allowing the 
regressive selfobject transference to form and flourish. In this 
way, as in normal 
him/herself to be 
childhood development, the therapist allows 
internalized as the selfobject nucleus for 
self-structuralization. If successful, this benign regression in 
the service of structuralization culminates in healthy internal 
resources of self-esteem and the capacity to relate to people as 
others rather than as archaic selfobjects. 
What Kohut has done is to formulate a developmental model that 
accounts for the process of self-structuralization and its 
pathogenesis in the form of narcissistic disorders. Furthermore, 
at the ' level of self-pathology he breaks entirely from classical 
instinct theory, not only in declaring the self to be the center 
of the psychological universe but also by undercutting the role 
played by sexuality and aggression in normal and pathological 
development. The notion of healthy selfobject relations acting in 
the service of self-structuralization replaces libidinal 
homeostasis as the fundamental objective of human life. Where 
.. 
sexuality and aggression emerge, in either childhood or 
adulthood, eS apparently primary motivational determinants, they 
do so really as pathological "disintegration products" of 
frustrated self-development: 
" . . . initially the self does not seek tension reduction 
or instinctual expression but relate dness, attachment, 
connection to others. If there is a severe injury to 
the self and its relations, these primary 
constellations break down and there is de terioration to 
pure pleasure-seeking and rage. Thus, classical theory 
has ma d e the result of severe psychopathology the 
build i ng-blocks of its developmental psychology." 
(Greenberg and Mitchell pg 361) 
It has be e n argued that this makes his dual-level model 
conceptually untenable, particularly with his inc reasing distance 
from classical drive theory. Kohut has be en cri t i c ized by puri st 
ob j ect reI a tion s authors (and classical theorists) f or his 
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metatheoretical position. However, his cogent elucidation of the 
dynamics and treatment of narcissistic pathology remains 
impressive and influential. Although his work is clearly in the 
tradition of Balint and Winnicott, he has focused, refined and 
developed what was often only inchoate in their thought and 
extended it to provide a comprehensive formulation of self-
development and deficiency without employing traditional 
metapsychology. 
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4.5 Otto Kernberg's model of narcissistic pathology 
Kernberg has undoubtedly been the most systematic and prolific 
psychoanalytic author to write on the topic of self-pathology, 
specifically on narcissistic and borderline conditions . His 
theoretical position is rather unique . Like Kohut he believes 
that classical psychoanalytic theory is invaluable and should be 
retained. But unlike Kohut he does not want to restrict classical 
theory's application to neurotic disorde.rs only. He believes that 
the classical model has relevance to our understanding of self-
pathology as well. He is no Freudian however, his work is a 
conceptual hybrid of the traditional drive model and object 
relations theory. The latter, purged of Freudian metapsychology, 
does not provide a complete model of psychic functioning, argues 
Kernberg. Whereas Kohut restricts the application of classical 
theory Kernberg does the same to object relations theory by 
defining it as: 
.. 
" , .. a more restricted approach wi thin psychoanalytic 
metapsychology stressing the build up of dyadic or 
bipolar intrapsychic representations (self- and 
objectimages) as reflections of the original infant-
mother relationship and its later development into 
dyadic, triangular, and multiple internal and external 
interpersonal relationships .. ," (1976 pg 57) 
Kernberg thus retains the concepts of drive, the topographic 
model , c onstitutional aggression etc. while integrating object 
relations developmental theory in order to account for 
narcissistic pathology. Kernberg describes the primary feature of 
narcissistic people as a "disturbance of their self-regard in 
connection with specific disturbances in their object 
relationships." This is clearly similar to Kohut's 
understanding but, unlike Kohut, Kernberg gives a v e ry specific 
diagnostic profile of the narcissistic personality, (See chapter 
one). He describes them as being grandiose, egocentric, 
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emotionally shallow, envious, prone to idealization and 
depreciation, exploitative, volatile, cold, resentful and 
incapable of feeling any real sadness or depression. He also 
notes that although, on the surface, there seems to be a lack of 
object relationships, on a deeper level there exist very intense, 
primitive and frightening internal object relations. Comparing 
the structure of narcissistic pathology to that of borderline 
disorders he says 
"The defensive organization of these patients is quite 
similar to that of the borderline personality 
organization in general. They represent a predominance 
of primitive defensive mechanisms such as splitting, 
denial, projective identification, omnipotence and 
primitive idealization. They also show the intense, 
primitive quality of oral-aggressive conflicts 
characteristic of borderline patients. What 
distinguishes . .. narcissistic personalities from the 
usual borderline patient is their relatively good 
social functioning, their better impulse control, and 
what may be described as a pseudosublimatory ... capacity 
for active, consistent work in some areas which permits 
them partially to fulfill their ambitions of greatness 
and of obtaining admiration from others . (1975 pg 215) 
Like Kohut, Kernberg understands narcissistic pathology in terms 
of deficient self-development stemming from the child's inability 
to metabolize pathogenic internal object relations, and hence 
consolidate a stable nuclear self-structure. He defines the self 
as the "sum total of self-representations in intimate connection 
with the sum total of object-representations." (1982 pg 900) 
The development of the self begins in the following way. Early 
infantile development consists of the internalization and 
differentiation of rudimentary dyadic object relations units, 
each of which comprises three interrelated components: 
The first of these is a self-representation/image. Because self-
representations are forme d only in relation to external objects 
the second component is the object-representation/image. The 
self- and object-representations are connected by a third 
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component, an affective charge or "valence" which is essentially 
a drive-derivative and hence either li!:lidinal or aggressive in 
flavour. The prototypical object relations which form the 
building blocks of subsequent personality development are thus 
semi-autonomous bipolar introjects consisting of self- and 
object-images derived from contact with primary care-givers and 
connected by a positive or negative emotional charge. These 
simple object relations units are formed through the defensive 
process of splitting, whereby good and bad self and object-
representations are kept apart. The infant's experiences with a 
single external object are thus split. into antagonistic self-
object units, each with a different affective valence depending 
on whether the experience felt gratifying (good) or frustrating 
(bad). Introjections taking place under the positive valence of 
libidinal gratification fuse and become organized into the good 
internal object. Introjections taking place under the negative 
valence of aggressive drive derivatives merge with similar 
negative introjects to constellate the bad internal object . 
.. 
Introjection is later replaced by a higher level internalization 
mechanism, identification, which incorporates the role-related 
aspects of interpersonal relations e. g., a young boy does not 
simply internalize his emotional experience of his father, he 
also identifies with social aspects of his father's masculine 
role. This involves a clearer differentiation of self from other 
and a more differentiated, less intense emotional colouring. 
Although identifications begin towards the end of the infant's 
first year they only become fully developed during the second 
year of life. 
The third and last stage in the organization of internalization 
processes, says Kernberg, is the level of ego identity, which 
refers to "the overall organization of identifications and 
introjections under ... the synthetic function of the ego." (pg 
362) This implies, firstly, consolidation of those ego structures 
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related to a sense of self-continuity, where self is understood 
to be the total organization of self-image components of 
introjections and identifications. Secondly, in addition to a 
stable organization of self-related internal structures there 
must be a complementary sense of a stable object world derived 
from the organization of the object-image components of 
intro j ections and identifications. This experience of one's 
object world as consistent and dependable in relation to oneself 
is vital for the acquisition of ego identity. A third 
prerequisite for ego identity is confirmation and affirmation of 
the child's characteristic interactions with his/her environment 
by care-givers. 
The developmental outcome of 
of stable ego boundaries 
normal identity formation 
i.e. a high degree of 
is a sense 
self-other 
differentiation, a rich internal world comprising the 
depersonified internal presence of objects who were loved and 
admired in a realistic way, and the experience of the external 
world as an inviting space populated by people who are 
(potentially) trustworthy, caring and consistent. 
In narcissistic disorders and all forms of self - pathology a 
stable sense of ego identity has never been consolidated because 
of a preponderance of pathological splitting, destructive 
internal objects and resulting poor self-other differentiation. 
"The pers i s tence", says Kernberg, "of non-metabolized early 
introjections is the outcome of a pathological fixation of 
severely disturbed, early object relations." (pg 365) 
Because int roject i ons are the developmental precipitants around 
which ego nuclei constellate, their role in identity formation is 
crucial. The process of splitting, whereby bad introjects 
comprising self- and object-images are defensively seperated from 
the good introjects and projected outwards, is gradually given up 
in normal development, culminating in the "depressive pOSition" 
which Klein outlined so well. In narcissism, however , although 
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fairly stable ego boundaries have formed, the ' presence of 
severely destructive bad objects and the relative absence of good 
objects means that the predominantly bad introjects have to be 
continually split off and projected . The result is a relatively 
empty, imp~verished internal world where self-representations are 
unconsciously organized around negative self-images derived from 
destructive external object relations. Self-esteem is 
con sequen tly very low and the narcissist's underlying self-
experience is that of being small, weak, ugly, bad , empty, 
hateful etc. At this point the specifically narcissistic 
defensive configuration comes into existence. Whereas normal 
infantile development is characterized by progressive 
differentiation of self- and object-representations, narcissistic 
development involves a process of: 
" .. . refusion of the self and object images ... at a level 
of development at which ego boundaries have already 
become stable. At this point there is a fusion of ideal 
self, ideal object, and actual self images as a defense 
against an intolerable reality in the interpersonal 
realm, with a concomitant devaluation and destruction 
of object images as well as of external objects." 
(Kernberg 1975 pg 216) 
The unconscious rationa le for identifying oneself with one's own 
ideal self and ideal object-images is to avoid or deny dependency 
on external objects or the internalized representations of these 
objects. The narcissist's unconscious logic is as follows: "I do 
not feel loveable for myself alone. The person who cares for me 
and whom I idealize will only love me if I am not small, 
vulnerable and needy. In orde r to avoid the threat of rejection I 
will become my 
Not only will 
identify with 
ideal self (strong, attractive, independent etc). 
I identify with my ideal self but I will also 
that idealized other person. In this way I can 
become completely self-sufficient and not need anyone." 
The narcissist's grandiosity thus derives from an inflated self-
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concept produced by the defensive conflation of real self (the 
specialness of the child reinforced by some good early 
experience), ideal self (fantasies of perfection that compensate 
for the experience of oral frustration), and idealized object 
(fantasy of a perfectly nurturant mother in contrast to real 
experience of deficient 
the unacceptable "bad" 
projected onto external 
nurturance) representations. Furthermore, 
self-representations are split off and 
objects who the narcissist then devalues. 
A further consequence of this 
mature superego development is 
pathological conflation 
retarded. The normal 
is that 
superego 
comprises the internalized demands and prohibitions of objects as 
well as gratifying rewards and encouragement if these are adhered 
to. In this way the ego-ideal and the idealized object are 
integrated into an internalized and valued system of personalized 
ethics and standards. The primitive and punitive superego 
forerunners (the projection of infantile aggression onto the 
"bad" frustrating parent) are tempered and modulated by real 
experiences with nurturant parental figures. With the narcissist, 
however, the fusion of real self, ideal self aI,1d ideal object 
eradicates any tension between the real self (ego)and the ideal 
self and object (superego) and thus prevents superego maturation. 
Moreover, the punitive superego forerunners are not modified by 
contact with realistically good parents and thus remain projected 
onto external Objects: 
"AI though some superego components are internalized, 
such as prohibitive parental demands, they preserve a 
distorted, primitive, aggressive quality because they 
are not integrated with the loving aspects of the 
superego which are normally drawn from the ideal self 
and object images ... " (Kernberg 1975 pg 217) 
This explains the narcissist's typical moral corruptability, lack 
of conscience and generally paranoid fear of being harmed, 
humi lia ted or re j ected by those who tave power over him/her. 
(These characteristics are most pronounced in antisocial 
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personalities, the most severe category of. narcissistic 
disorder. ) 
relationships with others as 
by greed (other people have 
nourishing resources inside which need to be extracted) 1 or by 
depreciation (other people are seen as already emptied and 
therefore worthless). This complex defensive structure is an 
elaborate protection against a split-off and deeply buried self-
The narcissist 
exploitative, 
experiences his/her 
characterized either 
image: 
"It is the image of a hungry, enraged, empty self, 
of impotent anger at being frustrated, and fearful 
world which seems as hateful and revengeful as 
patient himself . " (Kernberg 1975 pg 219) 
full 
of a 
the 
In terms of etiological considerations Kernberg is rather non-
committal as to the respective roles of constitutional and 
environmental influences. However, he does identify a coldly 
aggressive 
backgrounds 
or indifferent maternal figure as common in the 
of these patients. 
maternal role with superficial 
callousness, 
aggression." 
indifference 
(Kernberg 1975 
This mother figure performs her 
c ompetence "but with a degree of 
and nonverbalized, spiteful 
pg 220) As a result the child 
experiences intense emotional hunger, anger, resentment and 
frustration which initiates a process of defensive self-reliance 
and grandiosity. 
Kernberg isolates further specific etiological features 
characteristic of the narcissist's early relationships. These 
people are often realistically endowed with special features or 
1 The author's experience with one narcissistic patient 
supports Kernberg's emphasis on the oral dynamics underlying 
narcissism. The male patient in question was preoccupied with 
oral sexual fantasies and experienced a persistently intense 
"sexual hunger" for women which he experienced in his stomach 
rather than his genitals. I understood thi s to represent the 
sexualization of a predominantly oral ne~d. 
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aptitudes which parental figures unconsciously envy or resent. 
These features then become a refuge against feelings of being 
unloved, unaccepted and r esented. A third possible environmental 
cause involves the child being used to vicariously satisfy the 
parents' own narcissistic needs through the former's brilliance, 
beauty, talents · etc and at the expense of the child's own needs. 
The mother's narc issistic world creates a predisposition for the 
child's " spec ialnes s" around which fantasies of grandiosity 
crystallize . 
Whatever the specific etiology in each case it is clear what 
purpose the narcissist's defensive structure serves: to prevent 
dependency relations and the attendant greedy hunger, frustration 
and exploitation of the vulnerable archaic self-structure: 
"Once the kind of mechanism mentioned defensive 
fusion of ideal self, ideal obje ct, and self-images-
comes into operation, it is extremely effective in 
perpetuating a vicious circle of self-admiration, 
depreciation of others, and elimination of actual 
dependency. The greatest fear of these patients is to 
be dependent on anybody else because to depend means to 
hate, envy and expose themselves to the danger of being 
exploited, mistreated and frustrated." (Kernberg 1975 
pg 220) 
Even when the narcissist idealizes another person and is 
apparently dependent on him/her, the reality of the relationship 
is usually that there is no relationship at all because the 
admired other is experienced merely as an extension of the 
narcissist's own self . Narcissists thus often begin therapy after 
being rejected by s omeone. The resulting empty depression and 
o f the normal proc ess of mourning a lost 
rather a consequence of losing oneself 
despair is not part 
relationship, but is 
because the other was experienced as a mirror to, or extension 
of, oneself and not as an individual in hi s /her own right. 
Unlike Kohut, Kernberg emphasises envy as a n important dynamic in 
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narcissistic pathology . Because narcissist's experience their 
interior as empty or bad they are enviously attuned to the 
fullness and goodness of others. To experience this envy is 
painful because it emphasises their own inner desolation. 
Devaluation of others thus serves the defensive function of 
denying their own envy. This places narcissists in a double-bind: 
they desperately need so much from others to fill up their 
emptiness but cannot accept anything because it induces envy of 
others. This simply reinforces the defensive self-sufficiency and 
denial of dependency needs. 
Kernberg's explanation of narcissistic pathology may be 
summarized as follows: In the late oral stage of development the 
infant, having experienced a period of relatively adequate 
maternal provision and hence attaining reasonable self-other 
differentiation, now experiences intense oral frustration. This 
frustration may be due to an inordinate amount of constitutional 
aggression or it may be the product of deficient maternal care. 
Whatever the etiology the result is the subjective experience of 
deprivation felt and expressed through the oral modality as 
aggression, hatred, greed and envy. The preponderance of these 
negative experiences results in excessive splitting of both 
object and ego and the projection of aggressive phantasies onto 
external objects. This excessive splitting and projection results 
in a denuded and impoverished internal world expressed in 
feelings of emptiness, loneliness, coldness, ugliness, chronic 
inferiority and envy of others. The specific defense against this 
chronic emptiness, inferiority and envy takes the form of a 
regressive fusion of real self, ideal self and ideal object after 
ego boundaries have become consolidated. This defensive fusion 
serves two primary purposes: firstly, it results in a 
compensatory grandiose self-representation that denies the 
underlying negative self-representation of 
Secondly, 
hollowness, 
it abolishes inadequacy, badness, envy, hunger etc. 
dependency on an object world perceived a s depriving, rejecting, 
·1 
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hateful and unloving. The end result is a defensive grandiose and 
self-sufficient self-representation which hides an impoverished 
internal world ruled by chronic hunger, oral dependency, envy and 
rage. These underlying feelings are split off and projected onto 
external objects who are consequently depreciated. 
Kernberg, more than Kohut, emphasises the subjective experience 
of emptiness that is a central feature of narcissism. 
Narcissist's often complain of emotional numbness, bored 
restlessness, blankness, hollowness, meaninglessness and the 
feeling of being only half alive. Kernberg attributes this to the 
narcissist's denuded internal world: 
"The subjective experience of emptiness represents a 
temporary or permanent loss of the normal relationship 
of the self with objec t representations, that is, with 
the world of inner objects ... that constitutes a basic 
ingredient of ego identity ... when there exists a lack 
of an integrated self and of norm3.1 relations of the 
self with integrated internal objects, a deep-seated, 
chronic sense of emptiness and 
meaninglessness . . . Ejnsues. In narcissistic 
personali ties, where the normal relations between an 
integrated self and integrated internal objects are 
replaced by a pathological grandiose self and a 
deterioration of internal objects, the experience of 
emptiness is most intense and almost constant." 
(Kernberg 1975 pg 220) 
Al though Kernberg and Kohut agree on the phenomenology of 
narcissism and the notion that the central feature is a deficient 
self-structure, they differ in the following important respects: 
1. Firstly, Kohut defines narcissistic cathexis not in terms of 
its object (either self or other) but in terms of the nature of 
the ensuing transference which is either idealizing (the 
self-aggrandizing therapist serves as an 
(the therapist serves 
self). Kernberg, in 
idealized selfobject) or 
as a mirror for the patient's 
contrast, defines narcissistic 
grandiose 
cathexis 
specifically in terms of its object i.e. the grandiose self-
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representation. 
2. Secondly, while Kohut attributes narcissistic pathology to the 
developmental arrest of normal phase-specific narcissistic 
selfobject relations, Kernberg contends that narcissistic 
dysfunction represents an actively pathological distortion of 
psychic 
normal 
structures and object relations 
development. Pathological adult 
that is not part of 
narcissism and normal 
infantile narcissism are two entirely diffrent phenomena . 
Pathological narcissism involves a grandiose but deficient self-
structure which is a defense against emptiness, rage and envy 
which are not typical features of normal child development. 
3. Thirdly, whereas Kohut believes that narcissistic fixation may 
occur as late as pre-adolescence, after a period of normal 
development, Kernberg argues that narcissism has its genesis in 
the late oral stage of infantile development. This accounts for 
Kernberg ' s descriptive emphasis on oral metaphors in narcissistic 
functioning e. g. hunger, greed, oral aggression etc. Both 
theorists emphasize maternal deficiency as a primary etiological 
fact or, although Kernberg entertains the notion that excessive 
constitutional aggression may playa causal role . 
4. Kohut and Kernberg differ on the issue of classifying 
narcissistic pathology . Whereas Kohut makes a clear distinction 
between 
patho l ogy 
narcissistic personality 
Kernberg classifies NPD as 
disorder and 
a subtype of 
borderline 
borderline 
dis order, distinguished from BPD by a fairly integrated, though 
pathologica l grandiose self. The narcissist employs borderline 
defens e s such as splitting, i dealization, devaluation, projective 
identificat i on etc as well as sharing many borderline symptoms. 
5. Kohut sees narcissistic aggression as a reactive product of 
environmental frustration and only a secondary feature in NPD. 
Kernbe rg, on the contrary, sees oral a ggression/rage as a primary 
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feature of 
instinctual 
narcissism 
derivatives. 
and 
The 
understands this 
ghosts of Freud 
.in 
and 
terms 
Klein 
of 
are 
constantly present in Kernberg's metapsychology but Kohut has, in 
the area of narcissistic disorder, exorcised practically all 
traditional metatheoretical residues. 
6. At the level of clinical 
rather than interpretation 
selfobject transferences. He 
practice 
and the 
counsels 
Kohut emphasises empathy 
tolerant facilitation of 
clinicians to allow the 
idealizing and mirroring transferences to emerge and grow in 
order to foster the original transmuting internalization that was 
arrested at an early age. Kernberg, on the other hand, perceives 
these selfobject transferences not as normal (arrested) 
developmental phenomena but as pathological defenses against 
infantile rage, hatred and envy. The transference phenomena are 
thus impediments to therapeutic change and should be 
systematically interpreted in order to access the underlying oral 
aggression. 
The debate between Kohut and Kernberg is not simply 
<. 
metatheoretical insofar as their respective conceptual 
frameworks, to an extent, 
psychodynamically but also 
determine 
how they 
not only what they see 
act 
basically irreconcilable conceptual models 
as clinicians. Their 
have both contributed 
significantly to our understanding of narcissism and have 
provided an arena for lively debate. 
Chapter summary 
This chapter was de voted to a selective literature review of 
object relations authors who have made significant contributions 
to our understanding and treatment of narcissistic disorders . We 
began by looking at the early contributions of Balint and 
Winnicott. The value of Balint's work centers on his metaphor of 
the basic fault, a rich description of the phenomenology of 
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narcissistic injury. It was then argued that, although the two 
theorists have much in common, Winnicott provides a more 
comprehensive theoretical model of self-pathology revolving 
around the cardinal concepts of transitional space and false 
self devel?pment . Although Winnicott and Balint were theoretical 
pioneers in the field of pre-oedipal pathology they had little to 
say about the specifics of narcissistic disorders. To this end we 
turned to Kohut and Kernberg, the two most influential modern 
experts on narcissism. Kohut's split-level model focused on the 
arrested development of the bipolar self and the resulting 
primary deficits in self-structuralization. This is expressed in 
self-aggrandizing or idealizing selfobject relationships where 
other people are needed to perform functions (particularly self-
esteem regulation) that cannot be performed by the person's own 
underdeveloped self-structure. The remainder of the chapter 
concerned Kernberg's mixed model explanation of narcissistic 
dysfunction which centered on the defensive role played by the 
grandiose self-representation formed by the fusion of real self, 
ideal self and ideal object in order to deny object-dependency 
and chronic underlying feelings of emptiness, greed, rage and 
envy. The chapter concluded with a brief comparison of Kohut and 
Kernberg and the argument that their incommensurate theoretical 
paradigms have both advanced our understanding of narcissism. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC CASE STUDY OF NARCISSISTIC DISORDER 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the phenomenology, structure and 
psychodynamics of narcissistic pathology, drawing on a single 
short-term depth psychotherapy conducted by the author while 
completing his clinical psychology internship at Rhodes 
University psychology clinic. It includes diagnostic 
considera tions, highlights of the patient's history and the 
presentation of significant extracts from each session. Detailed 
discussion of the therapeutic material is not included here but 
appears in the discussion chapter (chapter six). 
5 . 2 Identifying data 
Dianna (a pseudonym) was a twenty-six year old university student 
who returned to Grahamstown a number of years after completing a 
BA degree in order to pursue graduate studies in journalism. She 
had spent the last few years working in commerce. Although 
successful in this field she felt unfulfilled. Although uncertain 
about an alternative career choice she intended studying nature 
conservation after completing her journalism diploma, a 
qualification she believed would have practical use in a 
conservation career. She lived alone, was unmarried and not 
involved in a sexual relationship at the time. 
5.3 Presenting problem 
On her clinic application form the patient cited her problem as 
follows: 
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"I have been suppressing something from an early age 
which has subtle but distinct ramifications in every 
area of my life and undermines me. I have built up a 
wall against it which I am tired of papering. I would 
like assistance to identify and confront it and put it 
behind me. I have tried alone but ultimately end up 
papering cracks again. I've experienced this for as 
long as I can remember, although conscious awareness of 
it has been intermittent since the age of sixteen." 
Elaborating on this during the assessment session she described 
experiencing "a parting of the vale and seeing something scary 
but not knowing what it is." She added that it was something 
"which I'm subliminally aware of, something deeper than the 
normal surface crises. " She felt that it related to the issue of 
self-confidence, to a dim but tangible awareness that her self-
image had been seriously undermined at some early age. She said 
she was becoming increasingly aware of "a fragility, an 
insubstantiality underlying my surface confidence." She wondered 
whether the fact that she had been sexually molested by a family 
friend at the age of three or four was not the source of her 
presenting problem . 
She added that in situations in which she felt vulnerable she 
would adopt an attitude of superiority, "a brittle dogmatic 
confidence" that she was increasingly coming to recognize as a 
front. She was very sensitive to criticism and did not deal with 
it well because criticism made her painfully aware of her 
underlying fragility. Her usual response to criticism was either 
to lash out or withdraw resentfully from the encounter. It was 
particularly confrontational situations that alerted her to this 
fragility. An innocuous c omment by an acquaintance on her rather 
spartan living conditions (she had very few material posessions 
and liked to feel that she could pack everything she owned in her 
car and leave at a moment's notice) had an unusually strong 
impact on her. Her spartan life-style suddenly felt like a 
"failure" on her part f or which she felt guilty. She wasn't sure 
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what her guilt was about but felt that it had something to do 
with a vague feeling of "having in some way failed myself." 
Another aspect of her presenting problem was that "I seem to be 
perennially sarcastic in response to surface compliments. 
Compliments about external appearences are not important, I need 
to have compliments about my self." 
As can be seen from the above her presenting problem was rather 
vague and shadowy. She did not feel depressed or anxious and did 
not exhibit any of the usual neurotic symptomatic indicators. 
5.4 Personality 
"How much tilne do I have?", she laughed in response to my 
question of how she sees herself. "I'm a funny mixture of the 
gregarious and the solitary. I enjoy my own company because it 
places no demands on me. Others think me eccentric. I don't fit 
in with going trends, I don't run with th~ pack." 
She was very outdoors-oriented and said she was happiest when she 
was out alone in the bush. She would frequently grab some camping 
gear, jump on her motorcycle and just take off at a moment's 
notice for anywhere, hiking and sleeping alone in the veld. 
Sometimes, frustrated by Grahamstmm' s lack of stimulation, she 
would drive miles out of town at night and, after parking her car 
in a deserted spot, turn up the volume of her car sound system 
and dance alone outside her car. 
She claimed to be " excited by little things - new leaves, rays 
of sunshine." She said she had "a very dry sense of humour that 
verges on caustic." She had always felt herself to be rather 
unique and felt ostracized by other kids at school because "they 
could never understand what I had to say." Her mother, however, 
attributed her lack of belonging to a "haughty attitude." She 
said that although she had the ;lighest IQ in her class she never 
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Ii ved up to her intellectual potential potential, much to the 
exasperation of her teachers. 
She always had ·the feeling that she never really fitted into 
things, that she was somehow left out. She never had many friends 
although she always ensured that she had one friend at anyone 
time. For as long as she can remember she had always been very 
self-sufficient, relying on herself for everything. 
She described herself as being " a sympathetic person, although 
that's not as noble as it sounds. I would always find people with 
hang-ups and want to fix them. I guess I needed to be needed-
its an ego thing" 
In spite of her apparent confidence she said she had always had a 
sense of "incompleteness" which she found strange because of her 
extraordinary self-reliance. 
She described moments of intense happiness or excitement and was 
aware of a secretive inner essence which she called "the silent 
passion." It was silent because it did not have an outlet and she 
f el t afraid of it being exposed and ostracized . Its only 
expression was in the poetry she wrote. She said it was passion 
in its purest form - that of intense feeling. 
5.5 Personal impressions 
The tone and style of her clinic application told me that Dianna 
was an unusual person. Her appearance and manner confirmed this 
impression. She was an imposing presence. She was a very tall, 
long-limbed and attractive woman who dressed very casually and 
wore her hair long. She didn't walk but rather sauntered into my 
office with a studied nonchalance, draped herself languidly over 
the chair and stretched out her legs without any sign of anxiety 
or tension. She leaned back in her chair, gazed slowly and 
appraisingly around my office with an ironical half-smile on her 
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lips and commented critically on the "perceptual pollution" of 
the sound-proofed walls and the curious taste evident in my 
choice of pictures. "They're very childish, not the sort of 
pictures I would hang on my walls", she said condescendingly. 
Taking her time she collected her thoughts and began to speak in 
a slow, lazy American drawl. She sighed dramatically, laughed 
lightly and spoke in an almost bored tone, choosing her words 
wi th a thoughtful and articulate precision from an impressive 
vocabulary. I felt like a member of an audience about to watch a 
theatrical performance by a celebrated actress. From the start it 
was clear that she was directing the interview. I had to hastily 
thrust my questions into the infrequent pauses in her impressive 
verbal flow. I felt small, self-conscious and vulnerable as she 
responded to my questions with an expression of wry and often 
surprised amusement. I chose my words carefully while she 
processed them, gazing steadily at me without blinking. She asked 
me a lot of personal questions and laughed at my evasiveness. I 
was aware that she was assessing me at the same time as I was 
assessing her. She began our second session by asking whether we 
could do therapy in the botanical gardens which my office 
overlooked. When I said no she asked whether she could sit in my 
chair for a change. I felt that she was testing me, tring to see 
to what extent she could control or influence me. At the end of 
our first session she inquired whether I was suffering from a 
hangover as I looked "all pale and wan." In spite of her 
cri tical, taunting and condescending attitude a degree of 
idealization was present from the start: "I came to the clinic 
because I'd heard so much about you personally." She requested, 
if accepted, to see me personally because, by the end of the 
interview she claimed to trust me more than she would be able to 
trust another therapist. 
5.6 Highlights of personal history 
Rather than listing purely factual details of the patient's life 
86. 
I will present a number of anecdotes that capture the atmosphere 
of her life and her family relations. 
Dianna is one of three children, the only daughter in the family. 
She has a younger and older brother. Her parents are divorced and 
both are remarried. 
She was a solitary child who always felt that she was rather 
special. Her father only wanted a girl and wouldn't even go to 
the hospital to see his first child because it was a boy. "I was 
my daddy's pride and joy." She described her father as being "a 
clown, rather immature and not very strong, although he had a 
good sense of humour." 
She described her mother as being a "matriarch", strong and 
domineering. She is a frustrated but talented artist who was 
pushed by her family into an architecture career and who has held 
down two concurrent full-time jobs for the past fifteen years. 
Dianna says that the children "are the reason for my mother's 
existence and she's made a lot of sacrifices for us." The world 
presented to Dianna through her mother's eyes was one of 
perpetual strife. She remembers her mother constantly telling 
her: "You must fight your own battles because you're on your own 
and no-one will fight them for you." Al though devoted to her 
children Dianna experiences her mother as remarkably insensitive: 
"Al though there is still that atavistic bond I can't trust her 
with my feelings." This feeling was s o strong that she still 
recoils if her mother tries to hug her. Her mother had always 
accused Dianna of being too dreamy and oversensi ti ve . She had 
ambitious fantasies about her daughter one day becoming a great 
writer and making lots of money for the family. Dianna, however, 
felt that "I was not able to express something because my mother 
dismissed a lot of what I said as being oversensitive, the 
product of a wild imagination." 
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Dianna remembers being caught in the middle of a fierce marital 
quarrel one day. Her mother called Dianna's brothers to her and 
Dianna was left standing between her parents. Her mother told her 
to come to her and Dianna realized that if she did the whole 
family would be standing against her father. She felt torn but 
eventually went to her father's side. Out of gratitude he bought 
her a large chocolate easter egg. When she brought it home her 
mother smashed it against the wall and Dianna recalls her and her 
father picking up the chocolate fragments. 
The marriage was conflict-ridden and she says she was born with 
the insight that there was a lack of bonding between her parents, 
that they did not marry for love. 
Dianna said that when she was a child she lived in "a mist of 
dreams and books" which she used as a form of escape. At the age 
of five, while taking her younger brother to nursery school, "I 
suddenly felt sad an,d realized that my childhood was over." 
She fought a lot with her brothers and defended herself against 
their superior physical strength with her verbal aggression. One 
day, in a moment of malice, she decided to start a fire in her 
brother's toy box beneath his bed. Having done so she left the 
room and carried on reading. The room caught fire and the fire 
brigade was called in. Dianne felt no remorse and remembers 
"enjoying the high drama of it all." 
Her parents were divorced when she was thirteen years old and 
both remarried within six weeks of each other. Dianna stayed with 
her mother and so inherited three step-siblings who she did not 
get along with . Nor did she have a good relationship with her 
step-father: "He used to play psychological mind games with rue." 
She coped with her unhappines s by withdrawing and overeating, 
something she still does periodically. 
I 
i 
I. 
I 
I 
:/ ~ I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'. ' ~ ' - - ~, , -- .. ~ ~ 
88. 
Between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two she went through a 
long period of "solid depression". She was moved from a school 
where she feels she would have been made head-girl to an up-
market convent· where she felt very alienated. During this period 
her mother would tell Dianna about all her problems and Dianna 
became her mother's only confidante. 
After leaving school she came to university to study law. It was 
a traumatic time for her: she became involved with a notorious 
campus political reactionary who was extremely disturbed. When 
she tried to extricate herself from the relationship "he set out 
to systematically destroy me." During this stressful period her 
mother got divorced for the second time. She says that all that 
kept her going during this time was her Christian faith and a 
very close male friend, both of which her mother vigorously 
attacked. It was in this year that she lost her virginity. This 
horrified her because her mother had told her that she was the 
only virgin left in the family and therefore responsible for 
upholding the family honour. Feeling that she'd betrayed her 
mother she experienced severe guilt for a period of three years. 
One night the accumulated stress got too much: 
" I started to go numb. I felt I was in a grey cotton cloud, 
seperated from other people. I felt guilty, laden and 
responsible. I was unable to get angry." 
During her third year at university she got engaged to a man who 
went overseas and who she did not see for the next eighteen 
months. She eventually realized that she did not want to get 
married and ended the relationship. During this period, she says, 
" I started to build myself up again." Her life after this until 
the present has been relatively stable except for the continual 
effect of her presenting problem. 
5.7 Preliminary diagnosis 
89. 
At the end of the assessment session I felt relatively certain 
that Dianna's problem was essentially narcissistic. My reasons 
for suspecting this were as follows: 
1. The presenting problem involved an inner fragility, 
incompleteness and insubstantiality underlying a rather grandiose 
exterior. Her extraordinary self-sufficiency concealed a chronic 
lack of self-confidence. This, as the literature suggests, is the 
leitmotif of narcissistic pathology. 
2. Her hypersensitivity to criticism and tendency to lash out or 
withdraw in response is another characteristic narcissistic 
feature. 
3. For all her life she has experienced herse l f as being special, 
unique and more intelligent than those around her. This 
"haughtiness" alienated her from other people and clearly 
' . 
affected her interpersonal functioning. 
4. The biting quality of her self-confessed sarcasm indicated a 
veiled aggression. The extent of this aggression was hinted at by 
her deliberately setting fire to her brother's toy box. Her 
pleasure in the "high drama" of this occasion, together with the 
absence of any guilt suggested deficient superego functioning 
characteristic of narcissistic disturbance. 
5. Her behaviour in the initial interview had a definite 
narcissistic quality to it. She was subtley critical, taunting, 
controlling, condescending and exhibitionistic. At the same time 
elements of idealization were present. 
6. My countertransference response to her ",'as unusual for me and 
possibly diagnostically meaningful. I felt small, vulnerable, 
defensive and evasive. These are often shadow qualities of the 
narcissistic person and I wondered if I was registering her own 
90. 
underlying self-representation. 
After the interview the above features, together with the long-
standing duration of the problem, pointed toward a diagnosis of 
narcissistic personality disorder. No other diagnosis appeared to 
warrant serious consideration. 
In spite of the fact that short-term depth psychotherapy with 
narcissistic patients is contraindicated I decided to accept her 
as a therapy patient, even though therapy would end after only 
four months owing to both patient and therapist leaving town. My 
reasons for accepting her were as follows: 
Firstly, in spite of her grandiosity and self-sufficiency she was 
consciously in touch with her underlying vulnerability and 
insubstantiali ty. The felt tension between her external facade 
and her internal experience, together with her desire to 
understand the meaning of this tension rather than simply abolish 
it, were healthy prognostic indicators. 
Secondly, she'd attempted for many years to master these 
egodystonic feelings by herself. Now she was acknowledging that 
she was not after all completely self-sufficient, that she could 
only be healed with the aid of another person. This partial 
surrender of narcissistic independence was another healthy 
indicator. 
My third reason for accepting her is less easily articulated. It 
had to do with the quality of our contact. What struck me most 
about my previous limited experience with narcissistic patients 
was their coldness or indifference and my experience of them as 
emotionally unavailable and far away. Dianna was rather 
different. She brought with her a tangible energy, an aliveness 
and vitality that, even though narcissistic in expression, made 
her feel somehow substantial and three-dimensional. Instead of 
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the typical narcissist's solipsistic withdrawal from external 
relationship, I experienced a very definite and strong sense of 
contact, of being in relationship with her. Interpersonal style 
or, more a·ccurately, the atmosphere or feeling tone created by a 
patient, is often a more reliable diagnostic indicator than the 
presenting symptom profile. Although Dianna's symptomatology and 
dynamics appeared expressly narcissistic she was clearly not a 
typical case of narcissistic personality disorder. I found this 
anomaly both intruiging and hopeful even though it presented an 
immediate diagnostic dilemma. I felt that any clear-cut diagnosis 
would be ex post facto, emerging only as the therapy unfolded. 
Her expectations of therapy were modest 
exploring this other side of herself which 
she wanted help in 
she'd pushed aside for 
so long. All the above suggested that she could possibly benefit 
from psychotherapy, even in the short-term . 
<. 
5.8 Psychotherapy 
Sessions two and three 
Psychotherapy began with a very definite focus, the disturbed 
relationship between Dianna and her mother. This was hardly 
surprising. Dianna's description of her mother in the assessment 
interview had made me feel horrified, angry and sad even though 
Dianna described her and their relationship in an unemotiona l and 
matter-of-fact way. I felt tears in my eyes when Dianna described 
the episode of her mother shattering the chocolate easter egg. 
When I questioned the detached manner in which she described the 
event Dianna shrugged and said she'd come to terms with it. I 
realized, though, that this destructive dyadic relationship would 
inevi tably be the crux of Dianna's diff icuil ties and that my 
horror, anger and sadness would need to become her own at some 
point in the course of therapy. At the end of the assessment 
session I already knew a lot about her mother, who had 
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immediately become a very real presence for me, arousing a lot of 
strong negative emotion that Dianna did not apparently feel. My 
early impressions of Dianna's mother may be summed up as follows: 
Firstly, she is clearly a very powerful and domineering figure 
who was the source of authority in the family. Father, being a 
weak and childish man was not able to check or counteract her 
influence - the family system was clearly matriarchal. Secondly, 
mother is also a talented and creative person whose artistic 
potential has been frustrated by a career (architecture) into 
which she was pushed rather than guided. Thirdly, in Dianna's 
words, the children were the reason for her mother's existence 
and she'd made many sacrifices for them, holding down two full-
time jobs in order to see to their material comfort. This 
apparent maternal 
the light of her 
wri ter and making 
together with the 
devotion emerges as extremely pathological in 
fantasy of Dianna one day becoming a great 
lots of money for the family. This fantasy, 
belief that t he family honour depended on 
Dianna's virginity suggests that Dianna waq. the vechile for her 
mother's own grandiose and frustrated ambitions and values and 
that she hoped to vicariously satisfy her own unrealized needs 
through the life of her intelligent and talented daughter. This, 
together with her insensitivity, volatility, destructive anger 
and domineering presence is the characteristic profile of a 
narcissistic personality. 
Fourthly, mother's narcissistic committment and devotion to her 
children would probably have masked her destructiveness, thereby 
making it hard for Dianna to get angry with her without feeling 
considerable guilt. 
These were my initial impressions of Dianna's mother and it 
didn't surprise me when Dianna began therapy by saying that 
al though she wanted to tell her mother about herself and about 
starting therapy bu t couldn't because she felt that her mother 
would be hurt, take this as criticism and respond in her typical 
way by lashing out rather thall listening. Dianna's mother was 
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leaving shortly on an overseas trip and Dianna said: "Air travel 
isn' t as safe as it was. If anything happens I want to have 
sorted this out." The unconscious derivative I heard in this 
communication was the repressed phantasy or wish that her mother 
would come to harm. I did not articulate this and Dianna carried 
on to relate an incident that had happened when she was a child 
of six. For some reason unknown to her she felt that there was 
going to be a drought and that she needed to collect water. When 
she went to her mother to ask for bottles her mother had laughed 
at her, leaving Dianne feeling very hurt. I understood this to be 
a symbolic communication that the child had felt insecure about 
her mother's love and feared that her already meager supplies of 
nurturant affection might dry up or be withdrawn, leaving her 
internal world parched and barren. Instead of taking the child 
seriously Dianna's mother had laughed at her, thus confirming her 
phantasies. I did not interpret this either but instead picked up 
on the theme of destructiveness by asking whether Dianna felt 
somehow afraid of harming her mother. She confirmed this and said 
"my huge indomitable mother has become much weaker since her 
children left and she no longer has anything to defend." Later on 
she asked whether I, as a therapist, found myself affected by 
absorbing my patients' "negative vibes." Making the connection 
between an earlier statement of hers about wondering whether 
anyone would be there to catch her if she fell, and the present 
phantasy of hurting her mother, I interpreted her fear that I 
might not be strong enough to handle her destructive feelings or 
hear the underlying frustrated plea for genuine caring which her 
mother had ignored. "Yes", she said, "its a question of trust." 
Session four 
Dianna began session four by saying that the previous session had 
not been very productive. She felt she had to find the incidents 
in her past responsible for the way she was feeling. But, she 
said, she'd already analyzed her past on her own and rationalized 
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the various events. There was nothing she did not understand, so 
why was she still not in control of her life? What more could she 
possibly do? Her intellect was even more formidable than I'd 
originally suspected. She generated theories and hypotheses about 
her life, expecting praise or at least encouragement for her 
efforts. To her intense frustration I did not provide any. She 
would arrive at each session with a handful of type-written notes 
she'd taken between sessions. The notes contained intellectual 
rumina tions and "promis ing" clues to unconscious childhood 
memories she felt sure she must have repressed. She got annoyed 
with me when I suggested that for her therapy would be about not 
knowing and not understanding. I had noticed that periodically, 
when a "hot" topic arose her eyes would become moist. Her 
response on these occasions would be a manic flurry of 
intellectual associations to the topic broached. When I pointed 
this out to her she said "I don't cry in front of other people. I 
should be able to sort this out by myself." When I interpreted 
her need for intellectual control and independence she said this 
was very necessary because "I can't expect anyone to catch me. 
That's too much to expect and, besides, I don't know anyone 
strong enough." It occurred to her that right throughout her life 
she had always needed to have someone to protect in some way. 
This, she felt had something to do with her fear of being out of 
control. It emerged that as long as she was protecting someone 
else's vulnerabilities she could feel less vulnerable herself and 
thus more in control. 
Session five 
Session five began with her recalling an incident that happened 
when she was at Rhodes for the first time. She was staying with a 
friend and feeling rather fragile at the time. When t he friend 
hugged her s h e felt "a dam burst" and she sobbed uncontrollably. 
After that incident her friend had remained distant. Dianna felt 
she must be thinking "You're not the person I thought you were." 
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I made the interpretation that although she was feeling fragile 
she could not let go for fear that I might not hold her, but 
rather withdraw because she wasn't as strong as the image she 
presented. , "Yes", she said, "I don't know what I can expect and 
what I have a right to expect from you if that happens 
again ... What happens if I break down five minutes before closing 
time. Will you kick me out? Do I have to time my break-down to 
fit in with the limits of therapy?" 
This session was significant because, for the first time, her 
neediness and dependence on me had become apparent. Up until now 
Dianna had used me simply as an audience for her intellectualized 
attempts to gain mastery over her life . She had previously 
referred to her perception of my role by saying " I need you 
because two brains are better than one." NOw, however, I wa s no 
longer merely a cerebral assistant but someone she wanted to care 
for her, to hold her a nd not reject her if her brittle shell of 
competence cracked. Al though she felt that I, because of my 
professional training, might do a better job than her friend had 
done, s he feared that I might just try to console her with 
psychological platitudes. 
She added that although she trusted me instinctually, "all I have 
to go on on an intellectual level is that you have a crochette-
hook mind." To trust me completely, she said, she would need to 
feel that I was her friend and not just doing a job. 
She concluded the session with 
"I feel like a broken limb 
a powerful 
that has 
and evocative metaphor: 
healed but hasn't set 
properly. I need to have it broken again - but then I'll need a 
crutch~ II 
Session six 
By this time my initial impressions of Dianna had to be 
considerably revised. As detailed in the previous chapter the 
hallmark of narcissistic object relating is the attempt to avoid 
any intimate relationship with Lne object in order to deny 
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the dangerously intense underlying dependency needs and maintain 
the grandiose self-representation . In Dianna's case, however, the 
initial narcissistic self-reliance and avoidance of dependency on 
me had rapidly. dissipated to reveal an intense desire for 
intimacy and support. I was surprised by how quickly this had 
happened and felt apprehensive about the extent and nature of her 
demands. In order to preserve the therapeutic frame I could not 
become her friend or give her extra time if she became very upset 
towards the end of a session . I knew that in this sense I would 
inevi tably have to fail her. Because of my own unresolved 
personal issues in this regard I felt uncomfortable and guilty 
about the necessary limitations on what I could offer her. I also 
felt afraid of her anger. I took Dianna's emerging apprehension 
of her own destructiveness very seriously and questioned my 
ability to withstand it. The fantasy I had was of being cut up or 
lacerated. This rather extreme countertransference response was 
puzzling. Was the fantasy more the product of something 
unresolved in myself or was I picking up on a surface derivative 
of an underlying sadistic rage expressed obliquely through 
Dianna's cutting sarcasm? Even though the vulnerability could be 
glimpsed with increasing frequency beneath the tough facade, 
there were occasional moments when her cruel cynicism made me 
flinch inwardly . 
Dianna arrived for session six saying that she'd recently had a 
dream which had left her feeling angry, disappointed and 
betrayed. It was an unusually vivid dream and she'd woken up with 
her body completely rigid. The dream was as foll ows: 
"I'm in a large enclosure with fences around it. There 
is a caravan in the corner and the enclosure has the 
feeling of a temporary settlement like a building 
site. I'm there with a man I've contacted before but 
who I don't know very well. He used to be a chef and is 
telling me about his experiences. I've come to him to 
talk about a problem. We leave the corner where there 
is something like a beerst-Jbe going on. We walk to the 
end of the enclosure and sit beneath a small tree that 
= 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-m 
97. 
doesn't give much shade. The trunk is gnarled and 
twisted and it doesn't have many leaves. I'm busy 
telling him my problem when suddenly he puts his arms 
around me and kisses me. I'm very surprised but not 
displeased. Just then a male acquaintance of the chef 
arives and begins telling him about a woman who has 
been giving him a hard time. I realize that the chef 
knows the woman and has had something to do with her in 
the past. This man leaves. Then a short, dark, heavily 
made-up woman arrives. I realize that this is the woman 
they were talking about. She starts telling the chef 
about a problem when suddenly he leans over and kisses 
her just as he did to me. He tells me that he kissed 
her simply in order to help her. Then yet another woman 
arrives and I leave through a door which closes behind 
me. I try not to imagine what the chef is doing with 
the woman behind the door. I feel angry and betrayed by 
his infidelity. I thought that his kiss indicated some 
personal caring but now realize that it was just a 
meaningless gesture." 
This dream was very meaningfu l in the context of the previous 
session in which she'd fe l t frustrated by her feeling that my 
professional role set limits and called into question whether she 
could really trust me, given the fact that our relationship was a 
professional one. In her dream she comes to a chef for help . A 
chef's professional role is to feed and nourish people - an oral 
metaphor for the therapist's provision of symbolic nourishment . 
But Dianna sees him in a temporary enclosure which will soon be 
dismantled . This is an obvious reference to thr transience of the 
therapeuti c space and our relationship. Together they walk to a 
gnarled tree. The latter reminded me of something she'd alluded 
to in the last session - she'd felt like a limb that had been 
broken and set crookedly, needing to be broken again in order to 
heal properly. The twisted tree in this instance was a possible 
reference to the narcissistic injury she'd suffered and hence her 
negative self-representation. At first she interprets the chef's 
kiss as an affectionate , caring gesture. But when she sees him 
kissing other women in order to help them - a reference to my 
seeing other patients - she feels betrayed, hurt and angry. My 
apparent tenderness and car.:.ng is not sincere but just a 
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technique, a stategy to make patients feel better . My 
interpretation of this dream left her feeling shaken. She said 
she was very scared of becoming dependent on me. All her life 
she'd been extremely independent, cultivating relationships in 
which others were dependent on her. She concluded the session by 
saying that she'd recently had the strange thought that she 
needed to protect me from herself. I felt deeply moved and close 
to her in her vulnerability. 
Session seven 
The dream of the previous session was distinctly erotic in 
flavour and indicated the emergence of a sexualized transference. 
Dianna began the seventh session by openly discussing this. She 
said she felt attracted to me on a "personal" level but that this 
was interfering with therapy because she was starting to have 
spontaneous erotic fantasies about me between sessions. She said 
she'd decided td "split you into a person, on the one hand, and a 
professional on the other, and to push the personal part away in 
order to re::'ate only to the professional." I interpreted this as 
a defensive strategy to avoid the frightening and perhaps 
uncontrollable needs that might emerge if she related to me as a 
person rather than a professional. Her reply to this was: "I 
found out that you're seriously involved with someone, and I 
don't go around stealing other women's men." 
Session eight 
Session eight was devoted to working on two dreams which she'd 
had after last session. The dreams were as follows: 
Dream one: 
"I'm going on a trip back to Grahamstown on my 
motorbike. For some reason I'm taking along a cat and a 
white rabbit. (The rabbit will one day grow big and the 
idea is that I'll be able Lo use it for transport.) For 
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some reason I don't take the usual road but go straight 
up the side of a mountain that is very steep and rocky. 
Night is falling and I realize that I won't make it to 
Grahamstown before dark. I find some sort of building 
and go inside. I take out the cat and the rabbit. They 
have completely opposite personalities. The cat is 
friendly and affectionate but the rabbit is very scared 
and nervous and is looking for a place to hide. I find 
a place to put the scared rabbit and look outside . Way 
below me I see the road I should have taken . Now I have 
to go all the way back again in order to get onto the 
easier road . " 
Dream two 
"I've been away from Grahamstown for quite a few years 
and have come back. I'm living in a flat with a nice 
garden. I meet you again and you come to my f la t to 
give me therapy . You look older and weatherbeaten like 
the man in the Camel advertisement, sort of travelled 
and macho. You arrive with a bag of Africana. What 
catches my eye are two African-looking ornamental 
knives. You feel quite aloof and distant. The crossed 
knife blades somehow add to your air of aloofness. We 
si t down to do therapy but keep getting interrupted, 
first by a group of black urchins and later by a group 
of old men. You get irritated and say something about 
not bei.ng able to do therapy like this and leave. You 
corne back later in a better mood, but instead of 
therapy we sit down together and start doing a cross-
word puzzle from a women's magazine. 
Both these dreams are rather complex. The following aspects, 
however, stand out: 
Dream one: 
The therapeutic journey is perhaps represented by the steep and 
rocky path up the mountain. The two animals are both probably 
aspects of herself that are presently unlived possibilities, not 
yet fully integra t ed into her life. The rabbit is particularly 
interesting as it symbolizes 
self-representation manifest 
side of herself hidden behind 
the weak, fr i ghtened, inadequate 
in her presenting problem that 
tie grandiose persona . Although the 
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rabbit needs to be hidden at present, it will one day grow big 
and become a means of transport i.e. psychic growth and movement. 
This shows Dianna's unconscious realization that therapeutic 
growth will emerge from her underlying vulnerabilty rather than 
from her egoic strength. However, the dream ends with Dianna 
abandoning the difficuilt mountain route in favour of a more 
familiar and easier road. Did this mean that, at some level, she 
was not prepared to see therapy through because it was proving 
too difficuilt? 
Dream two 
The second dream did not make the first one any clearer. Here I 
am represented as an older , experienced and Africanized masculine 
figure. In spite of my aloofness the impression created is of 
earthiness, rootedness. My attempts to help her are interrupted 
by poor black children and old men. Although I respond with 
irritation and leave, I return later in a better frame of mind. 
But instead of resuming therapy we start doing a cross-word 
puzzle. 
Dianna had few associations to these dreams. The endings of both 
dreams concerned me as both seemed to refer to the abandonment of 
the therapeutic venture. In the first dream the difficult 
therapeutic journey is foresaken in favour of another easier 
route. In the second dream therapy becomes a word game. However, 
in a supervision consultation Dr Vera Buhrman cautioned me not to 
underate the significance of the cross-word puzzle. She felt it 
referred to the serious task of articulating, piecing together 
and sorting out the puzzle of her life. 
Session nine 
She began by saying that she'd 
weekend. Lying on her bed she 
felt very depressed over 
had kept "telling myself 
the 
how 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
101. 
wonderful I am" in order to ward off a pervasive feeling of 
inadequacy and emptiness. In her depression she'd also felt anger 
which was directed at me. In the session she criticized me in a 
tone of cold hostility for what she perceived as my lack of 
personal involvement: 
"You're very good at what you do. You're a good 
listener, you have a fine memory and a crochette-hook 
mind that doesn't miss a stitch. But you sit on the 
side-lines and watch with a morbid kind of clinical 
interest. If I had to break down I think you would just 
si t there and think to yourself "Mm, this is 
interesting" and then just kick me out at closing time. 
They could invent a computer to take yor place - there 
wouldn't be much difference!" 
Her attack made quite an impact on me and I felt trapped: on one 
level I felt quite hurt by her criticism and anxiously wondered 
whether there was an element of transference-free truth in her 
words. On another level I felt she was provoking me, trying to 
' . 
manipulate me into modifying the therapeutic frame. Internally I 
felt a pressure to demonstrate some non-professional caring . Her 
frustrated need for intimacy and emotional responsiveness 
expressed the relationship with her mother who, although 
to perform the role of mother adequately, did so 
clearly 
seeming 
with a 
narcissistic coldness and insensitivity to her daughter's 
emotional needs. In the transference I had become the cold, 
witholding, robotic mother. 
Session ten 
She began session ten by saying that she'd thought about last 
session and had realized that she'd been trying to control me, 
al though she didn't know why. She \.;ent on to say that she needed 
to get to the bottom of her problem quickly because "otherwise 
I'll end up doing what I always do - papering cracks." I told her 
that she was like a trench di9ger, desperately digging away in 
order to get as deep as possible without staying with the 
f 
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feelings she unearthed in the process. I pointed out how, on a 
number of occasions she had been almost tearful but, instead of 
staying with her feelings she'd pushed them aside in order to 
proceed wLth her manic archaeology. By doing so she was avoiding 
experience and also controlling the pace of therapy. Her therapy 
had less to do with digging deeper into herself (another attempt 
at self-control) than it had with staying with and exploring the 
the relational in-between, her feelings and fantasies about me 
and the relationship. Dianna construed therapy to be a desperate 
and inward historical pur sui t of a hermeneutic key, a single 
biographical event that would unlock her past, dissolve the "fine 
plastic mist" that shrouded her and break her "hard and brittle 
shell of illusion". Therapy represented a process of working 
towards self-mastery by uncovering a determinate childhood fact 
that she could intellectually grasp. She was tuned perpetually 
inward, constantly listening for the echo of this discrete 
subteranean event. She desperately wanted to be self-sufficient 
in this pursuit 
I called her 
and not have to rely on me. She was offended when 
a trench digger. She felt frustrated when I 
constantly called her away from a distant internal past and 
perSistently relocated her in the interpersonal present where 
dangerously strong feelings for me threatened her equilibrium and 
her defensive self-reliance . She would get resentful when I 
didn't co-operate. She felt constrained, stuck and anxious when I 
seemed disinterested in her past and more interested in dwelling 
on the details of images and nuances of feelings, when I focused 
on the texture of the interpersonal rather than the interior . 
Session eleven 
For the first time she arrived ten minutes late, without her 
usual sheaf of notes. She said she felt a "calm sense of sclf-
awareness and control." She felt aware of 
inside of her: "Its like I'm holding a 
something very fragile 
fragile crystal bowl 
inside of me." She said she'd Lome to terms with "the fact that 
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you're not really committed to 
session I'd cautioned her that 
this therapy." In an earlier 
our therapy together was only 
preparatory work for more long-term therapy at some later date. 
This remark, she. said, had convinced her that I didn't have much 
energy invested in our therapy and was just doing it because it 
was my job. She added that she was determined not to let my lack 
of committment interfere with her therapy, thus indicating a 
return of her defensive self-sufficiency. She went on to speak 
about a television programme on schizophrenia she'd seen the 
previous night. It was mentioned in the programme that hearing 
voices was a symptom of the disease. This had worried her because 
occasionally she would hear a shrill, inhuman voice inside her 
ear calling her name. I did not know what to make of this but 
simply interpreted her fear of being crazy or more disturbed than 
was apparent. 
Session twelve 
She apologized for being angry with me. She realized that her 
anger had to do with me not acknowledging or being taken in by 
her strong competent facade. She also understood now why she 
resents superficial compliments because her facade is 
identified as the real her while her vulnerable, small, 
incompetent real self goes unrecognized. She said she wanted to 
talk about food - her tendency to binge when she feels bored or 
stressed. She felt this had to do with not taking responsibility 
for her life . Eating made her feel tired, lazy and sleepy, thus 
preventing her from sorting her life out and realizing her true 
potential. She remembered being told by a teacher that she had 
the highest IQ in the class and yet never actualized her 
intellectual capacity. At this point she made a meaningful slip 
of the tongue. She meant to say "My teachers at school. . ... but 
instead said "My pupils ..... , thus indicating how much the desire 
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for power and control is central to her life. She said she'd 
previously been hampered by the facade of being competent and in 
control but now she was actually attempting to gain real control 
by setting high goals and doing everything possible to attain 
them. In an earlier session she'd mentioned that she could not 
diet beyond a certain point without feeling inexplicably anxious. 
Connecting this to her binging I said 
way of remaining physically big to 
internal smallness and vulnerability. 
that overeating may be a 
counteract a feeling of 
The issue of control had 
shifted from her attempts to control me to an intense effort to 
control herself on both a bodily and emotional level. I asked her 
what it was that was so scary, so threatening that she needed to 
control it so desperately? An image carne to her mind: "I'm 
falling into a black void!" At this pOint she became anxious and 
couldn't hold the image, saying "I feel the mists closing in." 
The issue of control moved on many different levels . She was 
desperately trying to identify her psychic lesion and give it a 
name . She felt that by naming it she could control it. For some 
reason I commented that although her image had to do with 
falling, another metaphor that came to mind was that of not being 
held. She became very sad and said that when she experienced me 
as aloof, distant and disinterested that was exactly what came to 
mind that I wouldn't ho ld her. She remembered that, in the 
presence of her mother, if she became upset her mother would grab 
her and hug her. But this was an ambivalent experience because, 
although it was comforting she a lso felt vulnerable and afraid 
because her mother was in control. As a child she remembers her 
mother c rying because of s omething she'd done. She felt obliged 
to go and comfort her but at the same time felt terribly 
resentful. 
Session thirteen 
Dianna arrived saying that she'd "h i t a brick wall" and had 
nothing to say. "Its as though I'm enveloped in a thick mist and 
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can't see any further." She said she was hoping to find a 
significant event in her childhood responsible for her present 
condition, but now felt stuck. When I asked her for an image of 
her stuckness she described going into an empty room with a low 
ceiling and no furniture . The room was cold, had a marble floor 
and was antiseptically clean. There was a door in the room and as 
she looked through it she saw countless other identical rooms. 
"These are the rooms of my mind", she said . She went on to say 
that she'd had a lot of recurring negative images lately. As a 
child she often had vivid fantasies of monsters and rapists. 
She'd forced these fantasies out but recently felt that they were 
starting to invade her again . The most vivid fantasy was as 
follows: 
"I'm sitting in a room with my back to the wall, facing 
the window. Outside, looking in, is the head of a large 
wolf. The wolf is staring at me intensely with 
unblinking bulbous gree~ eyes - its staring at me with 
malicious intent." 
At first she wasn't able to say why the wolf was staring at her. 
I explored the meaning that wolves had for her. Her associations 
were: they're vicious preda tors that can survive in harsh 
condi tions and hunt in packs, although this wolf is solitary. 
This reminded me of s omething she'd said in our first session. 
She'd described herself as someone "who never runs with the 
pack." I reminded her of this. At first she brushed it aside but 
then said that perhaps the wolf was a self-image and did embody 
part of her. I asked about the wolf ' s intent . She said that if 
she went near the window the wolf would savage her. I asked her 
to carryon the fantasy and see what would happen if she did 
approach the wolf. She found herself on the other side of the 
glass. 
tearing 
feeling 
The wolf sprang at her, 
her fles h to tat t ers. 
ripping her 
( this vivid 
shaken a nd horrified.) ~~en I asked 
face with its claws , 
f antasy l e ft us both 
why the wolf had only 
I 
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attacked her face she said it had something to do with a feeling 
"that I've spent the whole of my life wearing a mask." Perhaps, I 
said, the wolf was tearing the mask of her face in order to 
discover who sh~ really was, what she really looked like. She 
said she feared that maybe she didn't have a face beneath the 
mask but just nothing, like an endless succession of empty rooms. 
She was now aware that she'd never felt real, that she'd always 
made or fashioned a face for herself. Now she was afraid and 
unsure of what, if anything, lay beneath the facade. 
Session fourteen 
This session focused on a dream she'd brought: 
"Its a futuristic dream that takes place in a post-
apocalyptic world after a nuclear war has destroyed 
civilization as we know it. I'm living in a beautiful 
green valley, in the remnants of a two-storey building. 
There are no windows, the walls have been destroyed and 
a lot of the building reduced to rubble. The building 
has merged with the mountain side as a result of a 
landslide. It is a reversion to a primitive age. I live 
in the building with another woman. We are dressed in 
animal skins and carry slings and bows and arrows as 
weapons . The other woman is very tall, f lambuoyant, 
beautiful, strong and athletic. Every morning she gets 
up and goes running for miles over the hills. She is 
also very promiscuous, although the men she has sex 
wi th are very shadowy figures who seem to exist only 
for her pleasure before disappearing again. During sex 
it is she who lies on top of them, rather than the 
other way around. I feel I want to show my affection 
for her . To do this I lie on top of her. As I'm doing 
so another woman arrives and accuses me of being 
promiscuous. (It is not a sexual act although it could 
be misinterpreted as such). This third person is the 
other woman's sister but she is much smaller and 
doesn't have her sisters qualities or personality-
she's like a shadow of her sister. Just then we are 
attacked by a neighbouring tribe carrying long spears. 
They come swarming down the mountain and into our 
building. A fierce battle ensues. We fight very hard, 
taking our opponents' weapons to use against them. I 
remember running a spear through one man and him saying 
"I've never experienc ed anything so painful. " When he 
I 
I 
,/ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
5 T 
107 . 
wouldn't die I tore out his throat with his own knife. 
At this point I decided to run and leave the other two. 
Soon I came to a big swimming pool, which seemed out of 
place given the primitive environment. In the pool were 
a number . of animals. One was a rabbit or a squirrel and 
I guided it out of the pool. The other was my 
landlady's stupid dog Aztec who was standing on the 
bottom of the pool looking up at me with huge, soulful 
eyes. I got him out of the pool and then realized I was 
close to a large suburban center. With some sadness I 
realized that that this beautiful primitive world was 
just a fantasy within a dream. The dream ends with me 
being caught by the neighbouring tribe. I knew it was 
them because I recognized an elderly, squat, dark-
haired woman who glared at me malevolently." 
Dianna related the dream to something she'd been doing the 
previous night. She'd been conducting a dialogue between two 
parts of herself. She remembered that, as a child, she'd liked 
her name very much. Dianna was an exotic name that made her feel 
special and unique in a way that the name Dianne didn't. Dianne 
was conventional ~nd ordinary. 
her being an exeptional 
The name Dianna evoked fantasies 
of person 
articulate and totally self-reliant, a 
needed this fantasy because from an early 
strong, intelligent, 
superhuman being. She 
age she'd felt that her 
real self wasn' t good enough and that she needed to be special. 
This real self, which she called Dianne, was unexciting, average 
and unexceptional. 
The dream obviously referred to the 
experienced between her real self 
discrepancy which Dianna 
which was ordinary and 
unexceptional - and hence unacceptable; and her ideal self which 
was powerful, beautiful and self-sufficient (represented in the 
dream by the Amazonian woman.) I believe that Dianna's lying on 
top of this woman in her dream represented the attempt to fuse or 
merge with this omnipotent ideal self representation. The third 
woman is Dianne (the real self), the plain, unexeptional one who 
does not in fact possess any of the remarkable qualities of her 
grandiose sister. In the dream they are attacked by another 
tribe. This , I think, symbolizes the breach of her narcissistic 
defenses by the therapy process. Dianna, like the mythical 
., 
108. 
Narcissus, finds herself gazing at a beautiful pool. But instead 
of a narcissistically perfect self-reflection gazing back at her, 
she sees two helpless and vulnerable animals, depicting aspects 
of her own' underlying self-representation which, significantly, 
she rescues. The dream ends with the realization that her 
primeval eden is only a fantasy that cannot be sustained any 
longer. Psychotherapy has confronted her with the shared , mundane 
world of suburban reality. Significantly, her dream ends in a 
confrontation with her dark, squat, aggressive negative self-
representation from whom she has been fleeing. This dream clearly 
indicated Dianna's unconscious realization that her narcissistic 
fantasies were no l onger an adequate defense against 
psychotherapy's attempts to confront her with split-off aspects 
of her real self which she had previously kept at bay through 
identification with her ideal self representation. 
Dianna accepted this interpretation and said that the prlOlvious 
night she'd heard Dianne mocking the omnipotent Dianna for not 
being real. 
Session fifteen 
The previous session had left her feeling very vulnerable. Over a 
period I had noticed a quali tati ve change in her presence. She 
was no longer so critical, sarcastic and intellectually verbose. 
She felt softer and more receptive. But, she said, she equated 
vulnerabili ty with being "completely stripped, broken and 
destroyed as a person." For the first time in therapy she started 
crying. The session ended with her saying "Well, aren't I a good 
girl - I finally managed to cry in front of Mister Ivey." Her 
tone was sarcastic and I suddenly realized that she'd been 
feeling that my caring was conditional on her living up to "my" 
expectation that she should be vulnerable and fragile, that she 
could not meet my needs and earn my approval unless she became 
vulnerable. Earlier on in the session she'd mentioned that she'd 
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always felt that her mother's love had to be earned, that it was 
not unconditional. In the transference I had clearly become the 
mother who would only love her if she lived up to my 
expectations. 
Session sixteen 
She began this session by presenting a dream: 
"I'm jumping on a trampoline with an acquaintance, a 
girl who is unattractive and lonely but also arrogant 
and opinionated. I'm trying to have a conversation with 
her while I'm jumping but I feel unstable and 
frightened of falling, not knowing where I'm going to 
land. Then I suddenly find myself on a university 
campus. The buildings are old and Oxfordian, with 
rolling green lawns and a river running down towards 
the sea. I walk and turn right when I get to the river. 
I end up walking through two large white doors. I see a 
sign saying "This way to happiness." It leads to a 
scenic spot with ponds and boats." 
, 
She felt this was a positive dream that referred somehow to her 
future. The first part clearly indicates the therapeutic dialogue 
between the two previously diconnected aspects of Dianna's self-
representation i. e. the overt narcissistic self-image and the 
underlying lonely, unattractive negative self-representation. 
Interesting to note is that they are no longer split but have 
become aspects of 
unsettling. She no 
the same person. This dialogue, however, is 
longer has the (quasi-) secure footing of her 
narcissistic self-representation to negotiate her world. 
Acknowledging her vulnerable, inferior and unattractive self has 
destabili zed her, made her balance precarious and her 
psychological destination uncertain. The second part of the dream 
is perhaps an answer to the first part. At first I considered it 
a rather defensive narcissistic attempt to assuage the anxiety of 
the threat to Dianna's egoic equilibrium: a beautiful edenic 
world promising happiness without conflict, compromise or 
sacrifice. My supervisor, however, emphasised an alternative 
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teleological interpretation that focused on the positive psychic 
possibility of a new and fertile world that might emerge from the 
healing integration of the negative self-representation. He felt 
that this dream expressed a feeling of being held. 
We played with the dream for a while but then, after a period of 
silence, Dianna spoke of how uncomfortable she felt sitting in 
silence. Her associations led to a feeling that she would be 
letting me down unless she brought something to talk about. She 
said she felt she had to "earn" whatever benefit she got from 
therapy. I reminded her that she'd used the word "earn" last 
session to refer to having to earn her mother's love. I connected 
this to my feeling in the last session that she felt she had to 
meet my expectations in order to earn my approval. She said yes, 
she remembers being very competitive toward her siblings for her 
mother's attention which wasn't simply forthcoming but had to be 
worked for . I suspected that her anxiety about silence was more 
, 
complex than this, that it had another component. The first 
component was clearly an interpersonal one that concerned her 
perception of my (and in the transference, her mother's) 
expectations of her and her belief that she needed to earn love 
and recognition. But I felt there was a second component which 
was more intrapsychic than interpersonal. This anxiety about 
silence, I suspected, had to do with her own hollow interior. I 
felt that words for her were a way of filling up silence which 
symbolically represented the absence and emptiness which she 
experienced at the core of her being. I did not make this 
interpretation to her but simply asked her if any images arose 
from the silence. "Only that of falling, or rather, being 
suspended motionless over a bottomless black pit", she said. She 
then added "I guess I talk to fill up the spaces, I talk in order 
to be", thus confirming my unspoken interpretation. Linking this 
to her earlier fear that if she became vulnerable she would be 
"destroyed as a person" I made the following interpretation : 
"Perhaps your deepest anxiety concerns not the question of what 
.. 
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to be but, rather, at some deep level whether you are or whether 
there is only a bottomless empty space at the center of your 
being that threatens to swallow you. Perhaps yours is a fear of 
non-being." She became tearful and said that this was exactly how 
she'd felt when she lost her virginity and, in so doing, betrayed 
her mother's expectation that she remain a virgin and uphold the 
family honour. She'd felt that she'd ceased to exist. 
Session seventeen 
She began this session by talking about success and her need to 
achieve. When I asked what success meant to her she said: "Saving 
the world being very busy working on committees for 
environmental concern, alerting people to the dangers of 
pollution ... " One of the first words she'd used when we first met 
was pollution and it had often cropped up since then in her 
speech. Certain words and themes struck me as highly significant . 
Pollution, in a general sense, means contaminating, poisoning or 
making something bad. Her reference to "saving" meant reparing or 
preventing damage done by pollution. Melanie Klein has written 
extensively about how infantile aggression is often expressed in 
fantasies of poisoning or contaminating the interior of the hated 
maternal object with urine, faeces etc . Dianna's concern with 
pollution and its prevention, I suspected, had a lot to do with 
such unconscious destructive phantasies and reparative urges to 
undo the damage done by her poisonous phantasies. I did not make 
this interpretation to her but rather asked how 
pollution and ecology had come about. She related 
suburban house next to 
her interest in 
how, as a girl, 
a veld. In the she'd grown up in a small 
middle of the veld was a copse of trees. Inside the copse was 
lush green grass, a stream and a little waterfall. This was a 
secret and very special space to Dianna. One day she went th8re, 
only to find that her special place had been been destroyed, with 
a town-house development being builtin its place. This was a 
traumatic event for her. When I asked what the place had meant to 
1 1 2 • 
her she replied: "It was a place where I could be accepted 
wi thout anything being expected of me. It didn't expect me to 
love it even though I did. All that green grass filled up the 
empty spaces inside of me." 
This confirmed my earlier impressions. Her preoccupation with 
ecology and pollution, at least at one level, symbolically 
depicted an externalization of her own internal ecology, the fate 
of her own psychic interior. The dynamics of this, I suspected, 
were as follows. The baby Dianna had internalized a destructive 
maternal object, founded realistically on her experience with her 
narcissistic mother. In order to defend herself against this bad 
introject she probably had phantasies of poisoning it with every 
resource ather body's di sposal . (Dianna's "caustic" i. e. 
corrosive humour could be a residue of this childhood phantasy.) 
However, she would have feared retaliation from this intrOject in 
the form of contamination (pollution) and poisoning of her own 
internal world. She also felt sufficiently ambivalent towards her 
, 
mother 
mother's 
to feel guilty for her phantasized poisoning of her 
her 
(see 
body. This was expressed in the transference as 
concern that I might be harmed by her "negative vibes" 
session one) and her feeling that for some reason she needed to 
defend me from herself. The reparative urges she felt in response 
to her destructive phantasies were expressed in her enthusiastic 
concern for ecology - "saving the world", as she phrased it. This 
understanding also made sense of the dream she'd had in the 
previous session. The lush, green university campus with ponds 
and streams suggested the possibility that her internal world was 
not just empty and polluted 
While making sense of her 
but potentially green and fertile. 
experience at one level, 
pathologizing 
what this 
interpretation risked doing was 
invalidating Dianna's committment to 
told her this and emphasized the 
and hence 
environmetal preservation. I 
authentic and praiseworthy 
dimension of her ecological concern, without attempting to reduce 
it to an interior event. (The external world is, after all, not 
--------------...... 
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simply an externalization of an internal world. It is being 
contaminated and destroyed, irrespective of the psychodynamics of 
phantasy life.) 
My interpretation, however, was very meaningful to her. She 
admitted that she was no longer in control of therapy, that her 
intellect and logic could no longer make sense of her experience . 
She said she'd finally put her trust in me and allowed herself to 
become dependent on me, although she felt very vulnerable doing 
so. 
Session eighteen 
Dianna began the session by saying that, as a young schoolgirl, 
she occasionally suffered from anxiety attacks that were not 
precipitated by any obvious events or circumstances. She has had 
a number of these since, usually when involved in a conflict 
si tuation. She said that recently she'd started having these 
a ttacks again. Picking up on the connection she'd made between 
conflict and anxiety I commented that a lot of her relationships 
were conflictual ones. She said that, for some reason, a lot of 
people took exception to her. (Given her aloofness, condescending 
air of superiority and verbal aggressiveness this was hardly 
surprising). She said that she'd always been aware of a powerful 
energy force within herself that she could calIon. When young 
she remembers thinking that if ever she was crippled she could 
cure herself through the sheer power of her will alone. (This is 
a good example of narcissistic omnipotence and self-sufficiency). 
Lately, she said, she'd been afraid of entertaining negative 
thoughts about other people because of a conviction that these 
thoughts carry energy. This energy enters the atmosphere and 
might harm others and perhaps even herself. Linking the topic of 
destructive fantasies to her anxiety I said that she se8med 
frightened that her own aggression was so powerful that, if it 
were unleashed in therapy, it might harm me (the good object) and 
possibly even her as well. I aSKed her if any image came to mind 
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when she thought of her destructiveness. "Just that big, black, , 
square hole", she said. I commented that the hole was no longer 
just a void, an absence, but also a presence, although it seemed 
that what was present was a lot of anger and aggression. She said 
yes, but she felt scared of confronting it because she had no 
idea where to put it or what to do with it, given that therapy 
was almost over. Clearly the adaptive context for her anger had 
to do with termination and my "abandoning" her at the point when 
she was most vulnerable and dependent. She acknowledged this but 
did not become angry with me.) At this point a memory suddenly 
sprang to mind. When Dianna was a little girl the family maid had 
a baby. One day while Dianna was present in the room she heard a 
sickening thud and then screaming. She turned to see that the 
baby had fallen off the bed. A few days later the child died and 
Dianna felt that she had somehow killed it . This, I think can be 
understood in the context of the generalization of Dianna's 
childhood destructive phantasies, from the original target of the 
bad maternal introject to other objects in the child's external 
world. As a result she must have felt convinced of her omnipotent 
destructiveness. This phantasy had persisted and now she clearly 
felt concerned about possibly destroying me and, in transference, 
her unloving and insensitive mother - the original object of her 
aggression. 
Session nineteen 
She arrived saying that she felt very vulnerable. A friend of 
hers, small in stature and emotionally insecure, had accused her 
of "just wanting to make friends with little people in order to 
make yourself look big." At this point Dianna suddenly started 
SObbing. She said that she'd suddenly felt that there "is 
something bad or destructive in me that is harmful to other 
people." I related this to her depressive transference 
fears/fantasies of hurting me for ending therapy just at a point 
when she was able to start trusting and depending on me. This 
• dIRr=~rr r:cn-i' rz= 
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interpretation relieved her. She said that, although she felt 
very weak and vulnerable, her vulnerability has had a marked 
positive impact on her interpersonal relations. She felt much 
more receptive and open towards people, more able to empathize 
with them. She realized, in retrospect, that although she used to 
pride herself on being able to intellectually analyze other 
people, she was in fact not emotionally in touch with them. 
Session twenty 
I felt concerned about how rushe d our termination had been. 
Therapy had ended just at the point when Dianna's most 
significant transference feelings were emerging. There had been 
no time to work through these, let alone the usual termination 
issues. We spoke about these. Dianna felt very fragile but said 
she could not revert back to her old way o f being. She felt that 
enough had happened to ensure a permanent change in her life. She 
also felt determined to go back into therapy at some later date 
in order to work through the issues that had emerged . She said 
that, in the light of her new understanding of the meaning of 
ecology in her life, she no l onger felt sure about pursuing a 
career in that field. Although this left her feeling up in the 
air she claimed to feel more at peace with herself . 
While writing this thesis I received a letter from her, thanking 
me for the therapeutic experience. She said her initially strong 
feelings for me had mellowed i nto fondness and warm respect. She 
had been accepted to study environmental science and felt 
enthusiasti c about her future. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION OF CASE STUDY 
6.1 Diagnostic considerations 
A personality disorder is more than an aggregate of long-standing 
symptoms detrimental to the individual's personal and social 
functioning. It is better described as a chronic maladaptive mode 
or style of object-relating that is not transient or situation-
dependent but rather continuous over time and context. This 
definition shifts the focus from the presenting symptoms to the 
individual's characteristic style of interpersonal fWlctioning. 
Obviously, obtaining a detailed a symptom profile is a necessary 
feature of any psychological assessment. However, many 
personality disorders either (a) do not initially present with 
overt florid symptomatology, (b) present with features of a 
polysymptomatic neurotic condition, or (c) present with certain 
features of a personality disorder syndrome but not enough to 
'. 
warrant a personality disorder diagnosis according to DSM-3 
criteria. This situation is complicated by the diagnostic 
pressure to identify the patient according to mutually exclusive 
nosological categories e.g. either the person is neurotic or 
personality disordered. Many personality disorders are 
consequently misdiagnosed because of the emphasis on the 
presenting symptoms rather than the nature of the underlying 
object relations. It is only in the unfolding context of the 
transference relationship - insofar as this reveals disturbances 
in the person's external and internal object worlds - that the 
psychodynamic structure of the personality disorder reliably 
emerges. 
My patient is an interesting case in point. Her symptom profile 
and style of relating in the early stages of therapy bore many of 
the hallmarks of a narcissistic personality disorder e.g . 
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grandiosity (with underlying sense of inferiority and emptiness) 
exhibitionism, self-sufficiency, sarcasm, argumentativeness 
hypersensitivity to criticism etc. However, after a short period 
of time the quality of her relationship with me invalidated NPD 
as an appropriate diagnosis . The evidence was as follows: 
a) In spite of her desire for control and self-sufficiency Dianna 
quickly developed strong dependency needs that expressed the 
desire for sexual contact, emotional intimacy and maternal 
holding. One of the primary diagnostic and dynamic features of 
NPD is the (surface) absence of object-need. This serves the 
purpose of denying rapacious underlying dependency needs, envy, 
inferiori ty , anger etc . The fast and intense emergence of her 
dependency needs suggested that, whatever narcissistic features 
she exhibited, these were not characteristic of NPD. Moreover, 
Dianna was primarily interested in understanding these needs 
rather than simply gratifying them. She could acknowledge, 
respect and use the limitations of the therapeutic frame without 
becoming unreasonably demanding or destructive . 
• 
b) Dianna's communication style was primarily symbolic the 
latent meanings of her words carried deeper meanings which 
indirectly - through metaphor and symbol - conveyed unconscious 
feelings and wishes. In NPD, however, words are not primarily 
symbolic vehicles of unconscious communication. Words, rather, 
are used to destroy authentic communication in order to avoid a 
meaningful relationship with the object. (Langs 1983 pg 599) 
Dianna's dreams were also rich, textured purveyors of unconscious 
meaning, portrayed by animals, humans and inanimate objects. The 
dreams of NPD patients tend to be autistic, flat, impoverished 
and two-dimensional. 
c) No matter how much her (transference) experience of me was 
influenced by her pathological maternal relationship Dianna 
always related to me as a whole rather than a part-object. I was 
I 
r 
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never merely a narcissistic extension of herself. Furthermore, 
Dianna's concern that I (and others) may have been harmed by her 
destructive impulses is uncharacteristic of NPD patients whose 
anxiety is more paranoid than depressive in character. 
She was also able to take and hold interpretations, which NPD 
cannot do because it would be allowing the therapist inside of 
them i. e. establishing intimate contact with him/her and thus 
deflating their defensive self-sufficiency . Not only was she able 
to internalize my interpretations during the sessions, I was also 
a very real presence for her between sessions - she would have 
silent dialogues with me, look forward to sessions and wonder how 
I would respond to some event, feeling or thought. Once again, 
this is totally uncharacteristic of NPD object-relating. For the 
latter patients the therapist tends to disappear between sessions 
and is not easily internalized as a real affective presence. 
d) The qualitative change in Dianna's presence - from aggressive 
self-sufficiency, arrogance etc to vulnerability, neediness, 
mature dependence and improved receptivity to others would not 
, 
have happened so quickly in the case of NPD. (I do not think that 
this was a defensive "flight into health". Dianna's life was not 
magically transformed and she was well aware of how much work 
still needed to be done.) 
All of the above provide strong evidence to suggest that Dianna's 
was not a typical case of NPD. 
A related problem to that of symptomatic diagnostic model is that 
of the psychodynamic diagnosis of object relations theory. 
Melanie Klein classified all functional psychopathology according 
to its psychodynamic location in either of two well-known 
developmental positions: the paranoid-schizoid position or the 
depressive position. In the paranoid-schizoid position the 
infant's immature psyche protects the infant from anxiety through 
the use of the primitive defense mechanisms of splitting, 
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projective identification, denial, idealization etc. In this way 
good and bad self- and object-representations are kept apart in 
order to protect the good internal objects from attack by the bad 
objects. If excessive frustration (endogenous or environmental) 
occurs at this point the paranoid-schizoid position cannot be 
successfully negotiated and personality development becomes 
this point . The ensuing adult psychopathology 
severity from psychosis to affective and personality 
arrested at 
(ranging in 
disorders) reflects this developmental arrest through the 
preponderance of splitting and other primitive defenses, as well 
as interpersonal functioning characterized by part-object 
relating. Borderline and narcissistic personality disorders 
traditionally fall into this category. 
If, however, infantile anxiety/frustration does not give rise to 
excessive splitting in the paranoid-schizoid position, then the 
infant matures t o a point at which the good and bad self- and 
object-representations are recognized as being different aspects 
of a composite, differentiated self and object. Klein called this 
the depressive position. The primary anxiety here concerns the 
fear that the object (no longer a part-object) will be harmed by 
the infant's aggressive phanta sies . This results in concern for 
the object, guilt and depression centered on remorse for having 
hurt or destroyed the unified object. Adult pathology arising 
from this later developmental juncture is typically neurotic in 
structure, characterized primarily by the higher level defense of 
repression (rather than splitting) and whole object relating. 
Although not entirely true to her original theory, Klein's 
paranoid-schizoid / depressive 
interchangeably with the 
dyadic / triadic pathology 
position dichotomy is often used 
pre-oedipal/oedipal and categories 
to describe characteristic object 
relations and psychodynamic operations resulting from the given 
level/position of developmental arrest. 
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Klein's explanation of psychopathology in terms of developmental 
positions 
diagnostic 
presented 
has proved extremely useful . However, in terms of 
exclusivity it poses a similar problem to that 
by the symptomatic diagnostic model. Because 
narcissistic pathology, according to this formulation, invariably 
has a pre-depressive (position) pathogenesis, it makes little 
s ense to speak of a neurotic whose dynamics are primarily 
narcissistic. Neurotics, by definition, have successfully 
negotiated the developmental position in which narcissitic 
dysfunction has its etiology. One can speak of a narcissistic 
character 
profile is 
structure even though a full narcissistic symptom 
not overtly manifest. (This is frequently the case 
with seemingly neurotic patients who, in the course of treatment, 
prove to have an underlying narcissistic personality structure). 
However, in terms of this developmental model, it is difficuilt 
to explain the case of a narcissistic patient who proves to have 
a neurotic i.e. depressive character structure. My patient, I 
would argue, is just such a case. 
The following evidence is strongly suggestive of depressive 
dynamics and object-relating: 
1) Firstly, 
splitting. 
emotionally 
Dianna's primary defense was repression rather than 
She was able to make use of my interpretations, 
access the underlying material and integrate this 
into a progressively evolving complex self-representation. 
2) Secondly, she wa s able to hold and contain ambivalent feelings 
towards both me and her mother, something which would have proven 
impossible if she was employing primitive narcissistic defenses. 
3) Thirdly, her transference anxiety about harming me r e presented 
a depressive capacity for concern that is unavailable to typical 
narcissistic patients whose anxieties are paranoid-schizoid in 
nature i . e. more concerned with being harmed than harming others. 
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In spite Of the narcissistic presenting profile and the long-
standing duration of her symptoms I have argued that Dianna could 
not be diagnosed as a typical case of narcissistic personality 
disorder. Yet the central issue in her life was expressly 
narcissistic a shell or facade of grandiose self-reliance 
erected as a defense against underlying feelings of inferiority, 
emptiness and destructiveness. But because (a) this underlying 
negative self-representation was repressed rather than split off, 
(b) this repression was effected in the interpersonal context of 
whole object-relating, and (c) the anxiety was depressive rather 
than paranoid-schizoid, I would use the term narcissistic 
neurosis (not in Freud's original sense) to describe Dianna 's 
case i.e. narcissistic symptomatology within a predominantly 
neurotic character structure. 
6.2 Psychodynamics 
Al though I in the previous chapter, most of the psychodynamic 
processes ,,'ere mentioned as they arose i'n therapy, this section 
provides a more comprehensive dynamic formulation in dialogue 
with the relevant theorists discussed. 
Dianna may be best decribed as a neurotic with a narcissistic 
injury or "lesion" genetically explicable in terms of a 
patho genic early relationship with a narcissistic mother. In 
order to adapt defensively to her mother ' s destructive influence 
Dianna had unconsciously to renounce her childhood dependency 
needs and hide her vulnerability behind a facade of grandiose 
self-sufficiency, superiority and intellectual control of her 
world. Underlying her surface self-representation of specialness, 
intelligence, independence and omnipotent strength was the 
negative self-representation of a needy, empty, vulnerable, 
unloved and angry child. It was this repressed self-
representation that emerged indirectly in her presenting problem. 
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The latter, it may be recalled, included 
vu lnerabi 1 i ty, insubs tantiali ty and 
accompanied by aggressive sarcasm and 
criticism . 
a sense of fragility, 
lack of confidence 
a hypersensitivity to 
Her defensive facade was narcissistic in Stolorow's (1980) terms 
because it served the functional purpose of maintaining the 
integri ty, continuity and positive emotional valence of the 
conscious self-representation against the threat of the negative 
unconscious self-image. In terms of Stolorow's categorization 
Dianna's would be described as a case of mild narcissistic 
disturbance because, although her underlying self-representation 
was decidedly negative, it retained its structural cohesiveness 
and continuity over time. (Hence the absence of severe chronic 
identity diffusion). 
Her defensive facade became a habitual egosyntonic component of 
her character structure. However, instead of employing the 
typical narcissistic defenses of splitting and projective 
identification to rid herself of the negative self-representation 
and thereby control it, Dianna used the higher order defense of 
repression to force the "bad" self-representation out of 
awareness . Because repression is a much less primitive and severe 
defense than splitting, the negative self-representation was more 
acces sible than is us ually the case in severe narcissistic 
disorders . 
The absence of splitting also meant 
less severe and that her mode of 
that her symptomatology 
(whole) object-relating 
was 
was 
neurotic rather than schizoid. This accounts for my initial 
feeling that, in spite of her narcissism, I had made contact with 
Dianna and established a relationship with her. 
The preponderance of splitting over more primitive defenses was 
evident in the symbolic nature of her communications which 
-
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conveyed hidden meaning rather than destroying meaning in order 
to avoid relationship. 
The composition of her narcissistic self-representation is 
revealed in the "post-apocalyptic" dream (session fourteen in the 
previous chapter). The dream featured three people: herself, a 
beautiful, powerful and athletic huntress-warrior, and the 
latter's sister smaller, ordinary and totally unlike her 
extraordinary sister. I understood 
real self, ideal self and/or 
these figures to represent her 
ideal object, and negative 
underlying self-representation. This interpretation was confirmed 
by her associations to the dream. Although, as a child, Dianna 
had felt very plain and unexceptional she'd fantasized about 
being strong, beautiful and self-reliant. She needed this fantasy 
because of her conviction that she had to be a very special and 
exceptional person in order to earn her mother's love. It was not 
good enough to be herself, she had to be something better. Otto 
Kernberg considered the primary feature of pathological 
narcissism to be a stable g~andiose self resulting from the 
regressive identification of real self, ideal self and ideal 
object once object constancy had been attained. It is interesting 
to note that, in Dianna's case, although there is the wish to 
merge with the ideal self symbolized by the huntress-warrior (by 
lying on top of her) the fusion is never effected. For Dianna the 
narcissistic identification with her ideal self remains a wish 
rather than a successfully enacted phantasy - real self and ideal 
self remain differentiated, which is not the case with more 
severe narcissistic disorders. The degree of differentiation 
between the real self and ideal self, I would argue, is a 
valuable prognostic indicator in narcissistic pathology. A lower 
degree of differentiation would be expressed symptomatically by a 
higher degree of grandiosity and a poorer therapeutic prognosis. 
The inverse would apply - as it does in this case - with a high 
degree of real self/ideal self differentiation. It is easier to 
work with someone who wishes to be her ideal self than it is with 
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someone who believes she is her ideal self . 1 
Another significant point is that Dianna's negative self-
representation is present in the dream, embodied firstly by the 
plain, unremarkable sister of the hunt ress-warrior and later by 
the dark, squat and aggressive woman from the invading tribe. 
Both figures depict different aspects of the repressed self-
representation . The significance of their dream presence lies in 
the relative accessibility of t he underlying self - another good 
prognostic indicator which could prove useful in assessing the 
therapeutic suitability of narcissistic patients. 
The structure of Dianna's grandiose self has already been 
discussed. We turn now to a closer consideration of the repressed 
negative self-representation. It is a fairly complex entity, 
comprising at least three aspects or components: 
Firstly, there is the mundane, ordinary and unexeptional child 
who desperately needs her mother's recogni tion and love but feels 
this has to be earned by meeting narcissistic maternal 
expectations . Because Dianna intuited the message that she was 
not to be naughty, needy or childish these aspects of herself 
could not be expressed and had to be repressed. To be needy or 
vulnerable at the hands of an insensitive and witholding mother 
must have been a very threatening experience - hence Dianna's 
belief that she could not trust her mother with her feelings . She 
thus renounced her childish dependency needs, becoming 
prematurely independent and intelle ctually mature. Biographical 
evidence f o r this is s ugge sted by t he r ea lization she f elt at the 
age of five that her ch i ldhood was over. In order to compensate 
for the mundane, unremarkable and hence un l oveable self-
1 It should be borne in mind that the huntress-warrior may 
not just symbolize the ideal self, but also might be an amalgam 
of the ideal self and the ideal object, integrated into a single 
image. 
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representation Dianna fantasized about being strong, beautiful, 
flamboyant and self-sufficient. This fantasy protected her from 
the unacceptable reality of her ordinaryness. 
The seconcj. aspect of Dianna's repressed self-representation is 
vividly expressed in her wolf fantasy (session thirteen) . Wolves 
for her were ravenous, vicious predators - wild and aggressive. 
This image symbolically depicts her own oral aggression, 
expressed indirectly by her biting sarcasm and tendency to give 
those who crossed her a "tongue-lashing". The genetic origin of 
this underlying self-representation can be inferred from Dianna's 
relationship with her mother. The latter was experienced as 
insensitive and witholding. Unconditional love and affection we re 
in short supply and Dianna remembers having to compete seriously 
wi th her siblings for her mother's attention. (This emerged in 
the transference as the jealousy and anger she felt toward me in 
the chef dream (session six) for seeing other patients and not 
caring sincerely f or her). The resulting childhood frustration 
must have given rise ' to extreme anger and aggression which could 
not be openly expressed but was instead displaced onto her 
siblings . (The incident in which she set fire to her brothers' 
toy box illustrates the destructive intensity of her anger). At 
times the destructive phantasies accompanying her frustrated 
anger - almost certainly directed towards her witholding mother-
could not be so effectively repressed. Although these did not 
emerge into consciousness their threshold activation gave rise to 
the anxiety attacks that she felt as a child and still does in 
certain c onflict situations. He r transference feeling that she 
needed to pro tect me from he rsel f indirec tly revealed t he anxiety 
she felt about the repre ssed de structive anger she felt towards 
her mother. The oral or i g i ns and derivatives of her frustrated 
aggression her "ravenous carnivore" association to wolves-
supports Kernberg's claim t hat narcissism has its etilogical 
locus in the experience of oral deprivation and subsequent angry 
hunger . Dianna's childhood conviction that there was going to be 
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a drought and that she needed to collect water in preparation was 
clearly a symbolic reference to a mother whose limited love and 
affection was threatening to dry up completely, leaving her 
daughter parched and thirsty for emotional sustenance. In therapy 
the uncons~ious choice of the wolf image and her association that 
wolves are "hardy animals that can survive in harsh conditions" 
reflects the cold, bleak and harsh maternal environment in which 
Dianna greedily hunted and fought for nurturance and recognition. 
The following quotation from Kernberg is remarkably relevant to 
Dianna's case: 
"The narcissistic character defenses protect the 
patient not only against the intensity of his 
narcissistic rage, but also against his deep 
convictions of unworthiness, his frightening image of 
the world as being devoid of food and love, and his 
self-concept of the hungry wolf out to kill, eat and 
survive." (Kernberg 1975 pg 276) 
The third aspect of the patient's underlying self-representation 
is dramatically illustrated by two of the images that emerged in ' 
therapy: the bottomless black pit or void (session twelve) and 
the endless empty and sterile rooms (session thirteen). The self-
representation here is what I would call the hollow self. This 
refers to Dianna's anxiety that her psychic interior was an arid, 
drought-stricken, denuded and empty space, unpopulated by 
sustaining internal objects. This is illustrated by Dianna's fear 
that if the wolf ripped away her mask there might in fact be 
nothing behind it - behind her narcissistic defenses she might be 
hollow and faceless. For this reason the prospect of silence in 
therapy \.;as very threatening. Silence symbolized her internal 
experience of hollowness and words served to partially fill up 
the empty space. Kernberg explains the subjective experience of 
emptiness in terms of "loss of the normal relationship of the 
self with ... the world of inner objects." (1975 pg 220) A sense 
a f inner "fullness" and self-worth comes from the 
internalization of a good maternal object which forms the nucleus 
127 . 
for a positive self-representation. Dianna, however, must have 
internalized a destructive maternal object, experienced as 
ungiving, callous, insensitive and rejecting. Dianna could not 
depend on this destructive internal object for gratification and 
so severed ties with it by becoming (in phantasy) omnipotent and 
self-reliant. But, as Kernberg points out, the psychodynamic 
consequence of disrupted contact with internal objects is a 
feeling of emptiness. The symptomatic result in Dianna's case was 
the underlying feeling of hollowness and insubstantiality. 
Accompanying the subjective experience of emptiness was the 
phantasy of destructive psychic contamination. The psychodynamics 
of this can be fruitfully argued in terms of Kleinian theory. In 
phantasy the malignant maternal introject polluted her internal 
world. Klein's work revealed that infantile aggression is often 
expressed in phantaSies of poisoning, burning or contaminating 
the interior of the hated bad object's body with urine or faeces. 
The child imagines that the object will retaliate in like fashion 
and thus fears contamination of its own interior by the punitive 
object. Evidence for this is suggested by Dianna's preoccupation 
with the th:r:eat of pollution and her desire to "save the world" 
from being poisoned. (See session seventeen in the previous 
chapter). At one level the poisoned world referred to might well 
be the world of her own psychological interior. The dynamics 
behind this may have been either oral (drinking contaminated milk 
from the bad breast) or anal/urethral (being poisoned by the bad 
mother's faeces or urine). Whatever the organ modality behind 
this phantasy the result was the threat a polluted internal world 
and the need to defend herself 
I believe, defended herself 
against this possibility. Dianna, 
by attacking the bad maternal 
introject with similar phantasies of pOisoning and pollution. But 
in Dianna's case the maternal introject was not completely bad. 
In spite of her mother's narcissism Dianna had already 
experienced a degree of adequate mothering which had allowed her 
to mature beyond the paranoid-schizoid position to a point where 
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she felt ambivalently towards a relatively integrated whole 
internal object, comprising images of both good and bad aspects 
of maternal care. It was this integration and the consequent 
replacement of splitting by more mature defenses that saved 
Dianna from much more severe narcissistic pathology. She had in 
other words reached the depressive position and her anxiety was 
not primarily the paranoid fear of destruction by the bad object 
but rather the fear of harming the sufficiently integrated, 
ambivalently loved and hated whole object. Her destructive 
phantasies of polluting and destroying the inside of her mother's 
body mobilized guilt and reparative concern. This was expressed 
biographically by her desire to save the (object) world from the 
threat of pollution, and transferentially by her fear of harming 
me and the need to protect me from herself. Further evidence for 
this thesis was her statement (session nineteen) that there was 
something bad or destructive in her that was harmful to other 
people. The incident in which she felt responsible for the death 
of the family maid's baby is another indication of her pervasive 
sense of destructiveness and her need to protect others from 
this. L 
As implied above, Dianna's internal world was certainly not all 
bad. This was apparent from the initial assessment session when 
she mentioned the internal presence of a secretive inner essence 
which she called the "silent passion". This, she said, was a 
center and source of intense feeling which had no outlet and 
which was afraid of being exposed and ostracized. Reading this 
description one realizes that 
and evocative description of 
even Winnicott himself has 
Dianna has provided a more accurate 
Winnicott's true self concept than 
done! It may be recalled that 
Winnicott described the true self as the intensely private core 
of psychosomatic identity, vitality and spontaneous action which 
has no traffic with the external world and which requires 
protection from external impingement. Dianna's "silent passion" 
and Winnicott's true self correspond exactly. What strikes one is 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
· , 
129. 
the ali venes s and immediacy of Dianna's contact with her true 
self. The hallmark of severe narcissistic pathology is the almost 
total lack of contact with the true self owing to the latter's 
intense fear of traumatic exploitation by a hostile object world. 
The result is the typical narcissistic feeling of deadness, 
emotional blunting, hollowness and lack of spontanaiety. Although 
Dianna did at times feel hollow and insubstantial she did not 
experience the chronic emptiness, deadness and depersonalization 
that invariably accompanies severe narcissistic disturbances. She 
did, however, experience the fear of true self impingement. This 
was manifest in her equating vulnerability with being "completely 
stripped, broken and destroyed as a person". The presence of her 
true self and its vulnerability was vividly illustrated at a 
point in therapy when she started to relinquish her narcissistic 
defensiveness, by the image of holding a fragile crystal bowl 
inside of her. Her fear of true self violation clearly had its 
developmental origin in her relationship with a narcissistic 
mother. Even as a child Dianna had felt that she could not 
express an essential part of herself because of her mother's 
insensitive dismissal of her attempted communications. (The 
incident in which her mother smashed her easter egg - even if we 
ignore the heavy symbo lism illustrates the extent of her 
destructive insensitivity). This essential part was her true self 
which, lacking adequate mat e rnal recognition, required the 
formation of a rigid false self defensive structure to protect it 
from impingement . This false self, manifest as Dianna's 
narcissistic facade, became identified with the real Dianna. This 
identification, though, was not complete as her true self was 
allowed a secret life which took the form of moments of intense 
excitement, childhood fantasy and poetry writing. A powerful 
childhood symbol of her true self was the "secret place" she used 
to visit ( s ee session seventeen) where the green grass filled up 
her "empty spa ces" a nd where she was unconditi onally accepted 
without any expectations of her. The destruction of this place by 
builders, even o n its own terms a painful event, had an added 
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traumatic impact by virtue of its personal symbolic status - a 
reminder of the violation Dianna's true self had already 
experienced at the hands of an insensitive mother. 
Interestingly, Dianna's dream (session Sixteen) of finding 
herself in a scenic place with green lawns, rivers and ponds 
promises the mature resurrection of her secret childhood space 
and fertile possibilities for renewed true self functioning . 
The remarkable resiliance and vibrancy of Dianna's true self, 
however, meant that she never fully identified with her 
narcissistic false self. For this reason she was, after a short 
period in therapy, able to recognize this false self as being a 
"mask" and a "hard, brittle shell o f illusion". Her fantasy of 
being attacked by a wolf (session thirteen) cannot be simply 
understood in terms of an aggressive underlying self-
representation. Added meaning is gained from interpreting this as 
the necessary therapeutic destruction of her false self facade or 
"mask", as she called it, in order to discover the real face of 
her true self pos sibilities hidden beneath. Fortunately for 
Dianna she had a reach internal world, unlike the nruncated and 
atrophied interiors of more severely disturbed narcissists. Her 
narcissism, moreover, was not the product of transitional space 
patho logy, hence her capacity for symbolic communication, 
imagination and creativity . 
The nature of Di anna's narcissistic injury raises an interesting 
question concern i ng the conceptual applicability of Balint's 
basic fault formulation to her dynamics. The phenomenology of her 
presenting problem strikes one as a classic example of such a 
fault. Dianna emerges as a true philobat who, as a consequence of 
having been failed by he r mother, wears a protective shell of 
grandiose self-sufficiency to protect a structural flaw. This 
flaw or fault is exp ressed symptomatically as a vague feeling of 
internal deficien cy and insubstantiality, of having be en somehow 
undermined at an early age. An evocative metaphor that Dianna 
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later used was that of a broken limb which had set crookedly and 
needed to be broken again 
powerful symbol was that of 
was suspended. Dianna's 
in order to heal properly. Another 
the gaping black whole over which she 
problem had all the structural 
characteristics of basic fault pathology. It 
an internal deficiency 
in terpersonal con text was 
product of deficient maternal 
rather than a 
clearly dyadic, 
care. 
was experienced as 
conflict and the 
the developmental 
But in the context of our therapeutic interaction Dianna did not 
exhibit three fundamental features of basic fault pathology: 
Firstly, the question of shared language and meaning was never 
really an issue. Dianna ' s narcissistic lesion could be languaged 
qui te adequately with a conventional, though creatively 
colourful, lexicon of shared meanings . 
Secondly, although interpretation was my primary form of 
intervention Dianna did not experience 
attacks, intrusions or failures in empathy. 
in terpreta tions as 
Instead she usually 
fel t met by these interpretations and was able to use them 
remarkably well. 
Thirdly, although her symptoms c ould be understood in terms of a 
structural deficit rather than a repressed impulse, neurotic 
conflict over ambivalent feelings was a significant psychodynamic 
feature. 
The above highlights a pr oblem alrea dy mentioned in the first 
part of this chapter - the tendency of object relations theorists 
to divide psychopathology into mutually exclusive categories 
according to the presumed level of developmental arrest. In 
classical theory a patient was either neurotic or psychotic. 
Research on borderline and narcissistic pathology made this 
Simple dichotomy untena ble and it was replaced by another binary 
opposition the distinction between paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive pathology . The fo rmer's psychodynamics were termed 
broadly psychotic while the latt er's ,,'ere c onsidere d neurotic. 
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This conceptualization has been questioned by modern theorists 
such as Andre Green (1986) 'who contend that deep analysis of 
neurotics reveals a psychotic kernel to their pathology. In a 
similar way this case study challenges Balint's rigid distinction 
between neurotic and basic fault pathology . My patient clearly 
exhibited the phenomenology of basic fault pathology in the 
context of primarily neurotic defenses and object relations. This 
paradox cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms of the 
simple object relations model of heirarchically structured 
developmental levels. Psychodynamic contradictions flourish in 
the murky world between these familiar conceptual co-ordinates 
with little respect for the self-consistency of theoretical 
models. 
6.3 Etiology 
Because etiology and psychodynamics are closely i nterwoven the 
previous section includes a number of speculations 
genetic origin of the patient's narcissism. This 
, 
concerning the 
section will 
dra\-;r together and argue the causal factors posited in the case 
study chapter and the above section on psychodynamics. 
In spite , of the considerable differences in the psychodynamic 
formulations of narcissism presented by various influential 
theorists there is remarkably close concordance on the issue of 
the causal factors involved. All the authors cited in the 
literature review adopt an environmentalist stance - they argue 
that pathological narcissism is a (mal)adaptive response to 
deficient parental care at f o rmative stages in the child's 
psychogenesis , Balint contends that at the developmental point 
when symbiotic union with the mother ("primary love") ends, the 
child's awareness of seperateness and dependence renders him/her 
perticularly vulnerable to deficient materna l care . If this care 
is not adequate the child deals with the resulting anxiety either 
ocnophilically - becoming excessively clinging and dependent - or 
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philobatically - withdrawing from people and becoming excessively 
independent. The latter defensive strategy is clearly 
narcissistic in character. According to Winnicott self-pathology 
results from the absence of good-enough-mothering in the early 
months of . inf.ancy prior to the attainment of object constancy. 
Either through impingement or non-recognition the mother fails to 
meet and mirror her infant's spontaneous omnipotent gestures. 
This retards the process of ego differentiation and development , 
resulting in the retreat of the true self behind the rigid 
defensive facade of the false self structure which forms the 
nucleus of the grandiose self-representation. 
In Kohut's model the arrested self-structuralization results from 
the parental selfobjects' failure to mirror the child's phase-
appropriate grandiosity and to invite the child's idealization. 
As a result transmuting internalization of the selfobject is 
prevented and the internal structures for self-esteem regulation 
cannot develop. Compensatory narcissistic selfobject 
relationships are consequently necessary to bolster the 
chronically fragile sense of self-worth. 
According to Kernberg a coldly aggress ive, resentful or 
indifferent mother results in the infant's experience of ora l 
deprivation and subsequent hunger, greed and rage. The consequent 
excessive splitting results in feelings of emptiness and 
inferiori ty which are defended against by the grandiose self 
formed by the fusion of real self, ideal self and ideal object. 
Kernberg isolates another causal factor in the parents' attempts 
to vicariously satisfy their own narcissistic needs v icariously 
through the lives of their children while not recognizing the 
latter's own needs. 
In various degrees all of the above positions are supported by 
evidence from this case study. Dianna's narcissism can clearly be 
traced to her childhood relationship with a pathogenic motr.er. 
Available information suggests that Dianna's mother was 
narcissistically disturbed. She appears to have been a 
wap 
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superficially hard, powerful, domineering matriarch who was so 
devoted to her children that she made considerable sacrifices for 
them. Her sacrifices, however, were narcissistic attempts to 
realize vicariously her own frustrated needs through their 
accomplishments e. g. her fantasy of Dianna one day becoming a 
great writer and making the family wealthy. Dianna, in other 
words, functioned as a selfobject for her mother. In spite of her 
apparent devotion to her family she was cruelly insensitive to 
Dianna's needs for love and recognition, awarding these only when 
Dianna earned them by meeting her mother's expectations of 
appropriate behaviour. Her mother, moreover, was easily hurt and 
angered when Dianna did not live up to these maternal 
expectations. Dianna, her dependency needs for love and 
recognition frustrated by her selfishly insensitive mother, 
renounced these needs. An omnipotent, invulnerable false self 
structure emerged to deal with her destructive maternal 
environment. She became prematurely self-reliant and withdrew 
into a private world of fantasies and books. By the age of five 
she was no longer a child but a miniature adult. But underlying 
her haughty, superior, self-sufficient exterior was a hungry, 
empty, vulnerable, dependent and angry little girl who resented 
her lack of nurturance and wished her mother harm. Destructive 
phantasies coexisted with guilt and reparative urges. 
A comprehensive outline of the ensuing psychodynamic details is 
included in the previous section and need not be repeated here. 
What stands out clearly is that Dianna's narcissism was a 
defensive adapt ion to a narcissistic mother who not only failed 
to meet her daughter's dependency needs but also unconsciously 
expected Dianna to gratify her own frustrated needs. Deeply 
frustrated, unhappy and resentful she sought vicarious 
satisfaction through the life of her daughter. Dianna felt 
burdened, angry and guilty and retreated behind a narcissistic 
mask, repressing both her anger and her frustrated need for love. 
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One author who, more than most, emphasises the narcissistic 
mother as the primary etiological determinant is Alice Miller 
(1987): 
"What these mothers had once failed to find in their 
own mothers they were able to find in their children: 
someone at their disposal who can be used as an echo, 
who can be controlled, is completely centered on them, 
will never desert them, and offers full attention and 
admiration". (Miller 1987 pg 53) 
The truth of this in Dianna's case is illustrated by the fact 
that her "huge, indomitable mother" became weaker and insecure 
when the children left home losing her selfobjects meant 
confronting her own narcissistic emptiness and inadequacy. 
Dianna intuitively realized the fragility and insecurity that lay 
beneath her mother's narcissistic character defenses. This was 
evident in her tendency to search out emotionally disturbed 
people in order to heal them: "I would always find people with 
hang-ups and want to fix them. I guess I needed to be needed". 
These were displaced reparative attempts to heal her narcissistic 
mother. Harold Searles is fond of emphasising that the extent of 
his patients' pathology is determined by the extent to which 
their therapeutic strivings to 
frustrated. The child wishes 
heal their disturbed parents were 
to heal his disturbed mother in 
order that she might function as an adequate parent to him. This 
introduces an added perspective to the traditional Kleinian 
notion of reparative urges. In this case Dianna's therapeutic 
strivings made her resentment and anger even more difficuilt to 
accept. 
The question that emerges is not why Dianna became 
narcissistically disturbed but why, given her history, she was 
not more disturbed? The a nswer, I believe, lies in her 
relat ionship with her father. Although he was clearly a weak man 
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the fact that Dianna was "his pride and joy" meant that she must 
have received sufficient devotion and mirroring from 
compensate for her deficient maternal care. This 
him to 
probably 
amelierated the malignant influence of her mother by providing 
adequate m~rroring and the subsequent transmuting internalization 
of a good paternal ' introject. 
6.4 Psychotherapy 
Details of the therapeutic interaction are included in the case 
study chapter. This section will therefore simply provide a 
summary of the course of Dianna's treatment and offer a few 
observations on therapeutic strategy with less severely 
disordered narcissistic patients. 
Dianna approached psychotherapy as an exercise in intellectual 
excavation. She wanted to uncover the 
analyzing clues and integrating them 
water-tight conceptual framework that 
• 
cause of her problem by 
within 
would 
a sophisticated 
allow her total 
mastery and control over her world. My dual role was to be that 
of intellectual accomplice and admiring observer of her 
conceptual and verbal skills. I realized that a therapeutic 
priority was that of creating a space in which Dianna could feel 
safe enough to relax her intellectualizing defences and search 
for cognitive control sufficiently to experience her 
narcissistic injury and its biographical context. The focus, 
given her life history, would inevitably be her relationship with 
her narcissistic mother. 
Stage one: sessions two to five 
The first stage o f therapy began with the implicit question of 
whether I, the transference mothe r, was strong enough to hold and 
contain Dianna's destructive feelings without being destroyed or 
rejecting her repressed dependen cy needs f o r love and 
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recognition. Her need to be held competed with her defensive need 
for self-sufficiency and emotional control. The question of trust 
was central. Dianna needed to know that I was not just 
professionally interested in her but that I really cared for her 
on a personal level, thus echoing the childhood insecurity she 
felt that her superficially competent mother was discharging her 
maternal duties without authentic care and affection . Al though 
narcissistic qualities were present her relational style and 
defenses began to emerge as primarily neurotic. 
Stage two: sessions six to eleven 
The second stage of therapy was characterised by a rapid 
intensification of mixed transference feelings revealed primarily 
through dream material. Almost all the work during this period 
involved working with dream imagery because of the richness, 
depth and emotiona l charge of the dream content. Dianna was very 
frustrated by the restrictions imposed by the therapeutic frame. 
She was asking for nourishment and holding but the transience and 
professional nature of our relationship meant that I would 
inevitably fail her. She felt angry, hurt, jealous and betrayed 
by the fact that I had other patients and was not simply there 
for her alone. Furthermore, she felt that my apparent caring for 
her was not sincere but rather an impersonal therapeutic 
strategy. This announced the 
fears that I might be harmed by 
renewed emergence of depressive 
her destructive feelings and that 
she needed to protect me from herself. Increasing anxiety about 
becoming dependent on this uncaring therapist-mother anticipated 
the emergence of sexualized feelings which she dealt with by 
splitting me into the personal and the professional, pushing away 
the former in order to relate only to the latter. Interpretation 
of her narcissistic defenses resulted in feelings of depression 
and 
she 
inadequacy. 
felt the 
There was an atmosphere of anxious expectancy as 
approach of a nebulous b~t imminent emotional 
collapse. She made various attempts to control me and manipulate 
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me into modifying the therapeutic frame. At this pOint her 
resentment became anger and she experienced me as the cold, 
wi tholding, uncommitted therapist-mother who related to her 
mechanically without any real feeling or concern. Her response 
was a temporary return to defensive self-sufficiency of earlier. 
I experienced various strong countertransference feelings during 
this stage ranging from fear of her destructiveness to anxiety 
and guilt that I could not give her more, that I was incarnating 
her coldly un giving mother. 
Stage three 
This stage began with the insight that her anger resulted from me 
not being deceived by and identifying her with the false self she 
presented. Although this made her vulnerable it also meant that 
her underlying weak and vulnerable real self felt recognized. She 
no longer attempted to control me but instead tried to use 
intellectua'lization to exercise self-control on increasingly 
finer levels to avoid falling into a black internal void. At this 
pOint she needed to feel held without her vulnerability being 
exploited as it had originally been exploited by her narcissistic 
mother. The descent into the emptiness confronted her with the 
realization that her narcissistic facade had been a mask and that 
there was a possibility that there might be nothing behind the 
mask, that she might in fact be hollow. This marked a distinct 
turning point in therapy, with Dianna recalling the childhood 
narcissistic fantasies of identifying with her ideal self in 
order to assuage the pain of not being loved for her real self 
alone. Her narcissistic fantasies were now no longer an adequate 
defense against the therapeutic confrontation with her repressed 
negative self-representation. She sadly acknowleged the 
untenability of identification with her ideal self and anxio~sly 
turned to face the world without the protection of her 
narcissism. She felt extremely vulnerable, fearing that without 
her narcissistic exoskeleton I might destroy or injure her like 
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her mother had done before. I became the transference mother who 
would not love her unless she met my expectations and subjected 
herself to my narcissistic power. Then began a period of dialogue 
with the aspects of Dianna's previously repressed negative self-
representation and the tentative possibility that the integration 
of the latter might herald fertile possibilities for true self 
functioning without the hollow pseudo-security of a narcissistic 
false self structure. But the gravity of her emptiness drew her 
back to the hollow self and the possibility of non-existence. 
What emerged, however, was not nothingness but a polluted 
internal world contaminated by a malignant maternal introject 
which threatened the life of her good objects and the secret 
pockets of true self residues. Renewed and intensified depressive 
anxiety arose at this point with Dianna's fantasy that her 
aggressive destructiveness might harm 
hated maternal object and all those 
close to her. 
the ambivalently loved and 
(especially me) who came 
Therapy ended prematurely at a point when Dianna felt raw, 
vulnerable and frightened, not only by her fragility but also by 
the aggression which we had only just begun to uncover. In spite 
of our short time together, however, she had undergone 
considerable change. She was warmer, less aggressive, more 
accessible and receptive. Her personal relationships had improved 
as a consequence and she found herself really listening to and 
empathising with people rather than intellectually analyzing 
their words and arguing for exhibitionistic effect. 
Although she feared the return of her old narcissistic facade I 
do not think this is likely to happen. I am optimistic that her 
narcissistic false self structure has been sufficiently modified 
to allow more flexible and meaningful contact both with other 
people and with her own real self. Clearly, however, many issues 
were uncovered without being sufficiently worked through. At the 
time of termination Dianna was enthusiastic about entering long-
term therapy at a later date. In spite of its many limitations I 
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consider our psychotherapy to have been reasonably successful. 
This is less attributable to my interventions than it is to her 
remarkable resources and capacities. Foremost in this regard was 
a rich internal internal world that, in spite of her subjective 
feelings of emptiness, proved to be a rather full and textured 
space. A second quality that stands out was her imaginative 
capacity for spontaneous fantasy. I discovered this in my efforts 
to side-step her formidable intellectualizing defenses. Dianna 
tried to make therapy a process of intrapsychic intellectual 
analysis 
detailed 
rather than an interpersonal emotional experience. My 
analysis of her intrapsychic dynamics gives a misleading 
impression of the therapy, which was very interpersonal in nature 
and focused on the spontaneous emergence of feelings in the 
immediate context of our relationship. In order to shift Dianna's 
defensive focus from the intellectual analysis of intrapsychic 
events and past incidents I would often ask if any images or 
fantasies emerged from the fleeting feeling states that she so 
aesperately tried to intellectualize out of existence. To my 
surprise 
opened 
a vibrant and evocative world of spontaneous 
up. The rest of our time together was spent 
imagery 
almost 
exclusively working on fantasy and dream imagery, with specific 
emphasis on the transference context in which these images arose. 
Dianna, more than any other patient, has taught me about the 
therapeutic power of spontaneous imagery in accessing and working 
with deep unconscious material. 
6.5 An explanatory model of narcissistic neurosis 
This case study demonstrates that certain categories of less 
severe narcissistic disorders may respond favourably to short-
term depth psychotherapy. The term narcissistic neurosis, pU~'ged 
of its Freudian connotations, suggests itself as the logical and 
most appropriate diagnostic label for the category I have in 
mind. I would define narcissistic neurosis as a form of 
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psychopathology in which a primarily neurotic character structure 
presents with a distinctly narcissistic symptom profile. 
I use the term neurosis to refer to a syndrome in which 
egodystonic self-representations, occuring in a relatively 
cohesive self-structure, result in anxiety, the meaning of which 
is covertly expressed through symptom formation but actively 
denied conscious expression through the use of high level 
defenses. 
The obvious question to ask is why a neurotic would present with 
narcissistic symptomatology? This case study, I believe, provides 
a plaus ible answer: the defensive self-sufficiency and 
grandiosi ty of the person's false self structure emerges as a 
compensatory response to an internalized negative self-other 
relational unit resulting from a particular mode of deficient 
mothering. 
On the basis of this case study and my reading of the object 
relations literature I have formulated a rough explanatory model 
which attempts to outline the psychodynamic development of 
narcissistic neurosis. (2) The stages in the formation of 
narcissistic neurosis, I would argue, are as follows: 
l) Stage one in the pathogenesis of narcissistic neurosis 
probably occurs after a period of adequate maternal provision has 
insured the successful negotiation of the paranoid-schizoid 
position, the capacity for play in the transitional space, and 
the attainment of object constancy. If this period of adequate 
mothering is initially absent in the first few months of life 
developmental arrest will occur within the configuration of 
paranoid-schizoid psychodynamics. In this eventuality severe 
self-pathology (NPD, BPD, schizotypal personality disorder or 
2 Because my model derives from a single case study I do not 
make claims for its universal arplication in other similar cases. 
Its use is purely heuristic. 
, 
l 
i 
, 
" 
, 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. 
142. 
even psychosis) rather than neurosis will occur. Adequate 
mothering during this critical period explains why narcissism 
emerges in the context of a neurotic rather than a personality 
disorder character structure. However, at this point the quality 
of maternal care fails the stage-dependent needs of the child. 
The nature of these needs is most comprehensively presented in 
Margaret Mahler's (1979) model of infantile psychic development. 
Details of this model will not be presented here. Suffice it to 
say that between the the ages of fifteen and eighteen months the 
toddler experiences a crisis (the "rapprochement crisis") arising 
out of a developmental tension between contradictory emotional 
needs. On the hand there is the developmental need for 
independence, differentiation and separation from mother. The 
consequent exploratory forays from the maternal orbit, however, 
resul t in seperation anxiety, vulnerability and the regressive 
longing for symbiotic (re) fusion with the maternal object. The 
resulting tension between these opposing needs leads to 
considerable anxiety and frustration. The mother 
required to intuitively recognize the child's 
at this point is 
dilemma and to 
affirm his need for autonomy while accepting the periodic periods 
of regressive dependency and clinging. If the mother is 
threatened by the child's impending seperation from her only the 
regressive dependency needs are rewarded. This, I would argue, is 
the origin of borderline pathology, which is characterised by 
exces s i ve dependency and sepera tion anxiety: "I f I become a 
seperate person mother will abandon me. I will surrender my 
independent selfhood rather than risk rejection". The 
narcissistic mother, I believe, is threatened by her child's 
dependency needs, probably because her own frustrated dependency 
needs were never met by her own mother. She thus needs her child 
to become prematurely mature and renounce his dependency needs in 
order that he might gratify her own unmet needs. Through her 
selfobject identification with him she can vicariously live out 
her frustrated needs through his life: "Unless I stop being a 
child and grow up quickly in urder to meet mother's needs and 
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she will cease to love me" . (My patient's 
with her narcissistic mother supports this 
these grounds I propose the following: Borderline 
and narcissistic pathologies result from opposite defensive 
strategies to the threat of the maternal withdrawal of love. The 
borderline child employs the adaptive strategy of pathological 
dependence whereas the narcissistic child employs the strategy of 
premature pathological independence. 
Because at this stage identification has not yet replaced 
introjection as the primary internalization mechanism the 
negative child-mother interaction is internalized as a relational 
unit (I have in mind Kernberg's self-affect-object model of the 
introject structure). The object pole of this introject/unit is a 
demanding, insensitive maternal object who places conditions on 
her love, unconsciously demands that the target child gratify her 
own unmet needs, and who lives out her frustrated 
ambitions/ideals through the acco~plishments of the target child . 
The self pole of this relational introject initiated by the 
negative experience of self in relation to primary other - is a 
needy, hungry, angry, unrecognized, vulnerable and empty child 
who does not feel held or met by mother . 
2. Stage two occurs simultaneously on two different levels: (a) 
intrapsychically, with the repression of this negative self-
representation and its replacement by a defensively grandiose, 
omnipotent surface self-representation, and (b) interpersonally, 
by severing dependency relations with the destructive object by 
becoming prematurely independent and self-sufficient. 
3. Stage three occurs when, owing to some specific precipitating 
event o r general life context, symptoms emerge as symbolic 
expressions of the activated egodystonic bipolar introjects. 
Because of the nature of the repressed self-representation the 
presenting symptoms would probatly involve feelings of emptiness, 
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inadequacy, loneliness, fragility, depression , abandonment etc 
even though the patient's interpersonal style may be expressly 
narcissistic - perhaps even more so than usual in order to combat 
the underlying negati ve self-representation with intensified 
narcissistic defenses. 
6.6 Suggestions concerning assessment criteria for short-term 
psychotherapy with narcissistic neurotics 
Because severe narcissistic disorders are notoriously difficuilt 
to treat and those with a favourable prognosis respond only to 
long-term intensive psychotherapy it is imperative that car eful 
assessment criteria are employed to distinguish narcissistic 
neurosis from NPD. Data from this case study suggests that the 
following differential diagnostic criteria may prove useful in 
this regard: 
(a) The symptomatology in NPD is more severe and long-standing 
than in narcissistic neurosis. This refers not only to the 
presenting problem as defined by the patient but also other 
narcissistic symptoms elicited during the assessment sess i on . A 
qualitatively different premorbid profile is more likely in 
narcissistic neurosis. Furthermore, NPD symptoms are more likely 
to effect occupational and social functioning than is the case 
with narcissistic neurosis. 
(b) In narcissistic neurosis the symptoms are likely to be more 
egodystonic than is the case in NPD. This means that the neurotic 
narcissist is more likely to experience and admit to feeling 
anxiety, depression and other feelings of subjective distress 
than is the NPD patient . This not only means a healthy motivation 
for change, 
representation 
therapeutically 
it also indicates that the negative self-
is closer to consciousness and thus more 
accessible. I 
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(c) In the case of neurotic narcissists a clearly defined 
therapeutic focus is more likely to emerge than with personality 
disordered narcissists who often present with multiple diffuse 
and non-specific complaints and issues. For example, in spite of 
the vagueness of my patient's presenting problem the troubled 
relationship with her mother quickly emerged as a useful focal 
issue . 
(d) Narcissistic neurosis is characterized by the use of higher 
order defense mechanisms (primarily repression) than NPD where 
lower order defenses such as splitting, denial, projective 
identification etc predominate. The preponderance of these lower 
order defenses is an indication that paranoid-schizoid dynamics 
are dominant. 
(e) The objective relations of neurotic narcissists are 
qualitatively better than those characteristic of NPD. The former 
are far more likely to have relatively intimate and e nduring 
friendships and sexual relati onships than are the latter. 
Neurotic narcissists are far more likely to relate to others as 
seperate people rather than as selfobjects and to appreciate them 
as a c omplex admixture of good and bad qualities (i. e. whole 
objects) rather than all good or all bad - an indication o f part-
object relating. Sel f -descriptions in narcissistic neuroses are 
also more likely to be three-dimensional, complex, textured and 
characterized by a mixture of positive and negative qualities . 
(f) Neurotic narciss i sts are less likely to evidence identity 
diffusion / confusion than are people with NPD. Gender conf usion, 
homo- or bisexuality and lack of vocational direction are common 
indicators of identity diffusion. 
(g) In narcissistic ne urosis there is more evidence of reasonable 
superego functioning ma nifest as feel i ngs of conscience, guilt 
and a valued set of personal ethics, t han is the case in NPD. 
I 
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(h) Neurotic narcissists have a broader and more differentiated 
affective range than NPDs. The capacity for mild depression, 
sadness, warmth, empathy and vulnerability are good indications 
that depressive rather than paranoid dynamics are operant. 
(i) Transference and countertransference phenomena, as well as 
communication style in the assessment period are extremely 
valuable differential diagnostic indicators. Firstly, in the case 
of NPD idealization, disparagement, envy, avoidance of personal 
contact, grandiosity and exhibitionism are far more likely to be 
more overt and intense. Secondly, countertransference feelings of 
anger, boredom, sleepiness, lack of empathy and non-relatedness 
are common with cases of NPD. With narcissistic neurosis the 
clinician is more likely to feel empathy, warmth and a sense of 
relationship. Thirdly, response to interpretation is an important 
differential criterion With NPDs interpretations are often 
ignored, cri tici zed or do not deepen rapport. Narcissistic 
neurotics are more likely to respond to accurate interpretations ' 
with anxiety, relief and deepened rapport. Fourthly, narcissistic 
neurotics are also far more likely to think about and respond 
emotionally between sessions to the events of the previous 
s es sion ( s ) NPDs, on the other hand, are often emotionally 
unaffected and frequently do not think about therapy between 
sessions. Fifthly, the communications and dreams of narcissistic 
neurotics are far more likely to have the quality of symbolically 
conveying hidden meaning. NPD communication is often flat and 
meaningless with no sense of multiple layers or symbolically 
disguised messages. 
As illustrated by this case study a narcissistic presenting 
profile does not automatically warrant a diagnosis of NPD. 
Careful and patient assessment may reveal a neurotic underlying 
structure which may respond favourably to brief psychotherapy . 
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6.7 Chapter summary 
Discussion of the case study began with the issue of narcissistic 
diagnosis in the context of both the symptomatic and 
developmental object relations diagnostic perspectives. It was 
argued that both of the above result in mutually exclusive 
diagnostic categories that do not do justice to the complexities 
of the phenomena which straddle these conceptual divides . 
The second section of the chapter was devoted to a detailed 
analysis of the patient's psychodynamics . The central 
psychodynamic structure to emerge was that of a narcissistic 
false self facade which served to defend the patient from a 
repressed negative self-representation compriSing aspects of 
neediness, ordinariness, aggression and emptiness. Phantasies of 
, 
a polluted internal world arising from the internalization of a 
bad maternal introject was a dominant f eature. Also present were 
depressive anxities about harming the ambivalently loved and 
hated maternal object. Emphasis was placed on the ameliatory 
influence of vibrant true self functioning. This section 
concluded with the psychodynamic application of the basic fault 
concept and a critical discussion of certain paradoxes to emerge 
in this regard. 
Part three considered popular hypotheses concerning etiological 
factors in narcissistic development. Evidence from the case study 
supported most o f these theories. The spe cific etiological factor 
in this case appears to have been a narcissistic mother who used 
the patient for both d irect and vicarious satisfaction of her own 
frustrated nee ds while not recognizing and meeting the needs of 
the patient. The patient' s narcissism was a n adaptive response to 
this unc ongenial maternal environment . 
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Section four briefly discussed the the three stages of the 
therapeutic process and the factors presumed responsible for the 
therapy's relative success. 
Section five was devoted to the definition and formulation of an 
explanatory model of narcissistic neurosis. It was argued that 
the narcissistic false self structure emerges after a period of 
adequate maternal provision ensures object constancy, psychic 
structuralization and the transition from primitive to more 
mature defenses. At this point a specific mode of deficient 
mothering results in the internalization of a negative self-
object relational unit which necessitates the repression of this 
unit and the formation of a compensatory narcissistic self-
representation to defend the psyche against the underlying 
deficient self- and object representations. 
The chapter concluded with suggestions arising out of the case 
study concerning assessment criteria for short-term psychotherapy 
with narcissistic neurotics. It was emphasised t 'hat strict 
assessment criteria should be employed to differentiate 
narcissistic neurosis from narcissistic personality disorder as 
brief psychotherapy is contraindicated in the case of the latter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
This case- study details the psychoanalytically-oriented brief 
psychotherapy of a female patient over a period of twenty twice-
weekly sessions. The hermeneutic framework employed was that of 
the psychoanalytic object relations tradition. The author's 
understanding of the therapeutic dynamics was dialogued with the 
theories of narcissistic pathology provided by Balint, Winnicott, 
Kohut, Kernberg and Stolorow . The history of the concept of 
pathological narcissism in psychoanalysis was briefly reviewed 
and current diagnostic systems presented . Although the patient 
used for the case study initially presented as a case of 
narcissistic personality disorder certain anomalies in the course 
of treatment disconfirmed this initial impression and raised a 
number of diagnostic paradoxes. The data from this case study was 
used to advance the proposition that narcissistic symptomatology 
and psychodynamics may occur wi thin a primarily neurotic 
character structure. Because diagnostic provision has not been 
made for this phenomenon in either the symptomatic or object 
relations developmental diagnostic models the author advocates 
the use of the term narcissistic neurosis to describe this 
disorder. Owing to the fact that object relations psychoanalytic 
theory has not provided an explanation for narcissistic neurosis 
the author formulated his own object relations explanatory model, 
drawing eclectically o n the above mentioned object relations 
theoris t s, with the addition of Klein and Mahler. This model may 
be s umma rized in the following points: 
1. The functional purpose of narcissistic pathology is the 
formation and maintenance of a grandiose, omnipotent and self-
sufficient surface self-representation which protects the peIson 
against an underlying negative self-representation c omprising 
feelings of emptiness, i nadequacy, ne ediness and anger. 
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2. The (neurotic) narcissistic false self emerges at a 
developmental juncture when prior adequate maternal provision has 
insured the acquisition of object constancy, the relatively 
successful negotion of the paranoid-schizoid position and the 
replacement of primitive by more mature dynamics and defensive 
strategies. If this initial period of adequate mothering is 
absent development will be arrested at the paranoid-schizoid 
position. If specifically narcissistic pathology arises as a 
consequence it is more likely to assume the form of narcissistic 
personality disorder than the less severe narcissistic neurosis. 
The latter is less severe primarily due to the absence of 
splitting defenses which fragment the self and the object, 
resul ting in part- rather than whole object relating and the 
predominance of paranoid anxieties. 
3 . Narcissistic neurosis may be structurally differentiated from 
NPD by the following: (a) The negative self-representation is 
repressed rather than split off, thereby making it potentially 
" 
more accessible and recoverable, (b) the structural cohesion and 
temporal continuity of the self is not seriously threatened by 
decompensation, (c) whole rather than part-object relating and 
the increased capacity to see others as autonomous rather than 
merely selfobjects, (d) anxiety is depressive rather than 
paranoid i.e. anxiety relates to a fear of harming others rather 
than the developmentally earlier paranoid fear of being harmed by 
others. 
4. The etiology of narcissistic neurosis results from the 
previously adequate mother's inability to meet the child's phase 
specific developmental needs due to her own unresolved conflicts 
concerning these needs. The specific need in this case concerns 
the recognition and gratification of the dependency, 
vulnerabilty, and need for holding that emerges in reaction to 
the child's increasing seperation from the maternal orbit. 
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(Frustration of the child's earlier need to have his grandiosity I 
mirrored is more likely to result in NPD). The narcissistic 
mother demands that the child renounce his/her dependency needs 
and become prematurely adult in order to gratify the mother's own 
unmet needs and provide a means for the vicarious satisfaction of 
her frustrated ambitions/ideals. 
5. The subsequent internalized self-object interactional unit 
comprises a demanding, insensitive and rejecting object-
representation and a self-representation of a needy, hungry, 
empty and angry child. 
6. In order to defend against this negative introject the child 
responds interpersonally by becoming prematurely self-sufficient, 
and intrapsychically by repressing the negative self-
representation and replacing it with a defensively grandiose, 
omnipotent surface self-representation. 
7. The advent of a specific precipitating event or general life 
context initiates the emergence of symptoms which symbolically 
express the nature of the repressed egodystonic self-
representation. 
Providing that careful discriminating assessment criteria are 
employed to diagnostically differentiate NPD from narcissistic 
neurosis the latter may be successfully treated with brief 
psychodynamic therapy. 
Treatme nt o f the patient focused intensively on the activation of 
the repressed negative self-representation in the context of an 
ambivalent maternal transference using dream imagery and 
spontaneous fantasy . In spite of the short duration of 
psychotherapy treatment was considered to be largely successful 
according to the criteria of significant modification of the 
narcissi s tic false self, greater s e lf-insight and qualitatively 
improved interpersonal relation,. 
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One: Ovid ' s Narci s sus Myth. from Schwartz - Sa l and 75. 
2 Ovid's Mylh of Narcissus 
The rollowing lransl~lion of the!' myth is by Louise Vingc: .... 2 I in ..... lulk it 
III:rc in its entirety hc.:c<.iuse we.: sh ~dl be conl:crneJ with nlt)SI of its c:lc-
Illcnts. Il hegins with pr:.Jisc ror thr.: hlind scer Tire:,ias: 
lie. f;'IIll L'J far ;lIld 11I':;I[ Ihwugh :111 Ihl." B(I~llIi:1I1 hl\~ n~. g:I\"1,." :tll!'o\.q'rs Ih:JI 
1I0llC could n'n"urr.: it) tllll.\1,." who ~ou~ht hi!'> :Lid . Thl." lir:-, hI !Il:Ii •. 1." Iri:!1 \If 
hi!>. (nllh and : t!\"url,:J ulh:r:tl\\.'(.'S wa; Ihl..' nymph. l.;r;\ljll.. .. Willi '"11.: .... Ihl." 
river-god . (\:phi'lls. I."l1lhr:Il.:r.:u in hi .... winJing -"tn:am anJ ra\"i .,lh:J. \\ hi!..: 
imprisonc:J in his w:lh:rs. Whl."l1 11I.:r liml." 1,;:11111.: th\." hl.":tIUI..'I,)U!o. nymph 
hrtlu!.!hl r"nll a child. whnm a nvmph mi!.!hl hl\"c,; I,."VI.:n as ;1 l.'hiIJ, :.tnJ 
n:tlll;J him N:.1r~i~ ... u:-., \Vht:ll :1:-.I..r.:J~ wht:tnr.:r ~his \.'hiIJ wllulJ live III rl.':1r.:h a 
wr.:lI. ripcnl.'J ;I:;e, Ihl.' :-.t:l.'r rl.'plicJ: "If h..: ne\.'r kll\lw~ him~I..'!r." lling JiJ the 
:-';Iy ing l)f Ihl.' pr\lphel :-.t:elll hut r.:mpl)' WllrJ"" UUI ",h:11 herd! rh1vl.'J its 
truth ·, the e \'1.' 11 I. Ihl.' 111:ll1nl.'r Ill" hi~ ( ..h:alh, Ihe :\Iran!!.r.:ne:-..., or his inf.ltu.llion, 
For Nan:i:.sus h:1J rt::ldlt:U hi", ,i .\Ir.:I.' nth \t::1r anJ l~idll :.r.:em t:ither ho'" tlr 
Illan, ~bny )"IIUths :tn J m:llly IlLlit.kns s:lughl his lu~ .... : bUI in IhJI :.k~JC"( 
rorm W;IS priue :.n 1.'\l IJ Ih:11 nn Ylluth. nn m:titkn hlu .. 'heJ hi!> hC;Jrt. Once as 
hI.' W;IS Jri\'ill~ thl..' fright .... n .... J lh:r.:r inlo his nt:l:., a l't:rt:tin Il~'mph III' :.lr:lIlgt: 
:-,pL'l..'l.'h nl.'hl.'lJ him, re:'llullJ ing fl.·llIl, \~hd r.:oulll n\.' ilhl,.'r hohl h .... r PI.'J.:t: 
whl'n 1>lIlI.'r:-. :-orok .. " 11M )1.'1 hl.'.=ill hI :-.p,,':tk lill Plh .. :r, 11.IJ :.IJJrl.':':'I.'J Ill.'r. 
Up hI Ihi:-. lillll.' Edh) h:1J f(lrm :.Inu W;t:-. nl't :\ \ "i\.'1.' :iI\lnl.': anJ ye t. 
though 1:t 1 1..:11 i \ '1,.', ... hl.' h:lu nn olh!..' r lh~ IIf "'pl.'r:dl Ih,Ul 'hlw .~ tlnl~ Ihe P,HI.C"( 
till I Ill" 1lI:1JI) wtlrd:. 1(\ r\.'p \'": 11 Ihe I:l:\t :-.h:..' h\.':lrJ, JUthl h:lu nl,IJ\.' hr:r Ihu:\: f'lr 
tll"il..'n wh\.'n :"Ih..: Illi;;hl h,I\·\.' :'lIrpri:"lI.'J the lI~mrh:'> in \.·,Imp.lny \\llh nr:r hlrJ 
ttptill Ihl..' moullui ll :.iJl'."'. Edhl \\' luIJ l' lInllilJ=-l~ IhllJ 11l1' gllJJO:\ ill hlng 
1;,111. until (ih.: n~mrh .\ \~\.'r..: IlI.'J. \\'hen S,llurni,1 r\.',llill.'J thi!>, ",hI.' :.;.tiJ hI 
h\.'r: "Th,1I hlll!!UI..' llf t!lil\l..· . h\' \Ibidl 1 h:J\r: n..:..:n tr; •. :/...cJ, :-.h..lll h:i\l' it:. 
ptlwcr l,tlrt:likd~ :IIlJ r:njll.\ Ihr: hr i ... C\.·,1 u:. r: \If ,11 ... I. ... h ... TIl\.' ":\'\."111 1.'llllrirml..'J 
her threat. Nevertheless she does repeat the lasl phr:.1ses of J speech and 
returns the words she hears, 
Now when she saw t'-:arcissus wandering through Ihe fields , she w~s 
ennamed ..... ·;Ih Jove and followed him by stealth: and the more she fulloweJ, 
the more she burned by a nearer flame: as \\o'hen quick-burning sulphur. 
smeared around the tops of torches, CJlchcs fire fr om Jnoth~r /ire broughl 
near. Oh, ho ..... · ofl~n do1.:s she hlOg to Jprroach him with alluring words and 
m:lke soft pra~:ers to him~ BUI her nature forhid ~ this, nor docs il permit hcr 
to be2.in: but as il allows, she is re:.to\" to ,Jw:lit Ih~ sounds to \\'hich she maY 
e.ive back her own words.' • 
... By chance the no:', sep;lrated from his faithful "omp:..lnions, h:ld cried: "'s 
anyone hcrt.':" anJ "Here!" cried [r.:ho h;td.:. I\m:lzed, he looks :tfl1und in 
all direclitJns and with loud voice cries ''Co~e!'': :..Ind "Come!" :-.ht.' calls 
him c:..ll!ing. HI..' Il)f,)ks behind him aml. scr:ing. no one coming, <..'alls again: 
"Why do \0U run from me?" :..Inll heJrs in :..In:.\\'\."r his ll\\'11 worlls ag;lin, I k 
slJnds ~1J1't. Jr:ccived hy thr: :..Inswcring voi\"'e, :tnJ "'lcrl..' kl us m"r:l't:' hI..' 
cri~s, El'ho, n~\'cr (0 ans\\"\."r :.Inotha sounJ more gl;Ldly, I.."fir:s: "Lct us 
meet": and to help her own words she comr:s forth fmm thl.' wllods Ihal she 
rna)' thfllw hr:r arms :.Iround the ned she longs \0 cl:isp. BUI he nees al hl'f 
appro:.1ch and, Del'ing, says: " H:.tnJs ofr. Emhr:lce me not! 1\.1:.:1)' I l1ie befme 
I give yl~U pnwr:r o'er me!" '" gi\"~ you pllwr:r o'er ml..'!" shl..' says, ;lnd 
nOlhing more, 
Thus spurn\.'J, ~he Iurb in the ..... ·(lods. hilh ... , her sh;lnlt.'d f:ln: :lmong th~ 
foliage, anu lives fWIll Ihal timt! on in 10nl.'1), \..·:I\'l'S. BUI still. though 
spurnr:d, h\.'r In\."c remains and gruws on grid': her sk\.'pk~s cares waste 
away hcr wrtcchcJ form: sh~ becomes g:..lunt :..Ind wrinkkd and all moisture 
fades from h~r b\.ldy in lo the air, Only hl'f voice :..Ind her honl..'s r\."main: 
then, onl\" .... {lice: for thl.'Y s:..Iy Ihat hr:r honr:s wr:rc turned to sinn 1..', Shl.' hiJl..'s 
in wood; and is Sl' en n~ more upon thl..' mounl:tinsiJl's: hut all nl~ly he;lr 
her, for voicc, and \"oice alone, still li\"es in III:r, 
(1982) 
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Thus ha~ Narcissus mocked her. thus has h~ mod:c.:d other nymphs of the 
waves or mount~in~; thus h~ s he mocho the ct1mp;..IOics o f men. AI Ic.:ast 
one of these scorneu youth. lifting up his h:.lnuS 10 heaven. pr;JYco: "So nuy 
-he himsdf love. :.Ind not gain the thing he lo .... es! .. The go(h.kss. Nemesis. 
heard his righl~ous rraycr~Thcrc WOlS a'"'de;lr pool with siln: ry hright W;III.:(, 
10 which no ~hcrhcrJ5 eve r caml!. or she-goals feeding on the mountain side.' 
or any olher tank: whose: smooth surface neither hirJ nur hC::.I~d nor falling 
bough ever rurnc:d. Grass grew all :.Iround its edge. fc.:J by the water ncar , 
and 0. c0ppice Ih:H would never surfc.:r the sun 10 W;Jrnl the spot. Here thc 
youth. worn by the cha~c and the heat. lies down. u{( racted thither hy Ihl" 
::Ipp~ar::ln((" of Ihl" r!;,H:C ;Jnd hy the spri ng. 
While he seeks 10 slab: his thirst ;Jn~)\hL"r thirst springs up, and ",hilL" he 
dr inks he is smitten bv Ih(" s i!!.hl of the h!:;Jutiful form hr.: sct..'s. He hWL"s an 
u nsub5t~nli;J1 hopt..' ;.]~d thinks Ih;l! sub"t;.]nc!'! whi..:h is only shadow. Ht.: 
louks in ::;pe("chk ,~s won(.kr at himself :..snd h;ln):s thert.: nwtil)nkss in tht.: 
same e:\prr:::.sion. li).;t: .. sta lUc carved from P:..tri;ln m;lrhlc. ProllL" on 1111: 
ground. h~ g:..tzr:s ;Jt his eyes, twin st:J rs, :..Inti his Jocks, wllrthy o( [la..:chu :-. . 
worthy of Apollo: on his smooth checks. his ivory neck. Iht.: glt'rious hl.':luly 
til' his f:lce. Ihe hlu~h mingk'd wi th snow v while : all Ihines. in shnrl. he 
;trJmin:s (tlr whi .. :h hL" is him-sdf :'.I(lmireJ. • ... 
Unwillin£ly h(" desires himself: he prJ;sL"s. :Jnd is him~el( ",·h:ll he praises: 
;IOJ while he seeks. is sC'lughl: r:qu;Jlly hL" kindles hl\L" anti hurns ""ilh Il)\'~. 
IIll ...... of len did h(" offer vain kisses on Ihe du!);\'e p"ol: Ho\.l, l)(len tliJ he: 
plunge his arms into Ihe ""'~ller seeking III cbsp the nel,:k he :.ces there. bUI 
did nll t d:l:"p him:.r:lf in Iht.:m: Wh;Jt hl.' !)el.'!\ he knllws nnl; hUI thai whi ... ·h 
ill..' ::~~s ht.: burn:: I'M. ;lnd Ihe s:lmr: (h.'ius; .... )n mod,s :lnu allurc:. hi:'> C)(:!). 0 
lilildly fouli sh h\l)' , wh)' \'Jinly stek to clasp;.] neeing im:.tge? Wh;JI :")U seck 
i~ Illl\Ao'hl.'rt.:: hUI turn ynursdf :1\\';1)' . :Jnd the ohjeu \l( yllur 11)\0;:: ""'ill be no 
lIlor(". Th:n whil'h Vl)U he hold is hut Ihl.' sh Jdl l\\' ll f ;1 rI."Jk .. ·Il.'J inl;]!!c :lnu 
h :t:-. Ill) :-lIh:..I,tI1l'l.' llJ~ ils own, With )'llU itl'llnll.",'. "" jIb :"IU it :-.1:I~S. :lnJ it will 
pI with )\IU - if Y\IU GIn g"l, 
No thllUl:-ht (If fllOd or r("st l'JIl draw him from tht: :-rwt: hul. strl.'h.:heJ on 
the :-.hadl."d !.!rass. h~ !!.a zt.:s on lh;J( (;ds(" im:.l~c with cws th:J1 .. :an nlll IOllk 
tlh.'ir jill :Lnj th rLlugh'" his (')wn eyl.'s rerish l.'s~ R:.1i "ing ·him:-.:lf a littk. and 
:Ml.'tl'h i n~ his ;JrnlS hl Iho;:: tn.'e:.. he l'rj~s: "Did :.1 n \'110':. 0 \'e WlllIJS. t:\'er 
111\'1.: mn;!.! I."rul.'lIv Ihan I? YllU knnw, fm yuU h;J~· L.! hl.'l.'n "thL.! l.·l)n\'enient 
haunts of many ·Iovl.'rs. 011 yuu in Ihe ages P:..lSI. fM yllur lifl." is one uf 
1't.:1l11lfies. rt.:mcmbl..'r :.tnyon.: who has pinc::ll :.1w:.1y like thi!)~ I :.1nl ch:lrmcd 
;IIlJ I see: hUI wh:.11 I see anu "" hat chJfms mc I c:Jnnol finJ - so ereal :.1 
Jdusion holds my love. AnJ. 1(') m;Jke me gr il.' \'e Ihe mlHe. nil mi!!.hl\':" Ol'Can 
:'L.!p:lr:lleS U ,~, nn 1:1O:; road. nn mountain ra~gc s. n\.l \.·ity w:.1lb with :'llIsc.:.hui 
~atcs: hy :t Ihin h:lrril.'f of W;Lil.'r \\'l.' :!ft: k~pl ;Ipan. 
"I II: him:-.clf i" C:.l!:!1..'r h) hI." cmhr'll'I.'J, f'1lf. (lften as I Slfcl(h nw lips 
hlwards thl.!' lucent \Ao~I\' e. so oftl.'n with upturned (:ll'e he Slr!\'c:' 1\1 Iff! his 
lip" Il' nlin~ , )\IU wllulJ think h!: cllul...! 01.' hlul.'h!:J -~0 sm:lll a thing it I!) 
111;lt ~I."p;lr;lll.· s nur 1\I\'ing hl.';lrt:. . \\'hlll.'\ '!:r you :lrc. l.·ll!lll' /\Irlh hithe r! Why. 
() pl·L.'rlO:-' )'t'uth. do ytlU cluJ!: Illl.''! Or whith .... 'r Jtl ~{IU t-"l \\ hl.'l1 I ~tri\1.' III 
fl';ldl \'lIU? Surl-'J\, my rllrm :JIlJ :Il.!t.: afe no l su\.·h til:lt "lll l :-.hllulJ sh un 
thl·llI. ~tnJ Ill\.' {llt; tht.:' nymphs h:.l\ 'C Illvel.!. SlHlll.' gr\lunJ f;lr hopt.: )llU llffa 
with \'our fril.'nJI\' hhlb. anJ whcn I h;l\'c sln:l(hc:J nUl mv ;tfOlS ttl "OU. 
~tlU :.irl.'ll'h ,Yllllr:-. "Otl, Whl.'ll I ha\'\..' smikJ. YlIU smile hack: :.InJ I h;J\'t.: {;[kn 
~l.'l·1I Il':lr:.. whl.'l1 I Wl.'l'P. {Ill )'tHlr dlCI.'k:.. t-. l." hl'd,s \'tIll ;111:.""l.'r with )'llur 
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'Sl:!S,"UU,)O :llur:u ;'4 1 SI:." lI:;'US pur. ';'I'):I;)J9)0 S.,!!!.) .141 lno4gnOJ tll J'd!O :>41 
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'SP~IJrJ dl!4.'1\ 
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11:41,,,\4 SI:4 J;'l;JU(Ill'~ ';"lJ~1 U~PP!4 Sl! A4 p;,wn s uoJ .\\.YlOIS S! pur. ·.\c.\\c ;.u!d 
' ;'I,\{ll ljl!.'1\ p:tJSt:.'I\ ';'Itl S,'(IP U" "un" iU!UJOlU lUJT: .'I\ ;'141 :'IJ0pq Sl!;'IW IS0Jj JC()4 
<iI: ')l::'1l[ :tIlU:'1'ii f: ,"\Jtl.P4 \"lptu >,' 1: .'1\ ,'YIOII '''){ ;'141 sr. ' jnq :~Jl)W ('1U JC:'Iq ur.;') :'14 
'U!I:;;I: Jl:.,,\1-"' ;'IlU(l;"l;l4 "':1{ J;"I)I:.'YI ,"\ 41 u;l4 ." 'S!4 1 S;"I;"lS ;"14 'iT: UtHlS \"V ' :'IU!J p,( IOU 
U:tlj ,'V\ .,,\n4 ;'IluJnu f: Ull ;"I~T:I SJ,ll\"ll[ .'} U! f;U!~Ur.4 S;"Iur.J;] Sf: J() 'ur.J J;'I410 ;'141 
U! p:'1J 4"nu ·IJr.U U! :t1!4.'1\ 4;1n041 'SJW!PW0S S;'lIJdc sc Isnf : ,'V\(l!~ JII"::'1![;"IP 
I: Ull s:t)-jl":\ ~.lnJI" ~! I! u:tq ." I"r.:uq S!H 'spur.4 P!IIr.d l/I !.'I'\ l';r.'J~ ;'IJcq S!4 
slc;.q puc PIOj J;;Iuun !'1! If! .l!unl S!4 .(r..'V\!: s :pntJ ~4 ' S;t . \;'I!J~ snYl ;'14 ;'I1!4 ,\\ 
,, 'u ll!ssr.d .(uJr.4un XlU t;;l:tj nr:Z lr41 .\q rur. '4:)001 lOU .\'Cw I lr4," 
uo ;:IZr.3 01 :tU!W ;'14 I! AJ:lU II!IS i;tUO pnJJ 'J;"l41 S;:I,\{ll 04·" W!4 IOU IJ 'S~ p 
pur. · .... PlJ \ns (.;1· ... U no.\ tIP J."lI[l !4·YI ·lIO .. : p .... !J."I ;tt[ ·IJI:J .... p ... n41 I! ,"\I:~ ;tIl "v 
'lllPJ P.'14ntlJl ;'141 IlhlJ,I 1-1r.4 ;'llUl:.l ,l~r.lU! ;'Ittl .\[lU!P put: ·J·"\Ir..\\ ."\lll p.'WllJ 
SH:;JI "! H ·:t~nll! .")lUr. ... :"Ill! 01 U!I:;;I: p."\tun J 'Jt[~IIt:JI":!PJI':lI 'pUI: ,"\~\lJs :t!1 
,,'lJ\1:;tJ4 ,1U{1 II! J,"\IP,'l;1111 ,'I !P lJeq ... (1,\\1.',\\ 'SI II 
!'r. In4 :J .l ~tlill "" !I j4~!IU P:t·\ClI S! 11'111 ;tq P!nll.'I\ I :!,"' lllllIlJI .\IU ,).\I:;'I! IJI:q~ j 
41r.;'I[, U! J(I.I ',lUi III ~U!tfWU S! l]1I:."I(l ' ;"IUJ!JJ S,,'Ijq .(tII U! )Jt1 10:'1 lUr. I plII: :tUl 
(ll "U1r.W;'IJ ;'l.l!I .1 " ;'I:'11:J" P!J4 I: Inq :qtil'u,"IJI" .\11I ~U!JJI:S "! j,'!J;1 :"lHI PUV 
i,'tU lUI'J.! lU,'lsq r. ;"IJ;'I .'I'I. :t.WI I 11 :4" 1\:1[1 P[I1{l·\, I 'J;'l\lll I: J,l.l J,'I.\I:JJ ,1;1I1I:J1\ 
'pU\-' i (P{l4 u ..... o .( tU UI\IJJ P;'IIJr.U "'t . 1l1:;!UI I 11:41 '40 ',ltu ~ 1:;1i1'''\4 S:tll-'IJ 
,(tu j(1 ;t:'1I1I: punqr. .\J;'I.\ ;'141 :;t,\r.q I ';:IJ!,>:tr I l1:q ,\\ i.11': Ir. 011 ..... . (41\\ iyl(l .~ 
JO [,,'1('10.,, '4 I nr.4S ~(Ir I 1Ir.4S lr.4 ,\\ ·1II.'ll{1 J;'l.l.lIlS pur. "';'IulI!lI :tljl ;"IlpU!, 
41l"ltj 1 :.Ip.;; 1I .\\{l ,.(lL\ Jtl ;'1,\01 YI! .'I' uJn4 I "'~I:tlJ! 11."0 .(w .\",U ."llU:-' I 'J! II ..... ' 
'''1:4 I i:-t4 \Or. I '40 - 'S)I':.' ,(w 4·l r.;'lJ IOU (lP 4 ·"\!t[" SpJ(l." Inq 'Ip." Sl: SIUII." 
,(IU J;'I .'I\"Ur. no.( 'sd!1 P,"\.'V\S Jnll.( JO jU;1lU;1.\\llU ,'lll 1I10J) j."l"J~ns I pUI~ :Ptlll 
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Appendix two: The Case-study Method. From Bromley (1986) pgs 25-27 . 
TilE CO:-lTE:"TS A:\D ORGA~IZATlO:" OF A CASE-STUDY 
ThL' hasic ruh.'!' anu procedural ~(CrS ahm'c lkscrihc: how a cas,,;-~tuJy ::,hnulJ 
he (onuueteu hut do not spcc i fy thL' ~orts t )f illfllfll1:1linll III ht.: inl,.'luJI..'u . Thl!' 
Ircalllll'nt 'or Ihi s isslIc in Ihi .... hl 'l)k is rallll.'r difkr\.'JlI from th;1I uC~l"rihI..'J in 
Bromky ( llJ77. pro 17J-~n2). In \\bieh rl.';Jlh . 'rs will} :l rl,.' partil'u brly in-
Il'rcstcd in tilL' t ' \HlIcnl ;l!l;dy:-.is of CISL··~llIJil..'s ;Irt..' (1,:(l..'rrl.'u. 
The question or whal illflnlllatioll is h) hI.' incllldl.:J in (or L'.'\L"llIlkJ from) a 
casL'-n,:p(lrl should he :tlhWL'rl..'d within tlh.' \,:: ISI."fL'!'l)rt ihl'lf. AI till.' hl..'art (If 
thl.! casc-rL'pnrt SllllU IJ be ;1 tk:-'LriptilHl :1I1U :lll:dysis l)f thL' ·.:L'lllr:d rrllhlL'm(s) 
(h;1( (hI.! G1SI.!-S(Uuy was se t up In ueal ,,"ith. (ll~ether \,"ilh :lny r\..'L"llllllnt:nJa-
lions b:lsed on th~ ;to;lly:-.is. Th~:-.I.! (elllr.!! issues. IH1\\"(,\"L'r. arC' L"mhl.!uJI.!J in a 
wider context of rt.:l~\ ·;lnt inflH"ll1;l1illn ant..! prOL'L'uur:I! cl lll siJL' r:ltillns, 
II will he hL'ipful 10 rc \"i..:w thl.! m:lIly Sllr1S of inforll1:tlillll til:.!t L"lllnmllnly 
lind their way into clsc-rl.!rorts and person:liity lil.:scriptil)llS. Thl.!sl.! f:"Ingt! 
from ob\'ious routin t! stateml.!nts of fact. through ;10 assurtmcnt of common-
s('nse particulars ahou t the C;.lSI.!. to tt.:'chnicd mattl!rs ul a sL'il!ntitic :.Jnu 
pmfessinnal nature. Con5irJer tht! following. lis t of cltL'glnit:s hasL'd on a 
L'pnh.:nl ;lIlillysis of p\..'rson:ility dl..'scriplinlls. 
(i) The identity of the Suhjec t of the case-study: his o r her n"me, "ge, 
addrc.:ss. physic<..!1 appcar;lncc. 
(i i) The life -hi","" , pre,ent circun""lnce" and future pmspects of the 
Subj\..'L"1. indlluing. his llr hc:r rnulinL' :1 L"l i,"itil.'s. m:ltt:ri;d Pl1sscs:-.iullS, 
physiL';t1 ilL'alth. :lI1U :lOy pcrtinent im"iJL'nts nr l i rL' -t:\ " ~nlS" 
(iii) The p,ychol,)gica' altrit>lllCS ur the Suhjecl, inc'luding hi s ur her 
Ch:lraclt!ri~tic reactions, nhH i\' :ltillIlS. allitul.kS . L' .\prL':-.si\"c: hehJ\"iour, 
ahilitit.:s. mnr:t1ity. seli-im:lgc . :Inu 'Iir('-~tory'" 
(i\') The Suhject"s soc iJ llife : his or hl.' r sllci:,.d position" rtl!c and SlaIUS. soc i:.J i 
rcl:itionsilips, bmily anJ kin. friL'ntbhips" :..Ind hl~ al!il.'s" 
(\') The rl.'btion:-.hips ht.:tWL'L'n thL' SUhjL'ct anu the IIl\"estigatn r(s) c<..! rrying 
out t hL' L':ISL'-s!lIdy" 
(,·i) The ,":dul.: judgments \11" the SUhj L' ct'S Ilhlr:1is in IL'rms of the ethical 
st; llltbrds gtwL'rning. tht:! C:I S L'- ~ tudy" 
In \'j(,w of the bct th:1t \\t.: :.Jre pursuing :1 tL'chnic~d (sciL'ntitic Jnd 
pnlfcssion:il) ;lpprl):H.:h to Ihe rsy<:hulug icd ~tuJy (If indi,"iuu;!l ca~es. it might 
~L'L'11\ out (If plal."C' 1\) rL'comm!.!nu :I IlhH:il ju ugll1L'nt :IS :111 ekmc:nt in ;.\ 
case- rL'pllrt . ThL' rL'a~llJ1S fo r inC\uuing it ~Ire ;1:-. rl )lIow~ . Fir~t, nll)(:.J1 iltlit uut! s 
anu jtHJgmellls ;Ire \'irtually un:I\"OilLtblt.' whL'1l ; l s~L'~~ing pCl1pk: so one:: may 
as wl.'ll rr..:cognizc thL' LIL't and :-.1:.Jte (ln~"s ;lttituJL' ~:xrliL'itly (othL',,\·i:-.e it might 
affL'ct the way nnt.:' h:lndlcs a CISC \\ itlhlUt lllle"S ilL'ill,:! :twarL' of the fact)" 
Second, morlil judgments c<..!n he justified hy ration;.!1 argulllell1 ami rcft.!n:nce 
to empiric~d datu-sec Toulmin {'{ 0 / . ( llJ7~. rp . 3{)t) - "13 / ). anu Ch:lptL'rs t) and 
II of the presL'nt hOOK. OnL' c;ln dL'term inc the L'xtenl \0 whit"1l a pt.:rslln's 
conduc t matches ur to;'10 ;Igrceu mor:"d cudc . i.e" th\..' colJectivc moral cout.! of 
the cummunity of inte rc :-.t r~r rL'sc ntcd hy th~ pl.'rson{s) Glrrying out the 
case-study. Thiru. in many in:-'I~trlce::-. it is thL' Subjcct\ failurL' In n1;Jteil ur to 
the mo ral code of the community to wili t,:h hl' or she hl.'lllnp that givr.:~ risc to 
the need for Ihe case -study: hL'nce it i ~ e:-'~ L'nli; " thaI IhL' (' thica l i::-.ues invol\'L'J 
be maue ciL':Jr. Fourth, the mnrJI ;Jtlitude 01 the l"(lI11ll1unity 10 which the.: 
Suhjec t helnng s is .10 import:..tnt Llctor go\'crning 11lL' sLlci:d L'1l\'irulllllcnt \t) 
which the Suhject h;l~ to <.Idjust: thL'rdlHl' it mu~t hL' t;I~L'1l into ;ICClll1llt ill lhc 
anu lysis and in :.lny rccommcmhtio n:-. :lhOli lthL' cour:-.\..' o f action 10 hl.' 1:1~l.'1l in 
the intcrcsb of ;.til cnnn:rnccJ. 
In auJition to tht: ~orl s of c~ltq!.(} ri es of in for mation li\tl.'u ;i!)O\,L' , ;J 
case· report ~hnuld con tai n the.: foillming lIL'm~" 
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(vii) A statement of the cent,a l problem(s) under investigation gIVing tile 
purpose( s) and terms of rderenee of the case-study together "'itll its 
autho rsh ip and authority. 
(viii) A detailed accoun t of the evidence and arguments describing and 
analysing the issues in the case, bearing in mind its pll rposc(s) :lnd terms 
of reference. 
(ix) Where appropriate. a detai led techn ical (scicntiHc and professional) 
account of any centfal issues in the case which (;.111 outsi ue the normal 
range of commonsense <lnu ordinary languag.e (o r can he tlc:dt with 
more effectively in technical terms) . 
(x) A statemen t of th e finJings in the case, i.e. conclusions or solutiuns . 
justifying the associate d decis ions and recommendations. 
If th e case·rcport is lengthy. it is i.Id visahlc 10 incorporate rem inders . 
reviews, and summa ries. as follows: 
(xi) A review of th e evidence and arguments dealing \vith the central issues 
in the case in re b.tion to the conclusions reached :,md recommend at ions 
mode. 
(xii) A summary of the methods used in carrying out the case ·study: a 
reminde r about the contex t of the case (the circumst<lnces surrounding 
it, the conditions which g<l\,c rise to it, thl! factors affecting its future); 
any [e ~t!f\·Jtions . implicJtions . o r comments deemed ;.lppropriate in 
feporting amI publicising the case. 
<. 
A psychological case-study carried out in a scic nt itic and professional way 
can be oresented OS" technical report-see Cooper (1%4) and T;lIknt (IY~.1) . 
Such a report contains three funher items. 
(xiii) A title and:ll1 ah~tr:lL'I: thl.! ab~tr:l(1 Slhl1dJ g.i\'~ simplY:l hriefsta teme nt 
llj" wh:lt til!..' !..·;I,!..· ·"tlldy is ahout. 
(xi\') SU1l111Ll ry :IIHI L"llJld ll..;i{)n~: :1 brit..·f :O: !:LtL'l1h,'nl llf Ill!..' prnhkl1l. the 
Illl'thl)US l1:-'I..'J 10 in\'est;gatc thl' prohkm. Ihl.! main lin J ings. L'llnclu-
sil)[1s . rl·coOlIll CIH.blions. :Inu fllfl!l'a :O:ls. 
(xv) Rl! fc r!..'l1cl·S. sn urec:,. ilCknl)\~ ' kug(,lllcnts. 
I emphasiz!..· that th e re is no sl:l!1d:lr(..i fllrrn:lI fl)T psyl'l llliog il..'<.ll cast:-sludics. 
Thc\' van' in knt!th. L'llrllent. purpllsc.:. and org;lniz:ltilln. C(lOs('4u~n(ly. the 
il1fo~m:tti'on I1c('ll nlll n)\"CT all nf the lirst lell catL'gl) r;I..'S lisled llhl)\·c'. If the 
casc-report is hrid. nr if SP IllL' ilSP':L'IS nf Ih!..' casL'·r(,.'pnrt ;lrL' hrid. thcn the-
relL'vant infnrllliitilln is simply ; 1:-.~im iJat!..· J h) rhe Il HlS t l't )Il\'l:'l1iL' 111 Gllt:gllfy. 
The aim i:-. 10 prq1;HL' a CUIll"bL'. \\"l'IJ ·()r~ ;ll1iLL'J ;ILT(llIlll ()f til!..' l'llSe \\h ie h ' 
rl'prl'SL'llh till' f;ll'b \\1.."11 ilnd j" <IS l'tlillprclll..'Il:-.ihlL' :lnJ ;IS u:-,,:fu l ;IS plhsible. 
I 
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